Narrative:

This event occurred on the second segment of a first officer's IOE trip. The flight departed ZZZ on a turn and made a normal takeoff enroute to ZZZ1. Climbing on the SID with the autopilot engaged; ZZZ departure handed us off to center to continue our climb. Nearly immediately after checking in; both pilots heard one loud bang and a series of smaller pops; and I felt the aircraft begin to yaw and looked at the EICAS. The number 2 engine had immediately rolled back; and a cursory glance showed what I remember to be single digit N2 indications within 3 seconds; I then disconnected the autopilot. Not realizing what the sound was caused by; and unsure if there was an uncontained failure at this point; I elected to run the engine fire/severe damage memory items; and requested the first officer (first officer) read the qrc to verify. We secured the number 2 engine with the memory items and as the first officer opened the QRH. I informed ATC we had an engine failure; requested priority handling and reported fuel/souls onboard. I requested a block altitude of 6;000-8;000 feet and advised we would need a minute to run checklists before making the turn back towards the field.while the first officer was still flipping through the QRH; I called the flight attendant (flight attendant) and advised her what had happened. She said everyone in the back also heard the very loud noise and looked a little startled. I asked if she could see any haze or smoke in the cabin; or hear any other abnormal loud noises (thinking of possible uncontained failure/engine parts penetrating fuselage). She reported that there was nothing abnormal at this time. I let her know that we would be returning to ZZZ and I would make a PA. I came back to check on the first officer and he was still thumbing through the QRH. At this point with the information from the flight attendant; and getting over the initial startle factor; but with a lack of EICAS messages; I decided that we probably did not have uncontained failure and elected to move from severe damage to engine 2 out.as he began to move to that checklist I made my initial PA to the passengers; informing them that we had experienced a mechanical issue and would unfortunately be returning to ZZZ shortly; and I would speak with them once again before landing. After returning my attention to the first officer; he had found the engine 2 out checklist in the QRH. At this point with the aircraft trimmed out I felt comfortable attempting to engage the autopilot; which I did while we devoted our attention to the checklist. I also briefly considered exchanging controls; but given that this first officer had around 20 hrs in transport category aircraft I was not inclined to be teaching energy management while being heads down in a book while single engine. I remained PF (pilot flying) and pulled up the QRH on my efb to put the text in my scan while flying the aircraft to ensure items were being accomplished correctly and in proper sequence. We did not attempt to restart the engine; given its unknown condition that would cause such a quick rollback; and if it had been a compressor stall; I did not want to lose it again at a lower altitude while making thrust inputs on the approach. At this point we began our turn back towards the airport; and I sent dispatch a quick ACARS message informing them of our failure. I had the first officer load the ILS xx into ZZZ and checked his performance computations. We would be making an overweight landing; and the QRH instructed us to multiply flaps 45 non-factored distance by 1.48. Unfortunately; the non-factored tables on a dry runway top out at 45;000 lb. We interpolated the dry runway landing distance and justified that even with compacted snow (for which we did have 47;000 lb non-factored landing distance) we would have had adequate runway length available for landing. Flight ops had previously advised pilots not to use the QRH factor on ACARS [for weight and balance calculations]; but I elected to send for data with the flaps 45 1.48 factor just to see what it came back with. After making 3 interpolations on landing distance (dry non-factored; compacted snow table; ACARS); and with prior experience with the aircraft; I came to the conclusion that with all these factors in agreement that we would be able to make a safe landing with plenty of runway to spare. The first officer agreed that it would not be an issue.we continued with him briefing me on the approach; which was still fresh in our minds since it was the same approach we used around an hour ago. We then moved to a quick review for a single engine landing; and would read through the checklist again as each phase of flight was accomplished. I made one last call to the flight attendant before landing for the final brief; she confirmed the cabin was secure after I advised her it would be a normal landing; and I would not be issuing a brace command. She did indicate that there was a 'weird smell.' I asked her if she could see any haze or smoke in the air through the cabin lighting. She still indicated no. I asked my first officer if he had smelled anything; which he claimed he did not. I told her to please call if whatever she smelled got worse; or if there was any smoke or other potent fumes that presented themselves as we neared the airport. As we were less than 10 minutes out from landing; and below 4;000 feet; out of an abundance of caution I turned off the packs and slowly manually depressurized the cabin. I do not know if the engine may have puked something into the bleed ducts during its failure that may have caused whatever the flight attendant smelled; but I preferred to remove any potential contaminants from the air if the flight attendant had suspected something was amiss. This was more of a move to ensure whatever may or may not have been back there did not once again become an issue on a single engine approach. Approach took our handoff from center and began vectoring us for the ILS xx. I left the comms loop to make one last PA to the passengers informing them we would be on the ground in less than 10 minutes; and apologized for the inconvenience. After returning to the loop; and having previously run through single engine landing checklist in its entirety to familiarize ourselves with the process; I asked the first officer to please consult the overweight landing checklist on the next page to see if there was anything worth considering. We agreed that we would not be utilizing this procedure; since it was requesting flaps 45 and the APU fuel shutoff pushed in; which would deny us of a bleed source and a generator in the unlikely event of the other engine failing. We would do our best to keep the descent rate within limits and 'touch smoothly the runway surface' (sic). I requested crash fire/rescue services to inspect the aircraft after landing to ensure it was safe to continue to the gate; and that airport ops perform a runway sweep to see if we had left any debris on departure. Approach told us the sweep was completed and crash fire rescue equipment standing by. We were cleared for the approach; and I disconnected the autopilot during localizer capture in night VMC conditions to get a feel for the aircraft as we decelerated and began configuring. After switching to the tower frequency; they cleared us to land and advised us crash fire rescue equipment was standing by for a post landing inspection. We configured on schedule; completed the checklist; and had a normal landing at the computed vref; touching down on the 1;000 feet markers and deploying max reverse on the remaining engine.after slowing to 80 knots; I determined that we still had more than enough runway remaining for just brakes; and stowed the reverser by 60 knots. We cleared the runway to the right at taxiway [1]; noting our brake temperatures in the top of the green before setting the parking brake for the inspection. Tower switched us to the ground frequency where we communicated with crash fire rescue equipment; who did an exterior inspection and found nothing of note. At this point; I was communicating with ground/crash fire rescue equipment and asked the first officer to please contact the station andrequest our gate assignment. The first officer came back to the ground frequency; and I made a brief PA to the passengers that the ground personnel were making a precautionary inspection and that we would be proceeding to the gate shortly. Crash fire rescue equipment cleared the aircraft and we continued a normal taxi to gate. The passengers deplaned normally with no adverse reactions recognized in the process. This was confirmed by a non-revenue commuting pilot in the cabin. I spoke with the duty manager during the deplaning process and gave him a brief rundown of the situation. Both pilots then exited the aircraft to conduct the post flight inspection; neither of us could determine any external faults on the engine. Maintenance control was called; a discrepancy entered into the logbook; and the aircraft secured. The crew retired to the hotel and was deadheaded back to base the next day. Dry non-factored landing distance numbers would have saved us a minute or two of unnecessary discussion. Maybe a potential fume checklist; since there is a gray area between doing nothing and a smoke evacuation procedure. That being said; despite the relatively inexperienced crew everyone performed well and got our aircraft and passengers back safely on the ground; with almost no disruption. A non-revenue commuting pilot in the back confirmed the general demeanor of the passengers as 'inconvenienced.' he complimented the flight attendant and crew on their comportment; as everyone was calm for the entire ordeal. Very proud of my crew's performance and a relatively inconsequential outcome to an aircraft emergency; despite the two crew members lack of experience.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-145 Captain reported a return to departure airport due to a Number 2 engine failure.

Narrative: This event occurred on the second segment of a First Officer's IOE trip. The flight departed ZZZ on a turn and made a normal takeoff enroute to ZZZ1. Climbing on the SID with the autopilot engaged; ZZZ departure handed us off to Center to continue our climb. Nearly immediately after checking in; both pilots heard one loud bang and a series of smaller pops; and I felt the aircraft begin to yaw and looked at the EICAS. The number 2 engine had immediately rolled back; and a cursory glance showed what I remember to be single digit N2 indications within 3 seconds; I then disconnected the autopilot. Not realizing what the sound was caused by; and unsure if there was an uncontained failure at this point; I elected to run the engine fire/severe damage memory items; and requested the FO (First Officer) read the QRC to verify. We secured the number 2 engine with the memory items and as the FO opened the QRH. I informed ATC we had an engine failure; requested priority handling and reported fuel/souls onboard. I requested a block altitude of 6;000-8;000 feet and advised we would need a minute to run checklists before making the turn back towards the field.While the FO was still flipping through the QRH; I called the FA (Flight Attendant) and advised her what had happened. She said everyone in the back also heard the very loud noise and looked a little startled. I asked if she could see any haze or smoke in the cabin; or hear any other abnormal loud noises (thinking of possible uncontained failure/engine parts penetrating fuselage). She reported that there was nothing abnormal at this time. I let her know that we would be returning to ZZZ and I would make a PA. I came back to check on the FO and he was still thumbing through the QRH. At this point with the information from the Flight Attendant; and getting over the initial startle factor; but with a lack of EICAS messages; I decided that we probably did not have uncontained failure and elected to move from severe damage to ENG 2 OUT.As he began to move to that checklist I made my initial PA to the passengers; informing them that we had experienced a mechanical issue and would unfortunately be returning to ZZZ shortly; and I would speak with them once again before landing. After returning my attention to the FO; he had found the ENG 2 OUT checklist in the QRH. At this point with the aircraft trimmed out I felt comfortable attempting to engage the autopilot; which I did while we devoted our attention to the checklist. I also briefly considered exchanging controls; but given that this FO had around 20 hrs in transport category aircraft I was not inclined to be teaching energy management while being heads down in a book while single engine. I remained PF (Pilot Flying) and pulled up the QRH on my EFB to put the text in my scan while flying the aircraft to ensure items were being accomplished correctly and in proper sequence. We did not attempt to restart the engine; given its unknown condition that would cause such a quick rollback; and if it had been a compressor stall; I did not want to lose it again at a lower altitude while making thrust inputs on the approach. At this point we began our turn back towards the airport; and I sent dispatch a quick ACARS message informing them of our failure. I had the FO load the ILS XX into ZZZ and checked his performance computations. We would be making an overweight landing; and the QRH instructed us to multiply Flaps 45 non-factored distance by 1.48. Unfortunately; the non-factored tables on a dry runway top out at 45;000 lb. We interpolated the dry runway landing distance and justified that even with compacted snow (for which we did have 47;000 lb non-factored landing distance) we would have had adequate runway length available for landing. Flight ops had previously advised pilots not to use the QRH factor on ACARS [for weight and balance calculations]; but I elected to send for data with the flaps 45 1.48 factor just to see what it came back with. After making 3 interpolations on landing distance (dry non-factored; compacted snow table; ACARS); and with prior experience with the aircraft; I came to the conclusion that with all these factors in agreement that we would be able to make a safe landing with plenty of runway to spare. The First Officer agreed that it would not be an issue.We continued with him briefing me on the approach; which was still fresh in our minds since it was the same approach we used around an hour ago. We then moved to a quick review for a single engine landing; and would read through the checklist again as each phase of flight was accomplished. I made one last call to the FA before landing for the final brief; she confirmed the cabin was secure after I advised her it would be a normal landing; and I would not be issuing a brace command. She did indicate that there was a 'weird smell.' I asked her if she could see any haze or smoke in the air through the cabin lighting. She still indicated no. I asked my First Officer if he had smelled anything; which he claimed he did not. I told her to please call if whatever she smelled got worse; or if there was any smoke or other potent fumes that presented themselves as we neared the airport. As we were less than 10 minutes out from landing; and below 4;000 feet; out of an abundance of caution I turned off the PACKs and slowly manually depressurized the cabin. I do not know if the engine may have puked something into the bleed ducts during its failure that may have caused whatever the FA smelled; but I preferred to remove any potential contaminants from the air if the FA had suspected something was amiss. This was more of a move to ensure whatever may or may not have been back there did not once again become an issue on a single engine approach. Approach took our handoff from Center and began vectoring us for the ILS XX. I left the comms loop to make one last PA to the passengers informing them we would be on the ground in less than 10 minutes; and apologized for the inconvenience. After returning to the loop; and having previously run through single engine landing checklist in its entirety to familiarize ourselves with the process; I asked the FO to please consult the overweight landing checklist on the next page to see if there was anything worth considering. We agreed that we would not be utilizing this procedure; since it was requesting flaps 45 and the APU fuel shutoff pushed in; which would deny us of a bleed source and a generator in the unlikely event of the other engine failing. We would do our best to keep the descent rate within limits and 'touch smoothly the runway surface' (sic). I requested crash fire/rescue services to inspect the aircraft after landing to ensure it was safe to continue to the gate; and that airport ops perform a runway sweep to see if we had left any debris on departure. Approach told us the sweep was completed and CFR standing by. We were cleared for the approach; and I disconnected the autopilot during localizer capture in night VMC conditions to get a feel for the aircraft as we decelerated and began configuring. After switching to the tower frequency; they cleared us to land and advised us CFR was standing by for a post landing inspection. We configured on schedule; completed the checklist; and had a normal landing at the computed Vref; touching down on the 1;000 feet markers and deploying max reverse on the remaining engine.After slowing to 80 knots; I determined that we still had more than enough runway remaining for just brakes; and stowed the reverser by 60 knots. We cleared the runway to the right at taxiway [1]; noting our brake temperatures in the top of the green before setting the parking brake for the inspection. Tower switched us to the ground frequency where we communicated with CFR; who did an exterior inspection and found nothing of note. At this point; I was communicating with ground/CFR and asked the FO to please contact the station andrequest our gate assignment. The FO came back to the ground frequency; and I made a brief PA to the passengers that the ground personnel were making a precautionary inspection and that we would be proceeding to the gate shortly. CFR cleared the aircraft and we continued a normal taxi to gate. The passengers deplaned normally with no adverse reactions recognized in the process. This was confirmed by a non-revenue commuting pilot in the cabin. I spoke with the duty manager during the deplaning process and gave him a brief rundown of the situation. Both pilots then exited the aircraft to conduct the post flight inspection; neither of us could determine any external faults on the engine. Maintenance control was called; a discrepancy entered into the logbook; and the aircraft secured. The crew retired to the hotel and was deadheaded back to base the next day. Dry non-factored landing distance numbers would have saved us a minute or two of unnecessary discussion. Maybe a potential fume checklist; since there is a gray area between doing nothing and a smoke evacuation procedure. That being said; despite the relatively inexperienced crew everyone performed well and got our aircraft and passengers back safely on the ground; with almost no disruption. A non-revenue commuting pilot in the back confirmed the general demeanor of the passengers as 'inconvenienced.' He complimented the FA and crew on their comportment; as everyone was calm for the entire ordeal. Very proud of my crew's performance and a relatively inconsequential outcome to an aircraft emergency; despite the two crew members lack of experience.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.