Narrative:

We departed runway xx on runway heading climbing to 4;000 ft. We were given a turn south staying at 4;000 ft. Shortly after turn; we were given a climb to 5;000 ft. I (pilot flying) initiated a climb at 1;000 ft./min and just prior to leveling; we were instructed to climb to 16;000 ft. As I advanced the thrust levers to the detent; the number 2 engine made an unusual sound and failed prior to reaching the detent. I took the autopilot off; leveled the aircraft at 5;000 ft; and started to diagnose the problem. I saw that everything was rolling back on the EICAS on the #2 side. I told the first officer (pilot monitoring) to notify ATC we would be staying at 5;000 ft. To diagnose an issue and we would get back to them. After further investigation on both our ends; there was nothing pointing us toward neither an engine fire nor severe damage other than the unusual sound made when it shutdown. I verbalized the memory items and the first officer accomplished them. Shortly after this; the first officer [advised ATC] requesting vectors back to ZZZ with all information needed from ATC. The first officer and I both concluded the engine failure/precautionary engine shutdown procedure was appropriate for what was displayed on the instruments. We ran all appropriate QRH checklists called for this by this procedure to prepare us for landing to include starting the APU and running packs off APU as we were not in any icing conditions. The most favorable runway for the winds was runway xyr which we set up for; briefed; and were being vectored to land. I informed dispatch our plans and received an amendment for the paperwork as well as informed the flight attendant of all NTSB requirements. I instructed the flight attendant to inform paxs our status and we were returning to ZZZ and due to the winds; when to brace prior to landing (I instructed the flight attendant I will ding her 1-2 minutes prior to ldg and that will be the signal for brace). After all QRH checklists were complete and one delay vector received to obtain landing data needed; we shot the ILS xyr approach. Due to the gusty winds; I added 5 kts. To approach speeds. We broke out of the clouds at 800 ft. And made an incredibly smooth touchdown on landing. We took one of the high speeds and stopped. We spoke to fire services and requested they inspect our engine prior to returning to the gate. They informed us there was a small leak of some kind which caused no concern on their or our minds. Shortly after; we returned to the gate and continued our very delayed flight to crp.there are many threats associated with an engine failure. We used good CRM; planning; use of QRH checklists; and all available resources to try and mitigate as many threats as possible to ensure a safe landing. I preface this with my crew did an outstanding job in all areas and flight attendant did her job extremely well and was very cool; calm; and collected. I could not have asked for a better flight attendant with this malfunction. I am unaware of how the flight attendants are trained in these situations and what is ingrained in them when they go through training. I briefed what I expected from her in regards to the brace signal and assumed it had been accomplished upon landing. After our day of flying was complete and I had a chance to finally speak with her about everything in more detail; I discovered she did not go through her brace calls with paxs. Although not a big deal given the outcome; it made me question what she expected from us. She informed me that if a brace signal is wanted; we would need to call it over the PA. I do not know if it was a miscommunication on my end or a misunderstanding on her end. Regardless; law of primacy prevails and if it is ingrained in the fas that 'brace; brace' is expected from the cockpit; it needs to be explained that it is an 'unless briefed otherwise' item as our hands can be full. All this to say; a better understanding of what the fas are doing during [situations] likethese helps us prepare better. Again; she did an incredible job!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ERJ Captain reported an engine failure during climb that resulted in a diversion to the departure airport.

Narrative: We departed Runway XX on Runway heading climbing to 4;000 ft. We were given a turn south staying at 4;000 ft. Shortly after turn; we were given a climb to 5;000 ft. I (Pilot Flying) initiated a climb at 1;000 ft./min and just prior to leveling; we were instructed to climb to 16;000 ft. As I advanced the thrust levers to the detent; the number 2 engine made an unusual sound and failed prior to reaching the detent. I took the autopilot off; leveled the aircraft at 5;000 ft; and started to diagnose the problem. I saw that everything was rolling back on the EICAS on the #2 side. I told the First Officer (Pilot Monitoring) to notify ATC we would be staying at 5;000 ft. to diagnose an issue and we would get back to them. After further investigation on both our ends; there was nothing pointing us toward neither an engine fire nor severe damage other than the unusual sound made when it shutdown. I verbalized the memory items and the First Officer accomplished them. Shortly after this; the First Officer [advised ATC] requesting vectors back to ZZZ with all information needed from ATC. The First Officer and I both concluded the engine failure/precautionary engine shutdown procedure was appropriate for what was displayed on the instruments. We ran all appropriate QRH checklists called for this by this procedure to prepare us for landing to include starting the APU and running PACKS off APU as we were not in any icing conditions. The most favorable Runway for the winds was Runway XYR which we set up for; briefed; and were being vectored to land. I informed dispatch our plans and received an amendment for the paperwork as well as informed the Flight Attendant of all NTSB requirements. I instructed the Flight Attendant to inform PAXs our status and we were returning to ZZZ and due to the winds; when to brace prior to landing (I instructed the Flight Attendant I will ding her 1-2 minutes prior to LDG and that will be the signal for brace). After all QRH checklists were complete and one delay vector received to obtain landing data needed; we shot the ILS XYR approach. Due to the gusty winds; I added 5 kts. to approach speeds. We broke out of the clouds at 800 ft. and made an incredibly smooth touchdown on landing. We took one of the high speeds and stopped. We spoke to fire services and requested they inspect our engine prior to returning to the gate. They informed us there was a small leak of some kind which caused no concern on their or our minds. Shortly after; we returned to the gate and continued our very delayed flight to CRP.There are many threats associated with an engine failure. We used good CRM; planning; use of QRH checklists; and all available resources to try and mitigate as many threats as possible to ensure a safe landing. I preface this with my crew did an outstanding job in all areas and FA did her job extremely well and was very cool; calm; and collected. I could not have asked for a better Flight Attendant with this malfunction. I am unaware of how the Flight Attendants are trained in these situations and what is ingrained in them when they go through training. I briefed what I expected from her in regards to the brace signal and assumed it had been accomplished upon landing. After our day of flying was complete and I had a chance to finally speak with her about everything in more detail; I discovered she did not go through her brace calls with PAXs. Although not a big deal given the outcome; it made me question what she expected from us. She informed me that if a brace signal is wanted; we would need to call it over the PA. I do not know if it was a miscommunication on my end or a misunderstanding on her end. Regardless; law of primacy prevails and if it is ingrained in the FAs that 'BRACE; BRACE' is expected from the cockpit; it needs to be explained that it is an 'unless briefed otherwise' item as our hands can be full. All this to say; a better understanding of what the FAs are doing during [situations] likethese helps us prepare better. Again; she did an incredible job!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.