Narrative:

I was the pm (pilot monitoring) and my first officer (first officer) was the PF (pilot flying). On taxi out; after being deiced; we received an intermittent left jet ovht fail caution message. The message went away as quickly as it showed up on ED1. We complied with the QRH and considered it a transient anomaly and continued with the flight. On climb out; we received several more of the left jet ovht fail caution messages. Once again the messages went away as soon as they appeared. As we continued the climb out of 10;000 to 12;000 ft.; we received an left jetpipe ovht warning message; which went away as quickly as it showed up on ED1. As a precaution; we ran the QRH for the warning message and reduced the thrust enough to maintain the climb and to reduce the risk of getting another warning message. We continued our climb to FL270 and still had a few recurring left jet ovht fail caution and left jetpipe ovht warning messages; but not as frequently as we had before we reduced the thrust on the engines.when we reached the cruise phase of the flight; we decided to slow the aircraft down to 250 kts. To reduce the itt on the engines (around 667 C). Once the thrust levers were pulled back all intermittent indications left jetpipe ovht warning messages stopped. We were then given a clearance to descend to FL240 and; upon reaching that altitude; we once again received an left jetpipe ovht warning message; but this time it stayed on. I noticed that my first officer had added power to maintain airspeed (around 84% N1) and this took the itts above 700 C. I instructed my first officer to reduce the thrust on the left engine and he said that it was at idle.the left jetpipe ovht warning message persisted and I was very concerned that the jetpipe of the left engine was overheating when the itt was above 700 C. We ran the QRH again and it led us to make the decision to shut the engine down. I decided that shutting the left engine was the safest thing to do because of the indications we saw when the thrust on the left engine was increased for normal flight. The QRH specifically states to complete 'in flight engine shutdown / engine failure' if the left jetpipe ovht warning message persists.we completed the in flight engine shutdown followed by the single engine approach and landing checklist. I then notified ATC of the nature of the problem; souls on board; the amount of fuel remaining and that we would like [airport rescue and fire fighting] to stand by. I gave my flight attendant (flight attendant) a brief and told him that we had a yellow emergency and to expect a normal landing and no evacuation.we were given direct [to the airport] where we made a visual approach to landing without incident. I took the controls about 10 miles out to make the landing. After clearing the runway; we requested [airport rescue and fire fighting] to inspect the left engine and all indications came back normal from their visual and instrument observations. We continued to the gate; deplaned the aircraft and made the necessary write-up.I want to commend my first officer for remaining calm and doing an excellent job in this situation. He has a great attitude; works very hard; and is eager to learn.I believe excessive deicing fluid contaminated the left jet pipe loops. This contamination generated an left jet ovht fail caution message that was very intermittent and was considered a transient anomaly.on climb out; we had a left jetpipe ovht warning message that was thought to be erroneous due to the brevity of the EICAS message. We did run the QRH and reduced the thrust enough to slow the frequency of the EICAS warnings.in the cruise phase of flight we decided to slow the aircraft to 250 kts. As a precaution to keep the itt down on the left engine. This action quieted the caution and warning messages for the duration of the cruise phase of flight. My thinking was if we kept the itt down on the left engine we could continue the flight safely on both engines and address the maintenance concerns on the ground.we were given an initial descent down to FL240 and upon reaching that altitude we received a continuous left jetpipe ovht warning message. I initially thought the EICAS message would go away but this time it stayed on and seemed to come on above 700 C. My concern at that point was that something was very wrong with the engine to generate a continuous ovht warning message every time the itt on that engine was above 700 C. This new information along with the guidance of the QRH influenced my decision to shut down the left engine in flight.in my judgment; the safest course of action was to shut the engine down at altitude and continue to the destination single engine where we could plan on and execute a stable approach to landing at the destination airport. I wanted to reduce the risk of having an in flight fire or dealing with multiple threats of fire; go around; and possible engine loss close to the ground. None of our decisions were rushed and were made in a controlled and calculated effort that enhanced safety; managed the threat; and kept the aircraft from entering into an undesirable aircraft state.I have nothing to add at this time until the root cause is identified.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-200 flight crew reported landing safely after shutting down the left engine for high ITT. Flight crew stated the overheat was possibly related to de-ice procedures at departure airport.

Narrative: I was the PM (Pilot Monitoring) and my FO (First Officer) was the PF (Pilot Flying). On taxi out; after being deiced; we received an intermittent L JET OVHT FAIL caution message. The message went away as quickly as it showed up on ED1. We complied with the QRH and considered it a transient anomaly and continued with the flight. On climb out; we received several more of the L JET OVHT FAIL caution messages. Once again the messages went away as soon as they appeared. As we continued the climb out of 10;000 to 12;000 ft.; we received an L JETPIPE OVHT warning message; which went away as quickly as it showed up on ED1. As a precaution; we ran the QRH for the warning message and reduced the thrust enough to maintain the climb and to reduce the risk of getting another warning message. We continued our climb to FL270 and still had a few recurring L JET OVHT FAIL caution and L JETPIPE OVHT warning messages; but not as frequently as we had before we reduced the thrust on the engines.When we reached the cruise phase of the flight; we decided to slow the aircraft down to 250 kts. to reduce the ITT on the engines (around 667 C). Once the thrust levers were pulled back all intermittent indications L JETPIPE OVHT warning messages stopped. We were then given a clearance to descend to FL240 and; upon reaching that altitude; we once again received an L JETPIPE OVHT warning message; but this time it stayed on. I noticed that my FO had added power to maintain airspeed (around 84% N1) and this took the ITTs above 700 C. I instructed my FO to reduce the thrust on the left engine and he said that it was at idle.The L JETPIPE OVHT warning message persisted and I was very concerned that the JETPIPE of the left engine was overheating when the ITT was above 700 C. We ran the QRH again and it led us to make the decision to shut the engine down. I decided that shutting the left engine was the safest thing to do because of the indications we saw when the thrust on the L engine was increased for normal flight. The QRH specifically states to Complete 'In Flight Engine Shutdown / Engine Failure' if the L JETPIPE OVHT warning message persists.We completed the In Flight Engine Shutdown followed by the Single Engine Approach and Landing checklist. I then notified ATC of the nature of the problem; souls on board; the amount of fuel remaining and that we would like [airport rescue and fire fighting] to stand by. I gave my FA (Flight Attendant) a brief and told him that we had a Yellow Emergency and to expect a normal landing and no evacuation.We were given direct [to the airport] where we made a visual approach to landing without incident. I took the controls about 10 miles out to make the landing. After clearing the runway; we requested [airport rescue and fire fighting] to inspect the left engine and all indications came back normal from their visual and instrument observations. We continued to the gate; deplaned the aircraft and made the necessary write-up.I want to commend my First Officer for remaining calm and doing an excellent job in this situation. He has a great attitude; works very hard; and is eager to learn.I believe excessive deicing fluid contaminated the L Jet Pipe loops. This contamination generated an L JET OVHT FAIL Caution Message that was very intermittent and was considered a transient anomaly.On climb out; we had a L JETPIPE OVHT Warning message that was thought to be erroneous due to the brevity of the EICAS message. We did run the QRH and reduced the thrust enough to slow the frequency of the EICAS warnings.In the cruise phase of flight we decided to slow the aircraft to 250 kts. as a precaution to keep the ITT down on the left engine. This action quieted the Caution and Warning messages for the duration of the cruise phase of flight. My thinking was if we kept the ITT down on the left engine we could continue the flight safely on both engines and address the maintenance concerns on the ground.We were given an initial descent down to FL240 and upon reaching that altitude we received a continuous L JETPIPE OVHT Warning message. I initially thought the EICAS message would go away but this time it stayed on and seemed to come on above 700 C. My concern at that point was that something was very wrong with the engine to generate a continuous OVHT Warning message every time the ITT on that engine was above 700 C. This new information along with the guidance of the QRH influenced my decision to shut down the left engine in flight.In my judgment; the safest course of action was to shut the engine down at altitude and continue to the destination single engine where we could plan on and execute a stable approach to landing at the destination airport. I wanted to reduce the risk of having an in flight fire or dealing with multiple threats of fire; go around; and possible engine loss close to the ground. None of our decisions were rushed and were made in a controlled and calculated effort that enhanced safety; managed the threat; and kept the aircraft from entering into an undesirable aircraft state.I have nothing to add at this time until the root cause is identified.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.