Narrative:

We departed the maintenance hangar in on a reposition flight under IFR conditions with light snow falling. We taxied to the deice pad and had them spray us with type 1 and 4 full body. After deice; we completed the ice test a with no defects or abnormal messages. It was the first flight for this aircraft; as well as being prudent when taking an aircraft from maintenance. We took off shortly after with the aircraft configured for icing conditions. The takeoff was normal and the climb out was normal. As the first officer (another ca (captain)) was finishing his after-takeoff flow and checklist; we were already in icing conditions and were presented with wing and stab anti ice fail and subsequently ice cond anti-ice inoperative. I ensured that he had put the ice override switch back to the automatic position; which he had done successfully. We got out the QRH and the first officer began reading it. We followed the guidance which ended up not solving our issue. Now climbing through 8000 ft. We collectively decided that continuing would not be prudent since we did not know how much ice the aircraft had accumulated or how much more we may encounter. We asked TRACON for a heading and altitude for a return to the airport. They gave us a right turn for a downwind and to descend to 5000 ft. Upon reaching 5000 ft. (Mod ice reported below 5000 ft.) we noticed that the icing was worse than it had been; so we asked for 6000 ft. And were granted it immediately; where we spent the majority of the downwind leg. We set up for the ILS and briefed the approach quickly knowing the aircraft was picking up ice. We also notified dispatch. ATC cleared us for the approach and I elected to hand fly to see how the aircraft felt. From the base turn it was apparent that the ice was affecting the flight controls adversely and more power was required.at this time the first officer and I both agreed [advising ATC] would be prudent to ensure we got on the ground with priority. We completed the ILS approach and landed safely. During the approach larger than normal control movements were required to keep the aircraft stable in moderate turbulence. We guessed it was because the ailerons were being affected by the ice on the leading edge disturbing the airflow. We taxied the aircraft back to the hangar with no further issues in the flight. After we had parked the aircraft and worked with maintenance to identify the problem we called scheduling to see what their plans were for us and made it clear that after an event like this that we were not willing to fly again and should receive rest. I have learned from previous [events] that adrenaline is powerful and the mental state after an [event] is not conducive to operating an aircraft safely. Scheduling wanted us to wait to see if maintenance could fix the problem and take the aircraft back into moderate icing conditions on to ZZZ after that. I told them that I was unwilling to accept the flight; to which they responded by giving me a 'refusal.' we were then released to rest.I think the first officer (ca in first officer (first officer) seat); did a wonderful job of running the QRH and questioning system logic throughout the event. We both used our extensive system knowledge to try and troubleshoot the issue while reading the QRH. I don't know what caused the system to fail but failures are part of our industry and that is why we train. The crew performed excellently and followed procedure; and had excellent and professional help from approach; for a safe outcome. Good CRM; good tem (threat and error management); good training. My biggest concern was scheduling's response to our fitness for duty and asking us to fly again after a successful [event] landing. I do not think it is safe or fair of them to ask pilots to fly after such events. Even more so; pilots should not be penalized for performing their duty and saving an aircraft and passengers; only to be met by a refusal to fly on their schedules. We kept saying; ' we are donefor the day; one [event] is enough.' I understand not all situations are equal but this needs to be addressed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An Air Carrier flight crew reported being penalized for refusing to take aircraft again after returning to departure airport due to icing and failed anti-ice systems.

Narrative: We departed the maintenance hangar in on a reposition flight under IFR conditions with light snow falling. We taxied to the deice pad and had them spray us with type 1 and 4 full body. After deice; we completed the Ice Test A with no defects or abnormal messages. It was the first flight for this aircraft; as well as being prudent when taking an aircraft from Maintenance. We took off shortly after with the aircraft configured for icing conditions. The takeoff was normal and the climb out was normal. As the First Officer (another CA (Captain)) was finishing his after-takeoff flow and checklist; we were already in icing conditions and were presented with Wing and Stab Anti Ice Fail and subsequently Ice Cond Anti-Ice INOP. I ensured that he had put the Ice override switch back to the AUTO position; which he had done successfully. We got out the QRH and the First Officer began reading it. We followed the guidance which ended up not solving our issue. Now climbing through 8000 ft. we collectively decided that continuing would not be prudent since we did not know how much ice the aircraft had accumulated or how much more we may encounter. We asked TRACON for a heading and altitude for a return to the airport. They gave us a right turn for a downwind and to descend to 5000 ft. Upon reaching 5000 ft. (Mod Ice reported below 5000 ft.) we noticed that the icing was worse than it had been; so we asked for 6000 ft. and were granted it immediately; where we spent the majority of the downwind leg. We set up for the ILS and briefed the approach quickly knowing the aircraft was picking up ice. We also notified Dispatch. ATC cleared us for the approach and I elected to hand fly to see how the aircraft felt. From the base turn it was apparent that the ice was affecting the flight controls adversely and more power was required.At this time the First Officer and I both agreed [advising ATC] would be prudent to ensure we got on the ground with priority. We completed the ILS Approach and landed safely. During the approach larger than normal control movements were required to keep the aircraft stable in moderate turbulence. We guessed it was because the ailerons were being affected by the ice on the leading edge disturbing the airflow. We taxied the aircraft back to the hangar with no further issues in the flight. After we had parked the aircraft and worked with maintenance to identify the problem we called scheduling to see what their plans were for us and made it clear that after an event like this that we were not willing to fly again and should receive rest. I have learned from previous [events] that adrenaline is powerful and the mental state after an [event] is not conducive to operating an aircraft safely. Scheduling wanted us to wait to see if maintenance could fix the problem and take the aircraft back into moderate icing conditions on to ZZZ after that. I told them that I was unwilling to accept the flight; to which they responded by giving me a 'refusal.' We were then released to rest.I think the First Officer (CA in FO (First Officer) seat); did a wonderful job of running the QRH and questioning system logic throughout the event. We both used our extensive system knowledge to try and troubleshoot the issue while reading the QRH. I don't know what caused the system to fail but failures are part of our industry and that is why we train. The crew performed excellently and followed procedure; and had excellent and professional help from Approach; for a safe outcome. Good CRM; good TEM (Threat and Error Management); good training. My biggest concern was scheduling's response to our fitness for duty and asking us to fly again after a successful [event] landing. I do NOT think it is safe or fair of them to ask pilots to fly after such events. Even more so; pilots should not be penalized for performing their duty and saving an aircraft and passengers; only to be met by a refusal to fly on their schedules. We kept saying; ' We are donefor the day; one [event] is enough.' I understand not all situations are equal but this needs to be addressed.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.