Narrative:

While conducting ground reference training; 'south' turns along a road; we encountered a near miss. Visual scanning; practice area radio frequency and ads-B were all used for situational awareness. This specific event happened in my opinion because the other aircraft was not transmitting an ads-B signal at the time and our radio was switched to 121.5 momentarily for training purposes. Upon rolling out of a left turn I noticed a close shadow on the ground; for which we continued to turn left while the other aircraft properly also turned left to avoid. We talked on the practice area frequency and they thought it was weird they did not send an ads-B signal. Their signal appeared on our traffic system a few minutes later after the event. I continued to try to establish communication with them after the event to connect on the ground in [an] attempt to apologize for not seeing them earlier but they did not respond. Our chain of events began with the use of 121.5 while simulating an emergency descent. Within that time frame the other aircraft may have given a position report. This action led [to] a diminished situational awareness of the practice area with a small over reliance on ads-B traffic awareness. The other aircraft was equipped with ads-B traffic in as they called out to me by tail number. Corrective action includes only simulating 121.5 frequency changes or tuning only to standby instead of activating and losing possible situational awareness radio calls.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Remos GX instructor pilot reported the lack of an ADS-B signal and a frequency change that contributed to an NMAC in the practice area.

Narrative: While conducting ground reference training; 'S' turns along a road; we encountered a near miss. Visual scanning; practice area radio frequency and ADS-B were all used for situational awareness. This specific event happened in my opinion because the other aircraft was not transmitting an ADS-B signal at the time and our radio was switched to 121.5 momentarily for training purposes. Upon rolling out of a left turn I noticed a close shadow on the ground; for which we continued to turn left while the other aircraft properly also turned left to avoid. We talked on the practice area frequency and they thought it was weird they did not send an ADS-B signal. Their signal appeared on our traffic system a few minutes later after the event. I continued to try to establish communication with them after the event to connect on the ground in [an] attempt to apologize for not seeing them earlier but they did not respond. Our chain of events began with the use of 121.5 while simulating an emergency descent. Within that time frame the other aircraft may have given a position report. This action led [to] a diminished situational awareness of the practice area with a small over reliance on ADS-B traffic awareness. The other aircraft was equipped with ADS-B traffic in as they called out to me by tail number. Corrective action includes only simulating 121.5 frequency changes or tuning only to standby instead of activating and losing possible situational awareness radio calls.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.