Narrative:

Aircraft X had been written up by previous pilot for weak brakes that were not providing stopping power. Brakes had been bled the night prior to the incident and on taxi out for take off appeared to operate correctly. On approach to land; when arming the nose wheel steering; the map steering annunciator did not illuminate. We landed as winds were from heading 270 with speed in the mid teens gusting to mid twenties.upon weight on wheels; steering annunciator still had not illuminated. Rudder pedals did not assist with directional control as the aircraft decelerated. I attempted differential braking to regain centerline as the aircraft was weather-vaning towards the right to discover brake lines had zero pressure. Then I attempted full reverse prop but with the cross wind the airplane was already committed to a right hand runway excursion. As the aircraft exited the runway; I pulled the engine stop and feathers. The aircraft rolled slowly until eventually stopping with the nose approximately thirty yards distance from the runway. Combination of mechanical failure and gusty cross winds are the main cause. No spilled fluids were discovered at scene of incident or along the path of the tow to the ramp to directly point towards faulty maintenance. However; I am positive maintenance crews were rushed the night before. Two lines out of our base airport were requiring metros for the week along with a charter flight calling for another. As of the night before the incident; of the four aircraft currently at our base; none of them were airworthy. My aircraft had been at the maintenance hangar since the prior week; but it was not until I was suppose to move it to the ramp the previous night that the write up on the brakes along with two other write ups were discovered to still be open. Possibly if I hadn't stayed late after my leg the previous night attempting to taxi airplanes around and then shown early again the morning of the incident; thereby legally being on duty the entire night; my reactions to the event may have been a little quicker. However; I am still confident I would of ended up off the right side of the runway with the conditions; I just probably wouldn't have rolled as far before coming to a full stop. During the approach phase; when the map steering annunciator did not illuminate upon attempting to arm the steering; I looked through the maintenance log and saw several months prior I had written up this same issue while in ZZZ1. At that time the first officer that was along with me had said that the aircraft had always been this way. Upon touchdown as soon as there was weight on wheels the annunciator illuminated and we rolled out just fine; and then I wrote up the annunciator at that time. Recalling that situation; I assumed that the steering would be available upon landing the morning of the incident. I also assumed if the steering was not available; I would have differential braking available just as if the steering had been MEL'd since the brakes appeared fine before departing. While rolling out for the right edge of the runway; the thought crossed my mind to attempt speeds low and possibly regain steering through the prop levers; however the aircraft was still moving fairly fast and training has reinforced that engaging steering in a bad situation will make the situation worse; especially if traveling with any speed. In hind site; I don't believe there is anything I could of done differently with the given situation. The brakes are suppose to be the back up for the steering thereby with the windy conditions not many options were available.upon discovering the open write ups the night prior to the incident; maintenance control claimed the previous pilot had not reported the write ups over the phone. However this aircraft had been in front of the maintenance hangar with ample time for someone to have checked the book. Usually the books are taken out of the planes at the end of the day anyways; I'm assuming for this very reason. Having caught these write ups the week prior would have reduced the workload on maintenance the night prior to the incident. Combine this with majority of the write ups on the other aircraft being repeat write ups; maintenance could really reduce their workload by actually fixing problems instead of trying to put them off. Whether this is an issue with needing to hire more mechanics or having more available planes to help rotate through and get work done correctly rather than always being rushed for the next morning's runs.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A pilot reported their brakes failed while on landing roll and they had a runway excursion.

Narrative: Aircraft X had been written up by previous pilot for weak brakes that were not providing stopping power. Brakes had been bled the night prior to the incident and on taxi out for take off appeared to operate correctly. On approach to land; when arming the nose wheel steering; the MAP steering annunciator did not illuminate. We landed as winds were from heading 270 with speed in the mid teens gusting to mid twenties.Upon weight on wheels; steering annunciator still had not illuminated. Rudder pedals did not assist with directional control as the aircraft decelerated. I attempted differential braking to regain centerline as the aircraft was weather-vaning towards the right to discover brake lines had zero pressure. Then I attempted full reverse prop but with the cross wind the airplane was already committed to a right hand runway excursion. As the aircraft exited the runway; I pulled the engine stop and feathers. The aircraft rolled slowly until eventually stopping with the nose approximately thirty yards distance from the runway. Combination of mechanical failure and gusty cross winds are the main cause. No spilled fluids were discovered at scene of incident or along the path of the tow to the ramp to directly point towards faulty maintenance. However; I am positive maintenance crews were rushed the night before. Two lines out of our base airport were requiring metros for the week along with a charter flight calling for another. As of the night before the incident; of the four aircraft currently at our base; none of them were airworthy. My aircraft had been at the maintenance hangar since the prior week; but it was not until I was suppose to move it to the ramp the previous night that the write up on the brakes along with two other write ups were discovered to still be open. Possibly if I hadn't stayed late after my leg the previous night attempting to taxi airplanes around and then shown early again the morning of the incident; thereby legally being on duty the entire night; my reactions to the event may have been a little quicker. However; I am still confident I would of ended up off the right side of the runway with the conditions; I just probably wouldn't have rolled as far before coming to a full stop. During the approach phase; when the MAP steering annunciator did not illuminate upon attempting to arm the steering; I looked through the maintenance log and saw several months prior I had written up this same issue while in ZZZ1. At that time the First Officer that was along with me had said that the aircraft had always been this way. Upon touchdown as soon as there was weight on wheels the annunciator illuminated and we rolled out just fine; and then I wrote up the annunciator at that time. Recalling that situation; I assumed that the steering would be available upon landing the morning of the incident. I also assumed if the steering was not available; I would have differential braking available just as if the steering had been MEL'd since the brakes appeared fine before departing. While rolling out for the right edge of the runway; the thought crossed my mind to attempt speeds low and possibly regain steering through the prop levers; however the aircraft was still moving fairly fast and training has reinforced that engaging steering in a bad situation will make the situation worse; especially if traveling with any speed. In hind site; I don't believe there is anything I could of done differently with the given situation. The brakes are suppose to be the back up for the steering thereby with the windy conditions not many options were available.Upon discovering the open write ups the night prior to the incident; Maintenance Control claimed the previous pilot had not reported the write ups over the phone. However this aircraft had been in front of the maintenance hangar with ample time for someone to have checked the book. Usually the books are taken out of the planes at the end of the day anyways; I'm assuming for this very reason. Having caught these write ups the week prior would have reduced the workload on maintenance the night prior to the incident. Combine this with majority of the write ups on the other aircraft being repeat write ups; Maintenance could really reduce their workload by actually fixing problems instead of trying to put them off. Whether this is an issue with needing to hire more mechanics or having more available planes to help rotate through and get work done correctly rather than always being rushed for the next morning's runs.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.