Narrative:

Cruise flight at FL340 we received 'hydraulic fluid loss' on the green system. We followed the ECAM (electronic centralized aircraft monitor) procedures and confirmed the fluid loss on both the gauge on the overhead panel and ECAM 'hydraulic' page. Both indicators showed zero fluid. After working through the ECAM procedures we ran both the hydraulic rsvr lo level and hydraulic system lo pr checklist in the red tabs. This [is] where things got busy. We had multiple procedures to review and brief: landing speed increments; increased landing distance; landing gear gravity extension; fuel consumption increased and equipment status with one or more hydro systems inop. We had approximateyl 40K of fuel and were within range of several airfields with long runways that could accommodate us. We took our time and methodically worked our way though the multiple checklists. First officer (first officer) did a great job of checklist management. At one point we had both QRH's out just to review the multiple additives for approach speed / landing distance and review of the left/G (landing gear) gravity extension checklist. Once we computed a landing speed / distance; the multiple checklists and ECAM items were complete; we reached out to dispatch and maintenance control via radio. At this point we were approximately 1 hour from ZZZZ. We agreed to continue to ZZZZ because the weather was VFR; light winds; and the airfield has 14;000 foot runway with multiple high speeds exits. I asked our dispatcher to contact the duty officer and let him know about our status and advised operations we planned to notify ATC. Once we had a plan and were caught up on all the checklist we declared the emergency (ZZZ center; I think) and requested direct to ZZZZ. We requested vectors to xxr due to it's length and multiple high speeds. Throughout the entire process we made every attempt to not rush. Again; we had tons of gas and time. Rushing would not have solved our problem; and would have only created more problems. ATC vectored us to approx. A 40m final. We briefed the nonstandard call-outs in the event of a go-around; as the gear would have to remain down. Upon landing I was not comfortable attempting to make the highspeed exit without nosewheel steering. We let tower know we were unable to make the highspeed and would be stopping on the centerline of the runway. They said that was fine and crash fire rescue equipment (crash fire rescue) was standing by. Once crash fire rescue equipment determined there were no injuries and the HZ (hazmat) goods were secure the tug started to head our way. We ran the after landing checklist; but kept the lights on since we were still on the runway. Runway xxr has a visible uphill gradient. After setting the parking break we shut down the #1 engine and kept #2 running to ensure positive break pressure. We kept the number 2 engine running until we were safely secured to the tug. It was long; but uneventful tow back to the gate. After block-in the mechanic said there was a visible drip of hydraulic fluid from the left pylon. The green system quantity gauge on the overhead panel had come up to the top of the yellow arc at block in.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Flight Crew flying A300 aircraft encountered hydraulic system failure in flight.

Narrative: Cruise flight at FL340 we received 'Hydraulic Fluid Loss' on the green system. We followed the ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor) procedures and confirmed the fluid loss on both the gauge on the overhead panel and ECAM 'Hydraulic' page. Both indicators showed zero fluid. After working through the ECAM procedures we ran both the HYD RSVR LO LEVEL and HYD SYS LO PR checklist in the red tabs. This [is] where things got busy. We had multiple procedures to review and brief: Landing Speed Increments; Increased Landing Distance; Landing Gear Gravity Extension; Fuel Consumption Increased and Equipment Status with One or More Hydro Systems Inop. We had approximateyl 40K of fuel and were within range of several airfields with long runways that could accommodate us. We took our time and methodically worked our way though the multiple checklists. FO (First Officer) did a great job of checklist management. At one point we had both QRH's out just to review the multiple additives for approach speed / landing distance and review of the L/G (Landing Gear) Gravity Extension checklist. Once we computed a landing speed / distance; the multiple checklists and ECAM items were complete; we reached out to Dispatch and Maintenance Control via radio. At this point we were approximately 1 hour from ZZZZ. We agreed to continue to ZZZZ because the weather was VFR; light winds; and the airfield has 14;000 foot runway with multiple high speeds exits. I asked our Dispatcher to contact the Duty Officer and let him know about our status and advised Operations we planned to notify ATC. Once we had a plan and were caught up on all the checklist we declared the emergency (ZZZ Center; I think) and requested direct to ZZZZ. We requested vectors to XXR due to it's length and multiple high speeds. Throughout the entire process we made every attempt to not rush. Again; we had tons of gas and time. Rushing would not have solved our problem; and would have only created more problems. ATC vectored us to approx. a 40m final. We briefed the nonstandard call-outs in the event of a go-around; as the gear would have to remain down. Upon landing I was not comfortable attempting to make the highspeed exit without nosewheel steering. We let Tower know we were unable to make the highspeed and would be stopping on the centerline of the runway. They said that was fine and CFR (Crash Fire Rescue) was standing by. Once CFR determined there were no injuries and the HZ (Hazmat) goods were secure the tug started to head our way. We ran the After Landing checklist; but kept the lights on since we were still on the runway. Runway XXR has a visible uphill gradient. After setting the parking break we shut down the #1 engine and kept #2 running to ensure positive break pressure. We kept the number 2 engine running until we were safely secured to the tug. It was long; but uneventful tow back to the gate. After block-in the mechanic said there was a visible drip of hydraulic fluid from the left pylon. The green system quantity gauge on the overhead panel had come up to the top of the yellow arc at block in.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.