Narrative:

In the period immediately preceding the occurrence of this incident, rapidly increasing wsw winds necessitated a change of the landing runway from runways 21L and 21R to runway 27. This change resulted in all inbound traffic being vectored to and landing on the single runway 27, instead of the 2 runways 21L and 21R, at a time when the # of inbound aircraft was at an apparent peak. On final approach, ILS runway 27, in trail spacing between aircraft was minimal. The aircraft following my mdt was reported to be 3 mi in trailing and 'gaining.' I was asked to maintain best possible speed to accommodate the situation, which is not altogether unusual when flying into dtw. It was very apparent that the # of inbound aircraft being restr to a single runway due to a rapid wind direction and velocity change had resulted in an ATC saturation bordering on overload, with attendant confusion. The runway 27 landing rollout of my aircraft was relatively short due to the strong winds. Tower initially instructed us to turn off at taxiway oscar 6, followed almost immediately by, 'first right turn' (or something similar to that quote), as we were closer to taxiway X/04 (just west of 21C) and a right turn at 06 would have necessitated additional taxi time on runway 27. Also, following landing traffic was about to touch down. Upon clearing the runway on 04, I stopped short of the outer and switched to ground control frequency 121.8 as instructed by tower. I made certain that my aircraft was well clear of the runway before stopping. The confusion on the ground control frequency was immediately apparent and it wasn't possible to effectively communication with the ground controller due to confusion and numerous aircraft xmissions cutting each other out. Ground controller then called for our flight to flash our light to confirm to him our position. When I turned our taxi light on and off, ground controller said, 'ok, I want you on the parallel. Make a left turn there.' followed shortly thereafter by, 'proceed on the outer to the golf course' (the 6 concourse). While proceeding westbound on the outer, ground control instructed us to give way to the large transport, which would be exiting runway 27 on taxiway 06. The frustration of the ground controller became very apparent as the confusion and interrupted radio xmissions increased. I gave way to the large transport exiting runway 27 at taxiway 06 as instructed. I then proceeded to cross 06 on the outer. As I looked left to assure safe passage through the crossing taxiway, a landing medium large transport Z departed runway onto taxiway 06, appearing from my aft left blind side. I stopped my aircraft abruptly, as did the medium large transport Z, preventing a possible collision. I submit the following as contributing factors in this incident. 1) runway change due to rapidly changing wind conditions reduced available landing runways from 3 runways (21L, 21R, 21C) to 1 runway (27) with numerous inbound landing aircraft. 2) it appeared that 1 ground controller was working most of the ground traffic due to the shift in runway operations. As confusion and frequency congestion increased, he seemed to have been placed in a position of work overload and was outwardly frustrated. There's only so much that a human being is capable of performing, no matter how well trained or experienced south/he may be. The system was overloaded! 3) in adequate spacing between landing aircraft. It doesn't make much sense to get aircraft on the ground as fast as possible, if there aren't enough controllers, frequencys or acreage (txwys, turnoffs, etc) to safely accommodate them once they've landed. Again the system was, from a human ability standpoint, overloaded! 4) landing traffic and parallel taxiway traffic moving in same direction, presenting opportunity for landing traffic to overtake taxiing aircraft from his blind side and cut in front of taxiing aircraft west/O warning, as the landing traffic attempts to exit the runway as expeditiously as possible. 5) in conjunction with #4, both aircraft on different frequencys, so not aware of each other's instructions/intentions as provided by ATC. This is particularly critical to aircraft being overtaken as he is visually unaware of impending conflict coming from behind him. 6) frequency congestion. With confusion and so many aircraft stepping on each other and on ground control, the ground controller was unable to communication the impending danger to me. Subsequent conversation with the tower cabin supervisor on the phone indicated that ground controller was in fact trying to direct me to stop, but was being continuously cut out by other traffic, preventing myself and my first officer from receiving the instruction/warning. Again, system saturation and overload! 7) as an added comment, the taxiway 06 turnoff from runway 27 is inadequately marked as the sign is north of the outer taxiway and not adjacent to the runway. This presents confusion at night.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A TAXIING ACR MDT STOPPED ACFT ABRUPTLY TO AVOID AN MLG TAXIING OFF THE RWY.

Narrative: IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE OCCURRENCE OF THIS INCIDENT, RAPIDLY INCREASING WSW WINDS NECESSITATED A CHANGE OF THE LNDG RWY FROM RWYS 21L AND 21R TO RWY 27. THIS CHANGE RESULTED IN ALL INBND TFC BEING VECTORED TO AND LNDG ON THE SINGLE RWY 27, INSTEAD OF THE 2 RWYS 21L AND 21R, AT A TIME WHEN THE # OF INBND ACFT WAS AT AN APPARENT PEAK. ON FINAL APCH, ILS RWY 27, IN TRAIL SPACING BTWN ACFT WAS MINIMAL. THE ACFT FOLLOWING MY MDT WAS RPTED TO BE 3 MI IN TRAILING AND 'GAINING.' I WAS ASKED TO MAINTAIN BEST POSSIBLE SPD TO ACCOMMODATE THE SITUATION, WHICH IS NOT ALTOGETHER UNUSUAL WHEN FLYING INTO DTW. IT WAS VERY APPARENT THAT THE # OF INBND ACFT BEING RESTR TO A SINGLE RWY DUE TO A RAPID WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY CHANGE HAD RESULTED IN AN ATC SATURATION BORDERING ON OVERLOAD, WITH ATTENDANT CONFUSION. THE RWY 27 LNDG ROLLOUT OF MY ACFT WAS RELATIVELY SHORT DUE TO THE STRONG WINDS. TWR INITIALLY INSTRUCTED US TO TURN OFF AT TXWY OSCAR 6, FOLLOWED ALMOST IMMEDIATELY BY, 'FIRST RIGHT TURN' (OR SOMETHING SIMILAR TO THAT QUOTE), AS WE WERE CLOSER TO TXWY X/04 (JUST W OF 21C) AND A RIGHT TURN AT 06 WOULD HAVE NECESSITATED ADDITIONAL TAXI TIME ON RWY 27. ALSO, FOLLOWING LNDG TFC WAS ABOUT TO TOUCH DOWN. UPON CLRING THE RWY ON 04, I STOPPED SHORT OF THE OUTER AND SWITCHED TO GND CTL FREQ 121.8 AS INSTRUCTED BY TWR. I MADE CERTAIN THAT MY ACFT WAS WELL CLR OF THE RWY BEFORE STOPPING. THE CONFUSION ON THE GND CTL FREQ WAS IMMEDIATELY APPARENT AND IT WASN'T POSSIBLE TO EFFECTIVELY COM WITH THE GND CTLR DUE TO CONFUSION AND NUMEROUS ACFT XMISSIONS CUTTING EACH OTHER OUT. GND CTLR THEN CALLED FOR OUR FLT TO FLASH OUR LIGHT TO CONFIRM TO HIM OUR POS. WHEN I TURNED OUR TAXI LIGHT ON AND OFF, GND CTLR SAID, 'OK, I WANT YOU ON THE PARALLEL. MAKE A LEFT TURN THERE.' FOLLOWED SHORTLY THEREAFTER BY, 'PROCEED ON THE OUTER TO THE GOLF COURSE' (THE 6 CONCOURSE). WHILE PROCEEDING WBND ON THE OUTER, GND CTL INSTRUCTED US TO GIVE WAY TO THE LGT, WHICH WOULD BE EXITING RWY 27 ON TXWY 06. THE FRUSTRATION OF THE GND CTLR BECAME VERY APPARENT AS THE CONFUSION AND INTERRUPTED RADIO XMISSIONS INCREASED. I GAVE WAY TO THE LGT EXITING RWY 27 AT TXWY 06 AS INSTRUCTED. I THEN PROCEEDED TO CROSS 06 ON THE OUTER. AS I LOOKED LEFT TO ASSURE SAFE PASSAGE THROUGH THE XING TXWY, A LNDG MLG Z DEPARTED RWY ONTO TXWY 06, APPEARING FROM MY AFT LEFT BLIND SIDE. I STOPPED MY ACFT ABRUPTLY, AS DID THE MLG Z, PREVENTING A POSSIBLE COLLISION. I SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING AS CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IN THIS INCIDENT. 1) RWY CHANGE DUE TO RAPIDLY CHANGING WIND CONDITIONS REDUCED AVAILABLE LNDG RWYS FROM 3 RWYS (21L, 21R, 21C) TO 1 RWY (27) WITH NUMEROUS INBND LNDG ACFT. 2) IT APPEARED THAT 1 GND CTLR WAS WORKING MOST OF THE GND TFC DUE TO THE SHIFT IN RWY OPS. AS CONFUSION AND FREQ CONGESTION INCREASED, HE SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN PLACED IN A POS OF WORK OVERLOAD AND WAS OUTWARDLY FRUSTRATED. THERE'S ONLY SO MUCH THAT A HUMAN BEING IS CAPABLE OF PERFORMING, NO MATTER HOW WELL TRAINED OR EXPERIENCED S/HE MAY BE. THE SYS WAS OVERLOADED! 3) IN ADEQUATE SPACING BTWN LNDG ACFT. IT DOESN'T MAKE MUCH SENSE TO GET ACFT ON THE GND AS FAST AS POSSIBLE, IF THERE AREN'T ENOUGH CTLRS, FREQS OR ACREAGE (TXWYS, TURNOFFS, ETC) TO SAFELY ACCOMMODATE THEM ONCE THEY'VE LANDED. AGAIN THE SYS WAS, FROM A HUMAN ABILITY STANDPOINT, OVERLOADED! 4) LNDG TFC AND PARALLEL TXWY TFC MOVING IN SAME DIRECTION, PRESENTING OPPORTUNITY FOR LNDG TFC TO OVERTAKE TAXIING ACFT FROM HIS BLIND SIDE AND CUT IN FRONT OF TAXIING ACFT W/O WARNING, AS THE LNDG TFC ATTEMPTS TO EXIT THE RWY AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE. 5) IN CONJUNCTION WITH #4, BOTH ACFT ON DIFFERENT FREQS, SO NOT AWARE OF EACH OTHER'S INSTRUCTIONS/INTENTIONS AS PROVIDED BY ATC. THIS IS PARTICULARLY CRITICAL TO ACFT BEING OVERTAKEN AS HE IS VISUALLY UNAWARE OF IMPENDING CONFLICT COMING FROM BEHIND HIM. 6) FREQ CONGESTION. WITH CONFUSION AND SO MANY ACFT STEPPING ON EACH OTHER AND ON GND CTL, THE GND CTLR WAS UNABLE TO COM THE IMPENDING DANGER TO ME. SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH THE TWR CABIN SUPVR ON THE PHONE INDICATED THAT GND CTLR WAS IN FACT TRYING TO DIRECT ME TO STOP, BUT WAS BEING CONTINUOUSLY CUT OUT BY OTHER TFC, PREVENTING MYSELF AND MY F/O FROM RECEIVING THE INSTRUCTION/WARNING. AGAIN, SYS SATURATION AND OVERLOAD! 7) AS AN ADDED COMMENT, THE TXWY 06 TURNOFF FROM RWY 27 IS INADEQUATELY MARKED AS THE SIGN IS N OF THE OUTER TXWY AND NOT ADJACENT TO THE RWY. THIS PRESENTS CONFUSION AT NIGHT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.