Narrative:

First officer was PF on first leg of 3-day sequence (I assigned him the first leg since he was senior on the aircraft; I was just off oe as ca; and had not flown in 5 weeks). Cleared direct to zzzzz fix for visual approach to runway xx. Noticed first officer was a bit high and fast; but given his experience flying the airplane; [I] felt he could adjust accordingly. When checked in with tower; they cleared us to land. First officer continued going direct to zzzzz fix; and was in a high energy state. Although my attention was diverted momentarily; I thought I saw him pull heading to establish himself on a downwind leg outside of zzzzz; a false assumption. I mentioned that we were high and pretty fast; but he said he thought he could get it within stable approach parameters by 1;000 feet. I monitored sink rate and airspeed. At 1;000 feet; I recall that he was within parameters; but I overlooked that fact that flaps were not at final setting. At the time I completed the final flap setting and checklist; I believe we were within stable approach parameters; but I overlooked the requirement for final flap configuration no later than 1;000 feet AGL. Normal landing made within landing zone with no adverse consequences. Once at the gate; first officer was very apologetic and angry at himself for not going around. I told him it was a crew failure; not just his; I should have commanded a go-around.cause -1. Lack of currency. This was my first post-oe flight. My last oe flight was early june. I had been practicing flows and callouts during this down time; but recall feeling very clumsy and 'behind the curve' on this flight. 2. I should have been more assertive in calling a go-around early on in an approach that didn't look like it was going to end well. I vow to be much more assertive in the future to avoid another similar occurrence. 3. First officer wore his covid cloth face mask the entire flight; his communications were very difficult to decipher at times due to the muffling effect on his voice. 4. I made a false assumption that because the first officer was senior and experienced; he was less fallible to getting too far behind the aircraftsuggestions - 1. I should have called a 'go-around' farther out on the approach when I saw that he wasn't 'catching up' to a comfortable point in his aircraft stabilization. 2. After the lengthy gap since my oe; I wish I had requested a check airman in order to get my skills back up to speed. 3. Better FMA monitoring and situational awareness. 4. Don't hesitate: if it doesn't look right; go-around!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing an unstabilized approach and flaps not at final setting before 1;000 feet AGL. Captain stated he should have commanded the First Officer to go-around and cited lack of recent flying as a contributing factor.

Narrative: FO was PF on first leg of 3-day sequence (I assigned him the first leg since he was senior on the aircraft; I was just off OE as CA; and had not flown in 5 weeks). Cleared direct to ZZZZZ fix for visual approach to Runway XX. Noticed FO was a bit high and fast; but given his experience flying the airplane; [I] felt he could adjust accordingly. When checked in with Tower; they cleared us to land. FO continued going direct to ZZZZZ fix; and was in a high energy state. Although my attention was diverted momentarily; I thought I saw him pull HDG to establish himself on a downwind leg outside of ZZZZZ; a false assumption. I mentioned that we were high and pretty fast; but he said he thought he could get it within stable approach parameters by 1;000 feet. I monitored sink rate and airspeed. At 1;000 feet; I recall that he was within parameters; but I overlooked that fact that flaps were not at final setting. At the time I completed the final flap setting and checklist; I believe we were within stable approach parameters; but I overlooked the requirement for final flap configuration no later than 1;000 feet AGL. Normal landing made within landing zone with no adverse consequences. Once at the gate; FO was very apologetic and angry at himself for not going around. I told him it was a crew failure; not just his; I should have commanded a go-around.Cause -1. Lack of currency. This was my first post-OE flight. My last OE flight was early June. I had been practicing flows and callouts during this down time; but recall feeling very clumsy and 'behind the curve' on this flight. 2. I should have been more assertive in calling a go-around early on in an approach that didn't look like it was going to end well. I vow to be much more assertive in the future to avoid another similar occurrence. 3. FO wore his COVID cloth face mask the entire flight; his communications were very difficult to decipher at times due to the muffling effect on his voice. 4. I made a false assumption that because the FO was senior and experienced; he was less fallible to getting too far behind the aircraftSuggestions - 1. I should have called a 'go-around' farther out on the approach when I saw that he wasn't 'catching up' to a comfortable point in his aircraft stabilization. 2. After the lengthy gap since my OE; I wish I had requested a check airman in order to get my skills back up to speed. 3. Better FMA monitoring and situational awareness. 4. Don't hesitate: if it doesn't look right; go-around!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.