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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1751027 |
Time | |
Date | 202007 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Multiengine |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 36 Flight Crew Total 18000 Flight Crew Type 2435 |
Person 2 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Multiengine |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 9.57 Flight Crew Total 1963.82 Flight Crew Type 1963.82 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown |
Narrative:
I was assigned to flight abcd on day 4 as a line check airman and was scheduled to give X line-checks over X days. Prior to this assignment; I was scheduled on day 3 to give a first officer requal which was [a] one day trip. This assignment was canceled on day 1 due to an aircraft substitution. On day 2 training scheduling called and asked if I could train the same first officer on a different assignment. Even though this assignment was longer; I agreed to do the trip. ZZZ-ZZZ1-ZZZ on day 3.first day requal ZZZ-ZZZ1-zzzsecond day I started pairing flight abcd. First leg was line-check ZZZ-ZZZ2; then sit for 5:30 hours; then another line-check ZZZ2-ZZZ3. Since this was mid-trip; I was not able to get any rest and had a long lunch off-site from the airport with a friend. After lunch I did a line-check ZZZ2-ZZZ3. By the time I reached my hotel; I was tired; ate dinner and went to bed early.third day started with a scheduled deadhead to ZZZ3-ZZZ4. When arriving in ZZZ4 and showed up for my next leg; a line-check ZZZ4-ZZZ5; I learned the original captain had called in sick and the new captain did not need a line-check. I informed training scheduling that the scheduled captain was no longer on the trip and I was told to deadhead in the back of the aircraft to ZZZ5. At some point on day 2 or 3; crew scheduling called to inform me there was an issue with first officer on the last day of my pairing for flight efgh; and asked if I could do the line check from the first officer seat. In the interest of the operation; I agreed.fourth day started with a late hotel shuttle. By the time I got my required [covid] temperature check and took the train to gate it was 25 minutes prior to departure. There were issues with the gate agents in issuing the required jumpseat access card. This flight was a line-check ZZZ5-ZZZ6. When I arrived in ZZZ6; I received an email from training scheduling; telling me that the captain for flight efgh had called in sick and they were looking for a new captain who needed a line check. I then called training scheduling and told them; if they could not find a captain who needed a line check; I would prefer to go back to ZZZ when I arrived in ZZZ3. I told them it had been a long few days and I was tired and wanted to get home. The scheduler told me they did not have a first officer and they would have to leave me on the trip as the flying first officer. She also stated whoever the captain was on this leg; I would be giving them a line-check from the right seat.ZZZ6-ZZZ3 the captain on this leg had not flown in several months and just came out of a landings class. While this crew did a good job and had a satisfactory line-check; I spent most of the flight and debrief going over new procedures and techniques. When I landed in ZZZ3; I called captain X and left a voice mail and followed up with a text regarding our roles and duties for flight efgh. I informed him; who I was and that I would be giving him a line check the next morning while sitting in the right seat doing first officer duties. I went to the hotel and had a normal night's sleep.fifth day flight in question.I went to the airport early so I would have extra time reviewing first officer flows and preparing the flight deck. When I started to preflight on the [tablet]; the flight plan never pushed to my [tablet] and I had to call dispatch twice. It never pushed and I had to get the dispatcher to mark me fit for duty and manually download the flight plan. I was at the gate an hour prior to the flight.captain X showed up about 15 mins later. We briefed and I explained my role as an lca and I would be giving him a line check from the right seat and we agreed I would fly the leg.the flight was uneventful; captain X did a good job and I gave him high marks for his line-check. His performance was better than most other captains I have observed on prior line-checks.after we landed in ZZZ; we arrived at gate XXX and stopped the aircraft; I did my parking flow. I cannot remember whether or not I heard captain X call to shut down engine #1. Engine #2 was shut down during the single engine taxi to the gate.we ran the parking check list. During the check list the captain said several times that one of the rampers was signaling to him and he could not understand what the ramper was trying to communicate. This was a distraction that pulled us away from or normal duties and interrupted the checklist. After the check list; I had to complete the line check form on the [tablet]; which is cumbersome to use. I did notice a noise coming from the cabin and my first thought was it was the new cleaning system and thought it was odd because the passenger door just opened. I looked at the engine gauges and I could not see them because the screens were already set low for the termination. The captain had gotten up out of his seat and immediately heard the noise from the engine and saw the ramp supervisor. He told me the #1 engine was still running. I immediately shut is down and reran the entire parking check list; visually confirmed the fuel flow was zero. Captain X and I debriefed this. I am unsure of the amount of time from setting the parking brake to shutting down the engine but estimate is was 2 mins. It should also be noted that this aircraft has a different style of fuel cutoff levers. They are not levers but knobs and visually are not a prominent in the off and on positions. From the time the parking brake was set; to discovering the engine running; I never left my seat. During this time; I was still performing my lca duties and was double checking all my first officer duties were completed. I believe that even if captain X had not caught our mistake; I would have caught it before I left my seat.there were numerous distractions. I have only flown 36 hours in 90 days and have not flown in the first officer's seat in over four months. The numerous scheduling changes added to the confusion. Furthermore; it was difficult to evaluate a captain from the right seat while managing my first officer and line check airman duties.I'm certainly not trying to make excuses because the errors were definitely made between the both of us. Regardless of the distractions; I need to remain vigilant and strictly adhere to SOP. Proper checklist discipline is one of the most important tools we have to avoid threats which ultimately lead to an overall reduction of errors. I will use this event as a discussion point about the importance of checklist discipline as well as other procedural threats we face in our operation; especially in the current environment where so many pilots are changing seats and aircraft.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Air carrier flight crew reported they left an engine running after parking at the gate. They cited as contributing factors the failure to complete a checklist due to distraction.
Narrative: I was assigned to Flight ABCD on Day 4 as a line check airman and was scheduled to give X line-checks over X days. Prior to this assignment; I was scheduled on Day 3 to give a first officer requal which was [a] one day trip. This assignment was canceled on Day 1 due to an aircraft substitution. On Day 2 training scheduling called and asked if I could train the same first officer on a different assignment. Even though this assignment was longer; I agreed to do the trip. ZZZ-ZZZ1-ZZZ on Day 3.First day Requal ZZZ-ZZZ1-ZZZSecond day I started pairing Flight ABCD. First leg was line-check ZZZ-ZZZ2; then sit for 5:30 hours; then another line-check ZZZ2-ZZZ3. Since this was mid-trip; I was not able to get any rest and had a long lunch off-site from the airport with a friend. After lunch I did a line-check ZZZ2-ZZZ3. By the time I reached my hotel; I was tired; ate dinner and went to bed early.Third day started with a scheduled deadhead to ZZZ3-ZZZ4. When arriving in ZZZ4 and showed up for my next leg; a line-check ZZZ4-ZZZ5; I learned the original Captain had called in sick and the new Captain did not need a line-check. I informed training scheduling that the scheduled Captain was no longer on the trip and I was told to deadhead in the back of the aircraft to ZZZ5. At some point on day 2 or 3; crew scheduling called to inform me there was an issue with First Officer on the last day of my pairing for Flight EFGH; and asked if I could do the line check from the first officer seat. In the interest of the operation; I agreed.Fourth day started with a late hotel shuttle. By the time I got my required [COVID] temperature check and took the train to gate it was 25 minutes prior to departure. There were issues with the gate agents in issuing the required jumpseat access card. This flight was a line-check ZZZ5-ZZZ6. When I arrived in ZZZ6; I received an email from training scheduling; telling me that the Captain for Flight EFGH had called in sick and they were looking for a new Captain who needed a line check. I then called training scheduling and told them; if they could not find a Captain who needed a line check; I would prefer to go back to ZZZ when I arrived in ZZZ3. I told them it had been a long few days and I was tired and wanted to get home. The scheduler told me they did not have a first officer and they would have to leave me on the trip as the flying first officer. She also stated whoever the Captain was on this leg; I would be giving them a line-check from the right seat.ZZZ6-ZZZ3 the Captain on this leg had not flown in several months and just came out of a landings class. While this crew did a good job and had a satisfactory line-check; I spent most of the flight and debrief going over new procedures and techniques. When I landed in ZZZ3; I called Captain X and left a voice mail and followed up with a text regarding our roles and duties for Flight EFGH. I informed him; who I was and that I would be giving him a line check the next morning while sitting in the right seat doing first officer duties. I went to the hotel and had a normal night's sleep.Fifth day Flight in question.I went to the airport early so I would have extra time reviewing first officer flows and preparing the flight deck. When I started to preflight on the [tablet]; the flight plan never pushed to my [tablet] and I had to call dispatch twice. It never pushed and I had to get the dispatcher to mark me fit for duty and manually download the flight plan. I was at the gate an hour prior to the flight.Captain X showed up about 15 mins later. We briefed and I explained my role as an LCA and I would be giving him a line check from the right seat and we agreed I would fly the leg.The flight was uneventful; Captain X did a good job and I gave him high marks for his line-check. His performance was better than most other captains I have observed on prior line-checks.After we landed in ZZZ; we arrived at Gate XXX and stopped the aircraft; I did my parking flow. I cannot remember whether or not I heard Captain X call to shut down engine #1. Engine #2 was shut down during the single engine taxi to the gate.We ran the parking check list. During the check list the Captain said several times that one of the rampers was signaling to him and he could not understand what the ramper was trying to communicate. This was a distraction that pulled us away from or normal duties and interrupted the checklist. After the check list; I had to complete the line check form on the [tablet]; which is cumbersome to use. I did notice a noise coming from the cabin and my first thought was it was the new cleaning system and thought it was odd because the passenger door just opened. I looked at the engine gauges and I could not see them because the screens were already set low for the termination. The Captain had gotten up out of his seat and immediately heard the noise from the engine and saw the ramp supervisor. He told me the #1 engine was still running. I immediately shut is down and reran the entire parking check list; visually confirmed the fuel flow was zero. Captain X and I debriefed this. I am unsure of the amount of time from setting the parking brake to shutting down the engine but estimate is was 2 mins. It should also be noted that this aircraft has a different style of fuel cutoff levers. They are not levers but knobs and visually are not a prominent in the off and on positions. From the time the parking brake was set; to discovering the engine running; I never left my seat. During this time; I was still performing my LCA duties and was double checking all my first officer duties were completed. I believe that even if Captain X had not caught our mistake; I would have caught it before I left my seat.There were numerous distractions. I have only flown 36 hours in 90 days and have not flown in the first officer's seat in over four months. The numerous scheduling changes added to the confusion. Furthermore; it was difficult to evaluate a Captain from the right seat while managing my first officer and line check airman duties.I'm certainly not trying to make excuses because the errors were definitely made between the both of us. Regardless of the distractions; I need to remain vigilant and strictly adhere to SOP. Proper checklist discipline is one of the most important tools we have to avoid threats which ultimately lead to an overall reduction of errors. I will use this event as a discussion point about the importance of checklist discipline as well as other procedural threats we face in our operation; especially in the current environment where so many pilots are changing seats and aircraft.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.