Narrative:

While being vectored for the buf NDB runway 23 approach, the engine sputtered. Because we were in and out of clouds, we turned on carburetor heat. Engine ran for about 1 min, then began to quit. The pilot and I performed the normal emergency checklist quickly and effectively (switch tanks, fuel pump on, carburetor heat, mixture, primer, etc). The engine came back to life west/O an in-flight restart, but the pilot in the left seat, who was receiving an INS competency check from me, set 7700 on the transponder and declared an emergency to buf approach. Since we were inbound for an approach to buf we took the ILS to land to be safe, in case we couldn't make it back to our base at iag, even though all gauges read normal. I did not hear that we were given priority, so I assume we were not. The pilot told ATC while on the ILS 23 to buf that all indications were normal and we did not need the crash trucks. Nevertheless, the vehs watched our safe, controled, well-executed approach and landing and followed us to the GA ramp. The PF exhibited excellent knowledge and execution of emergency procedures. Both of us worked effectively to handle the situation calmly and properly. The aircraft was never in an unusual attitude or at an unsafe altitude. The PF had not flown for some weeks, and I, while I have many hours in small aircraft's, had no time in the type small aircraft we were flying. I relied upon the pilot to know the details of fuel consumption. We departed with about 4 hours fuel on board, so exhaustion of our supply seemed unlikely until I learned 1 of the 4 tanks was run dry. The pilot had not been switching tanks as I thought he had. I saw his hand near the selector a couple of times during our 1 1/2 hour flight, so I assumed he was switching tanks. We, at the time, thought the problem was carburetor ice, since we were used to flying aircraft which would go 2-3 hours/tank. Fortunately, we had 3 other tanks with plenty of fuel available.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GA SMA RAN A FUEL TANK DRY ON A TRAINING FLT. INSTRUCTOR PLT SAYS HE WAS RELYING ON THE STUDENT PLT TO MONITOR THE FUEL BURN AND TANK SWITCHING BECAUSE HE WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THIS TYPE ACFT.

Narrative: WHILE BEING VECTORED FOR THE BUF NDB RWY 23 APCH, THE ENG SPUTTERED. BECAUSE WE WERE IN AND OUT OF CLOUDS, WE TURNED ON CARB HEAT. ENG RAN FOR ABOUT 1 MIN, THEN BEGAN TO QUIT. THE PLT AND I PERFORMED THE NORMAL EMER CHKLIST QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY (SWITCH TANKS, FUEL PUMP ON, CARB HEAT, MIXTURE, PRIMER, ETC). THE ENG CAME BACK TO LIFE W/O AN INFLT RESTART, BUT THE PLT IN THE LEFT SEAT, WHO WAS RECEIVING AN INS COMPETENCY CHK FROM ME, SET 7700 ON THE XPONDER AND DECLARED AN EMER TO BUF APCH. SINCE WE WERE INBND FOR AN APCH TO BUF WE TOOK THE ILS TO LAND TO BE SAFE, IN CASE WE COULDN'T MAKE IT BACK TO OUR BASE AT IAG, EVEN THOUGH ALL GAUGES READ NORMAL. I DID NOT HEAR THAT WE WERE GIVEN PRIORITY, SO I ASSUME WE WERE NOT. THE PLT TOLD ATC WHILE ON THE ILS 23 TO BUF THAT ALL INDICATIONS WERE NORMAL AND WE DID NOT NEED THE CRASH TRUCKS. NEVERTHELESS, THE VEHS WATCHED OUR SAFE, CTLED, WELL-EXECUTED APCH AND LNDG AND FOLLOWED US TO THE GA RAMP. THE PF EXHIBITED EXCELLENT KNOWLEDGE AND EXECUTION OF EMER PROCS. BOTH OF US WORKED EFFECTIVELY TO HANDLE THE SITUATION CALMLY AND PROPERLY. THE ACFT WAS NEVER IN AN UNUSUAL ATTITUDE OR AT AN UNSAFE ALT. THE PF HAD NOT FLOWN FOR SOME WKS, AND I, WHILE I HAVE MANY HRS IN SMA'S, HAD NO TIME IN THE TYPE SMA WE WERE FLYING. I RELIED UPON THE PLT TO KNOW THE DETAILS OF FUEL CONSUMPTION. WE DEPARTED WITH ABOUT 4 HRS FUEL ON BOARD, SO EXHAUSTION OF OUR SUPPLY SEEMED UNLIKELY UNTIL I LEARNED 1 OF THE 4 TANKS WAS RUN DRY. THE PLT HAD NOT BEEN SWITCHING TANKS AS I THOUGHT HE HAD. I SAW HIS HAND NEAR THE SELECTOR A COUPLE OF TIMES DURING OUR 1 1/2 HR FLT, SO I ASSUMED HE WAS SWITCHING TANKS. WE, AT THE TIME, THOUGHT THE PROB WAS CARB ICE, SINCE WE WERE USED TO FLYING ACFT WHICH WOULD GO 2-3 HRS/TANK. FORTUNATELY, WE HAD 3 OTHER TANKS WITH PLENTY OF FUEL AVAILABLE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.