Narrative:

I, as a flight instrument, conducted a training flight in an small aircraft from teterboro airport. We departed teb and departed the air traffic area to the northeast. The WX being reported at teb at the time was; E40BKN 120 ovc 12 48/35/1710/049, a very light rain had just begun to fall. As we departed the air traffic area, we turned left and headed north and the intensity of the rain increased. When able (clearing the 1800' floor of the ny TCA), we initiated a climb to 2500'. As we leveled off at 2500', we found that at this altitude the rain was now snow, even though the OAT was about plus 4 degree C. We still had 7-8 mi of visibility and had not reached any clouds, however I noticed that the precipitation was freezing and accumulating on the tires and leading edge. For this reason I instructed my student to descend to 2000', where the precipitation was strictly rain and not freezing. We also decided at this time that we would return to the airport. After orienting himself using the VOR and making a couple of turns to establish himself inbound, my student headed toward teb and called the tower reporting that he was 10 mi north, inbound for a landing. We reported closer in, as instructed and were cleared to land on runway 19. After returning to the FBO, there was a telephone call from the pilot of an light transport. He claimed that while on radar vectors to the VOR 24 approach to teb, he broke out of the clouds at 2500' and saw an small aircraft right in front of him. After speaking with him it was not determined whether or not the small aircraft he saw was the one I was in. I did not see any light transport while in the practice area. However, if it was my airplane that he saw, that would put me less than 500' below the clouds (and in violation of far's). As I stated earlier, the reported WX was 40 broken, and the visibility was 12 mi. During our brief stay at 2500', the visibility was about 8 mi and we were not close to being in the clouds. We did descend due to the freezing precipitation however. The problem encountered by the light transport pilot arose when he was vectored by ny approach control directly into (both heading nd altitude) conflicting VFR traffic. A contributing factor was, according to the light transport pilot, that he was not made aware of this traffic, ie, no traffic alert was given. I think approach should use more care when vectoring traffic through a known practice area when the WX is VFR. If approach is unaware of the practice area then they should be made aware. The two other approachs at teb used most often (ILS6, VOR/DME a), do not pass through any practice areas.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA PLT THOUGHT TO BE ACFT IN CLOSE PROX OF CLOUDS AND ACFT ON VECTORS FOR IFR DEP.

Narrative: I, AS A FLT INSTR, CONDUCTED A TRNING FLT IN AN SMA FROM TETERBORO ARPT. WE DEPARTED TEB AND DEPARTED THE ATA TO THE NE. THE WX BEING RPTED AT TEB AT THE TIME WAS; E40BKN 120 OVC 12 48/35/1710/049, A VERY LIGHT RAIN HAD JUST BEGUN TO FALL. AS WE DEPARTED THE ATA, WE TURNED L AND HEADED N AND THE INTENSITY OF THE RAIN INCREASED. WHEN ABLE (CLRING THE 1800' FLOOR OF THE NY TCA), WE INITIATED A CLB TO 2500'. AS WE LEVELED OFF AT 2500', WE FOUND THAT AT THIS ALT THE RAIN WAS NOW SNOW, EVEN THOUGH THE OAT WAS ABOUT PLUS 4 DEG C. WE STILL HAD 7-8 MI OF VISIBILITY AND HAD NOT REACHED ANY CLOUDS, HOWEVER I NOTICED THAT THE PRECIPITATION WAS FREEZING AND ACCUMULATING ON THE TIRES AND LEADING EDGE. FOR THIS REASON I INSTRUCTED MY STUDENT TO DSND TO 2000', WHERE THE PRECIPITATION WAS STRICTLY RAIN AND NOT FREEZING. WE ALSO DECIDED AT THIS TIME THAT WE WOULD RETURN TO THE ARPT. AFTER ORIENTING HIMSELF USING THE VOR AND MAKING A COUPLE OF TURNS TO ESTABLISH HIMSELF INBND, MY STUDENT HEADED TOWARD TEB AND CALLED THE TWR RPTING THAT HE WAS 10 MI N, INBND FOR A LNDG. WE RPTED CLOSER IN, AS INSTRUCTED AND WERE CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 19. AFTER RETURNING TO THE FBO, THERE WAS A TELEPHONE CALL FROM THE PLT OF AN LTT. HE CLAIMED THAT WHILE ON RADAR VECTORS TO THE VOR 24 APCH TO TEB, HE BROKE OUT OF THE CLOUDS AT 2500' AND SAW AN SMA R IN FRONT OF HIM. AFTER SPEAKING WITH HIM IT WAS NOT DETERMINED WHETHER OR NOT THE SMA HE SAW WAS THE ONE I WAS IN. I DID NOT SEE ANY LTT WHILE IN THE PRACTICE AREA. HOWEVER, IF IT WAS MY AIRPLANE THAT HE SAW, THAT WOULD PUT ME LESS THAN 500' BELOW THE CLOUDS (AND IN VIOLATION OF FAR'S). AS I STATED EARLIER, THE RPTED WX WAS 40 BKN, AND THE VISIBILITY WAS 12 MI. DURING OUR BRIEF STAY AT 2500', THE VISIBILITY WAS ABOUT 8 MI AND WE WERE NOT CLOSE TO BEING IN THE CLOUDS. WE DID DSND DUE TO THE FREEZING PRECIPITATION HOWEVER. THE PROB ENCOUNTERED BY THE LTT PLT AROSE WHEN HE WAS VECTORED BY NY APCH CTL DIRECTLY INTO (BOTH HDG ND ALT) CONFLICTING VFR TFC. A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS, ACCORDING TO THE LTT PLT, THAT HE WAS NOT MADE AWARE OF THIS TFC, IE, NO TFC ALERT WAS GIVEN. I THINK APCH SHOULD USE MORE CARE WHEN VECTORING TFC THROUGH A KNOWN PRACTICE AREA WHEN THE WX IS VFR. IF APCH IS UNAWARE OF THE PRACTICE AREA THEN THEY SHOULD BE MADE AWARE. THE TWO OTHER APCHS AT TEB USED MOST OFTEN (ILS6, VOR/DME A), DO NOT PASS THROUGH ANY PRACTICE AREAS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.