Narrative:

We had a TCAS RA at FL290 in cruise for an aircraft that was 1300' below us climbing to FL280. I did not react to the RA alert, since I had the aircraft in sight. It is possible that the TCAS might have read his rate of climb just before he leveled off and determined that he was a threat. ATC did not show a conflict or alert. 2 points: 1) pilots should cut their rate of climb/descent for the last 1000 to 500' to 1000 FPM. If my first officer has not slowed to at least 1000 FPM for the last 500', I protest to the point of taking over. 2) over the yrs we changed our reactions to emergencys by slowing doing--being methodical to the point of 'sitting on one's hands.' it has been proven that quick reactions cause worse problems over and above the primary emergency. The checklists have been changed so that the whole crew confirms actions taken. Now we are to react blindly to a dumb/dutiful computer that cries, 'climb.' if we continue to put blind trust in a computer, we will have more midairs and near midairs. TCAS is a handy tool, but should never be followed blindly!! It is a problem with TA alerts below 1000'. Right after takeoff, one has to disregard and really concentrate on just flying the aircraft. TCAS needs refinement, which I am sure will improve, but never to the point of blind obedience!!

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF LGT HAD TCAS RA, BUT IGNORED THE COMMAND ACCOUNT TRAFFIC IN SIGHT AND 1300' LOWER, LEVELING.

Narrative: WE HAD A TCAS RA AT FL290 IN CRUISE FOR AN ACFT THAT WAS 1300' BELOW US CLBING TO FL280. I DID NOT REACT TO THE RA ALERT, SINCE I HAD THE ACFT IN SIGHT. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE TCAS MIGHT HAVE READ HIS RATE OF CLB JUST BEFORE HE LEVELED OFF AND DETERMINED THAT HE WAS A THREAT. ATC DID NOT SHOW A CONFLICT OR ALERT. 2 POINTS: 1) PLTS SHOULD CUT THEIR RATE OF CLB/DSNT FOR THE LAST 1000 TO 500' TO 1000 FPM. IF MY F/O HAS NOT SLOWED TO AT LEAST 1000 FPM FOR THE LAST 500', I PROTEST TO THE POINT OF TAKING OVER. 2) OVER THE YRS WE CHANGED OUR REACTIONS TO EMERS BY SLOWING DOING--BEING METHODICAL TO THE POINT OF 'SITTING ON ONE'S HANDS.' IT HAS BEEN PROVEN THAT QUICK REACTIONS CAUSE WORSE PROBS OVER AND ABOVE THE PRIMARY EMER. THE CHKLISTS HAVE BEEN CHANGED SO THAT THE WHOLE CREW CONFIRMS ACTIONS TAKEN. NOW WE ARE TO REACT BLINDLY TO A DUMB/DUTIFUL COMPUTER THAT CRIES, 'CLB.' IF WE CONTINUE TO PUT BLIND TRUST IN A COMPUTER, WE WILL HAVE MORE MIDAIRS AND NEAR MIDAIRS. TCAS IS A HANDY TOOL, BUT SHOULD NEVER BE FOLLOWED BLINDLY!! IT IS A PROB WITH TA ALERTS BELOW 1000'. RIGHT AFTER TKOF, ONE HAS TO DISREGARD AND REALLY CONCENTRATE ON JUST FLYING THE ACFT. TCAS NEEDS REFINEMENT, WHICH I AM SURE WILL IMPROVE, BUT NEVER TO THE POINT OF BLIND OBEDIENCE!!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.