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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 177163 |
Time | |
Date | 199104 |
Day | Tue |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : bos |
State Reference | MA |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Light | Dusk |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng |
Navigation In Use | Other Other |
Flight Phase | landing other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Large Transport, Low Wing, 3 Turbojet Eng |
Flight Phase | climbout : takeoff other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 280 flight time total : 6000 flight time type : 2000 |
ASRS Report | 177163 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : instrument |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : ground less severe incursion : runway non adherence : clearance other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance flight crew : rejected takeoff other |
Consequence | Other |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 6000 vertical : 0 |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
We landed on runway 15R with ATIS calling for 700 2 r-f. Approaching 100 KTS and taxiway G, tower asked if we could exit on taxiway D. Not knowing where D was, west/O reading the chart, I told him we could make 'the one after G.' approaching D (but not knowing it was D), I noticed the turn was about 135 degrees and thought to myself that he couldn't mean this exit. Just after passing D, tower called and asked if we were going to make D, and before I could response, he told us to stop and hold our position, which we did. Unknown to us, he had cleared an air carrier large transport Y for takeoff on runway 9. Tower cancelled large transport Y's takeoff clearance, and told him to exit the runway. I was never issued a hold short clearance, and would not have accepted one had it been given to me. I do not recall ATIS reporting departures from runway 9, and assumed all takeoffs and lndgs were from 15R. While the controller was asking about D taxiway (which was not identifiable west/O a chart). I had a handful of aircraft to contend with. (Speed was about 100 KTS). I was making mandatory callouts for the copilot's landing, and attempting to switch aircraft control, etc. It was no time for me to be discussing exit from a runway from an intersection that was unidentifiable. This practice of tower's asking questions and issuing instructions during landing occurs frequently, and should be stopped. My first and only responsibility is to fly the aircraft.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ACR MLG FAILS TO EXIT ON PROPER TXWY AFTER LNDG AT BOS AND CONFLICT WITH ACR LGT Y CLEARED FOR TKOF RESULTS.
Narrative: WE LANDED ON RWY 15R WITH ATIS CALLING FOR 700 2 R-F. APCHING 100 KTS AND TXWY G, TWR ASKED IF WE COULD EXIT ON TXWY D. NOT KNOWING WHERE D WAS, W/O READING THE CHART, I TOLD HIM WE COULD MAKE 'THE ONE AFTER G.' APCHING D (BUT NOT KNOWING IT WAS D), I NOTICED THE TURN WAS ABOUT 135 DEGS AND THOUGHT TO MYSELF THAT HE COULDN'T MEAN THIS EXIT. JUST AFTER PASSING D, TWR CALLED AND ASKED IF WE WERE GOING TO MAKE D, AND BEFORE I COULD RESPONSE, HE TOLD US TO STOP AND HOLD OUR POS, WHICH WE DID. UNKNOWN TO US, HE HAD CLRED AN ACR LGT Y FOR TKOF ON RWY 9. TWR CANCELLED LGT Y'S TKOF CLRNC, AND TOLD HIM TO EXIT THE RWY. I WAS NEVER ISSUED A HOLD SHORT CLRNC, AND WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED ONE HAD IT BEEN GIVEN TO ME. I DO NOT RECALL ATIS RPTING DEPS FROM RWY 9, AND ASSUMED ALL TKOFS AND LNDGS WERE FROM 15R. WHILE THE CTLR WAS ASKING ABOUT D TXWY (WHICH WAS NOT IDENTIFIABLE W/O A CHART). I HAD A HANDFUL OF ACFT TO CONTEND WITH. (SPD WAS ABOUT 100 KTS). I WAS MAKING MANDATORY CALLOUTS FOR THE COPLT'S LNDG, AND ATTEMPTING TO SWITCH ACFT CTL, ETC. IT WAS NO TIME FOR ME TO BE DISCUSSING EXIT FROM A RWY FROM AN INTXN THAT WAS UNIDENTIFIABLE. THIS PRACTICE OF TWR'S ASKING QUESTIONS AND ISSUING INSTRUCTIONS DURING LNDG OCCURS FREQUENTLY, AND SHOULD BE STOPPED. MY FIRST AND ONLY RESPONSIBILITY IS TO FLY THE ACFT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.