Narrative:

While on a training flight to timmerman field, milwaukee, wi, I requested the VOR 15L approach for practice. We were radar vectored to the final approach course, level at 2500' MSL assigned. With current ATIS information and altimeters set, we intercepted and tracked inbound on the final approach course as published. Mke approach control cleared us for the approach and we proceeded inbound. While inbound, we lost the DME readout in our aircraft, I idented and set the navigation 2 receive to the cross radial to identify the final approach fix (atown FAF, cross radial 063 degrees from bae VOR). Upon crossing the FAF inbound, we started the descent to the MDA. After descending approximately 200', the controller issued an altitude alert, the current altimeter setting (which I x-chked against the altimeters) and advised us to contact tower. I initiated a climb back to 2500' MSL and double-checked the chart to verify we were inside the FAF. As we were FAF inbound and cleared for the approach, I queried the controller. The controller stated we were cleared for the approach, reissued the altitude alert, altimeter setting and instructions to contact the tower. I reported the start of descent from 2500' MSL for the approach and contacted the tower. The tower requested a 1 mi report and gave circling instructions to expect. Between the FAF and the VOR (map) we had descended to only about 1900' MSL. The published MDA was 1280'-category B. I did not have the field in sight until passing over the runway complex just prior to the map due to distraction. The WX was VFR and visibility was better than 10 mi in my estimation; however, I missed the 1 mi report requested by the tower and was late to visually identify the field. Upon reporting the field in sight, the tower issued circling instructions which we followed to landing. Upon landing, I queried the tower controller about the altitude alert, but he did not know what had occurred. After shutdown, I called mke approach control (phone) and spoke with supervisor on duty. I explained the situation and my lack of understanding why we had been issued an altitude alert. He said that possibly we had a high sink rate (we had only descended about 200') and said the computer determines when an altitude alert is required. As I still did not understand why the alert was issued, we discussed the approach procedure further. This advice was for future situations like this to acknowledge the alert and continue on the approach as cleared, but west/O further information for me other than to say that the computer will issue the alert notice to the controller, which must be passed on to the pilot. In summary, we were cleared for the VOR 15L approach and followed the published procedures. However, we were issued an altitude alert, which I believe was in error. Consequences of above situation: 1) distraction from published approach, cause of cockpit confusion. 2) lack of proper descent rate from the FAF inbound to ensure reaching the MDA in a timely manner. 3) distraction from obtaining visibility reference to the airport in a timely manner, missing the requested 1 mi reporter. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reporter contacted for additional information. The reporter indicates that several other pilots have also received false altitude alert warnings from ATC at mwc. The FAA is not pursuing the matter.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TRAINING SMT INSTRUCTOR GETS FALSE ALT ALERT WARNING FROM APCH CTLR, LEADS TO MISSED RADIO CALL.

Narrative: WHILE ON A TRNING FLT TO TIMMERMAN FIELD, MILWAUKEE, WI, I REQUESTED THE VOR 15L APCH FOR PRACTICE. WE WERE RADAR VECTORED TO THE FINAL APCH COURSE, LEVEL AT 2500' MSL ASSIGNED. WITH CURRENT ATIS INFO AND ALTIMETERS SET, WE INTERCEPTED AND TRACKED INBND ON THE FINAL APCH COURSE AS PUBLISHED. MKE APCH CTL CLRED US FOR THE APCH AND WE PROCEEDED INBND. WHILE INBND, WE LOST THE DME READOUT IN OUR ACFT, I IDENTED AND SET THE NAV 2 RECEIVE TO THE CROSS RADIAL TO IDENT THE FINAL APCH FIX (ATOWN FAF, CROSS RADIAL 063 DEGS FROM BAE VOR). UPON XING THE FAF INBND, WE STARTED THE DSNT TO THE MDA. AFTER DSNDING APPROX 200', THE CTLR ISSUED AN ALT ALERT, THE CURRENT ALTIMETER SETTING (WHICH I X-CHKED AGAINST THE ALTIMETERS) AND ADVISED US TO CONTACT TWR. I INITIATED A CLB BACK TO 2500' MSL AND DOUBLE-CHKED THE CHART TO VERIFY WE WERE INSIDE THE FAF. AS WE WERE FAF INBND AND CLRED FOR THE APCH, I QUERIED THE CTLR. THE CTLR STATED WE WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH, REISSUED THE ALT ALERT, ALTIMETER SETTING AND INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTACT THE TWR. I RPTED THE START OF DSNT FROM 2500' MSL FOR THE APCH AND CONTACTED THE TWR. THE TWR REQUESTED A 1 MI RPT AND GAVE CIRCLING INSTRUCTIONS TO EXPECT. BTWN THE FAF AND THE VOR (MAP) WE HAD DSNDED TO ONLY ABOUT 1900' MSL. THE PUBLISHED MDA WAS 1280'-CATEGORY B. I DID NOT HAVE THE FIELD IN SIGHT UNTIL PASSING OVER THE RWY COMPLEX JUST PRIOR TO THE MAP DUE TO DISTR. THE WX WAS VFR AND VISIBILITY WAS BETTER THAN 10 MI IN MY ESTIMATION; HOWEVER, I MISSED THE 1 MI RPT REQUESTED BY THE TWR AND WAS LATE TO VISUALLY IDENT THE FIELD. UPON RPTING THE FIELD IN SIGHT, THE TWR ISSUED CIRCLING INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WE FOLLOWED TO LNDG. UPON LNDG, I QUERIED THE TWR CTLR ABOUT THE ALT ALERT, BUT HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT HAD OCCURRED. AFTER SHUTDOWN, I CALLED MKE APCH CTL (PHONE) AND SPOKE WITH SUPVR ON DUTY. I EXPLAINED THE SITUATION AND MY LACK OF UNDERSTANDING WHY WE HAD BEEN ISSUED AN ALT ALERT. HE SAID THAT POSSIBLY WE HAD A HIGH SINK RATE (WE HAD ONLY DSNDED ABOUT 200') AND SAID THE COMPUTER DETERMINES WHEN AN ALT ALERT IS REQUIRED. AS I STILL DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE ALERT WAS ISSUED, WE DISCUSSED THE APCH PROC FURTHER. THIS ADVICE WAS FOR FUTURE SITUATIONS LIKE THIS TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE ALERT AND CONTINUE ON THE APCH AS CLRED, BUT W/O FURTHER INFO FOR ME OTHER THAN TO SAY THAT THE COMPUTER WILL ISSUE THE ALERT NOTICE TO THE CTLR, WHICH MUST BE PASSED ON TO THE PLT. IN SUMMARY, WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VOR 15L APCH AND FOLLOWED THE PUBLISHED PROCS. HOWEVER, WE WERE ISSUED AN ALT ALERT, WHICH I BELIEVE WAS IN ERROR. CONSEQUENCES OF ABOVE SITUATION: 1) DISTR FROM PUBLISHED APCH, CAUSE OF COCKPIT CONFUSION. 2) LACK OF PROPER DSNT RATE FROM THE FAF INBND TO ENSURE REACHING THE MDA IN A TIMELY MANNER. 3) DISTR FROM OBTAINING VIS REF TO THE ARPT IN A TIMELY MANNER, MISSING THE REQUESTED 1 MI RPTR. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: RPTR CONTACTED FOR ADDITIONAL INFO. THE RPTR INDICATES THAT SEVERAL OTHER PLTS HAVE ALSO RECEIVED FALSE ALT ALERT WARNINGS FROM ATC AT MWC. THE FAA IS NOT PURSUING THE MATTER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.