Narrative:

Before departure from gye for mia, we planned the flight based upon information given by the company that we would operate as normal through cuban airspace. We were told the permits were arranged. We planned the flight and fueled the aircraft with ample fuel for the overflt of cuban airspace. Before our arrival at the cuban airspace boundary, kingston control informed us that the cuban overflt was not arranged and that we would be required to go around. We elected to around the western end of cuba because of the shorter distance to mia from where we started, and the fact that there were a greater # of suitable airports within a short fuel range. The lack of a cuban overflt permit and the requirement to fly around cuba added approximately 400+ mi to our flight. When we were in contact with ZMA, we declared 'minimum fuel.' the controller did not seem to understand the meaning of that term because he asked our flight if we intended to land at key west. We responded that we intended to land at mia. When we were on approach to runway 9R at mia and extended the landing gear, the red landing gear unsafe light remained on and the nose gear green light did not come on. We recycled the gear and did not correct the problem. The F/east was unable to verify the nose gear down and locked through the nose gear viewing port in the cockpit floor. I thought at the time that the reason he could not see the marks was because the port or the marks on the links were obscured or obstructed. He has since told me that he could see the marks and they were not lined up. This would indicate that the nose gear was probably not down and locked. Whether the gear was down and locked or not before the landing would not have changed my decision to land with the gear extended. However, to be accurate it was the only point of confusion between the F/east and me. We then informed the tower that we had a nose gear unsafe indication and would require a fly-by the tower to check the nose gear extension. During the fly-by the tower informed us that the nose gear appeared normal. With that report from tower, I elected to leave the landing gear extended and we requested an immediate return to 9R. After the aircraft was parked we found the nose landing gear downlock bungee cylinder upper bracket broken, and the cylinder loose and attached only in 1 of 2 required locations. In reality, I did not have and could not be expected to have a real-time, actual fuel remaining figure after the initial missed approach and fly-by of the tower. As soon as we leveled off to miss the first approach, all of our normal descent and landing fuel burn estimates are out the tailpipe. After the landing, while we were awaiting maintenance personnel to insert a gear pin in the nose gear, I checked the quantities of 2 fuel gauges and based upon that gave ground control an estimate (at their request) of 15 mins. I was wrong--I was being conservative and there was actually 30 mins remaining, as later measured from the aircraft dripsticks when the aircraft was later parked at the ramp. However, I could have been wrong in the other direction just as easily. Aircraft fuel gauges and normal methods of monitoring fuel burn over a trip of this length simply do not provide the ability to determine how much fuel is left within 15 mins.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATX HVT ON FLT FROM SOUTH AMERICA TO MIA IS FORCED TO GO AROUND CUBA DUE FLT PLAN FILING ERROR, ENDS UP AT MIA WITH MINIMUM FUEL AND UNRELATED LNDG GEAR PROBLEM.

Narrative: BEFORE DEP FROM GYE FOR MIA, WE PLANNED THE FLT BASED UPON INFO GIVEN BY THE COMPANY THAT WE WOULD OPERATE AS NORMAL THROUGH CUBAN AIRSPACE. WE WERE TOLD THE PERMITS WERE ARRANGED. WE PLANNED THE FLT AND FUELED THE ACFT WITH AMPLE FUEL FOR THE OVERFLT OF CUBAN AIRSPACE. BEFORE OUR ARR AT THE CUBAN AIRSPACE BOUNDARY, KINGSTON CTL INFORMED US THAT THE CUBAN OVERFLT WAS NOT ARRANGED AND THAT WE WOULD BE REQUIRED TO GO AROUND. WE ELECTED TO AROUND THE WESTERN END OF CUBA BECAUSE OF THE SHORTER DISTANCE TO MIA FROM WHERE WE STARTED, AND THE FACT THAT THERE WERE A GREATER # OF SUITABLE ARPTS WITHIN A SHORT FUEL RANGE. THE LACK OF A CUBAN OVERFLT PERMIT AND THE REQUIREMENT TO FLY AROUND CUBA ADDED APPROX 400+ MI TO OUR FLT. WHEN WE WERE IN CONTACT WITH ZMA, WE DECLARED 'MINIMUM FUEL.' THE CTLR DID NOT SEEM TO UNDERSTAND THE MEANING OF THAT TERM BECAUSE HE ASKED OUR FLT IF WE INTENDED TO LAND AT KEY WEST. WE RESPONDED THAT WE INTENDED TO LAND AT MIA. WHEN WE WERE ON APCH TO RWY 9R AT MIA AND EXTENDED THE LNDG GEAR, THE RED LNDG GEAR UNSAFE LIGHT REMAINED ON AND THE NOSE GEAR GREEN LIGHT DID NOT COME ON. WE RECYCLED THE GEAR AND DID NOT CORRECT THE PROB. THE F/E WAS UNABLE TO VERIFY THE NOSE GEAR DOWN AND LOCKED THROUGH THE NOSE GEAR VIEWING PORT IN THE COCKPIT FLOOR. I THOUGHT AT THE TIME THAT THE REASON HE COULD NOT SEE THE MARKS WAS BECAUSE THE PORT OR THE MARKS ON THE LINKS WERE OBSCURED OR OBSTRUCTED. HE HAS SINCE TOLD ME THAT HE COULD SEE THE MARKS AND THEY WERE NOT LINED UP. THIS WOULD INDICATE THAT THE NOSE GEAR WAS PROBABLY NOT DOWN AND LOCKED. WHETHER THE GEAR WAS DOWN AND LOCKED OR NOT BEFORE THE LNDG WOULD NOT HAVE CHANGED MY DECISION TO LAND WITH THE GEAR EXTENDED. HOWEVER, TO BE ACCURATE IT WAS THE ONLY POINT OF CONFUSION BTWN THE F/E AND ME. WE THEN INFORMED THE TWR THAT WE HAD A NOSE GEAR UNSAFE INDICATION AND WOULD REQUIRE A FLY-BY THE TWR TO CHK THE NOSE GEAR EXTENSION. DURING THE FLY-BY THE TWR INFORMED US THAT THE NOSE GEAR APPEARED NORMAL. WITH THAT RPT FROM TWR, I ELECTED TO LEAVE THE LNDG GEAR EXTENDED AND WE REQUESTED AN IMMEDIATE RETURN TO 9R. AFTER THE ACFT WAS PARKED WE FOUND THE NOSE LNDG GEAR DOWNLOCK BUNGEE CYLINDER UPPER BRACKET BROKEN, AND THE CYLINDER LOOSE AND ATTACHED ONLY IN 1 OF 2 REQUIRED LOCATIONS. IN REALITY, I DID NOT HAVE AND COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO HAVE A REAL-TIME, ACTUAL FUEL REMAINING FIGURE AFTER THE INITIAL MISSED APCH AND FLY-BY OF THE TWR. AS SOON AS WE LEVELED OFF TO MISS THE FIRST APCH, ALL OF OUR NORMAL DSNT AND LNDG FUEL BURN ESTIMATES ARE OUT THE TAILPIPE. AFTER THE LNDG, WHILE WE WERE AWAITING MAINT PERSONNEL TO INSERT A GEAR PIN IN THE NOSE GEAR, I CHKED THE QUANTITIES OF 2 FUEL GAUGES AND BASED UPON THAT GAVE GND CTL AN ESTIMATE (AT THEIR REQUEST) OF 15 MINS. I WAS WRONG--I WAS BEING CONSERVATIVE AND THERE WAS ACTUALLY 30 MINS REMAINING, AS LATER MEASURED FROM THE ACFT DRIPSTICKS WHEN THE ACFT WAS LATER PARKED AT THE RAMP. HOWEVER, I COULD HAVE BEEN WRONG IN THE OTHER DIRECTION JUST AS EASILY. ACFT FUEL GAUGES AND NORMAL METHODS OF MONITORING FUEL BURN OVER A TRIP OF THIS LENGTH SIMPLY DO NOT PROVIDE THE ABILITY TO DETERMINE HOW MUCH FUEL IS LEFT WITHIN 15 MINS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.