Narrative:

While operating flight under part 91 to reposition to boston, unusual smell was noted intermittently during climb out. Initial action was to turn off windshield heat. When smell seemed to return mins later, suspected wind shield wiper motor, as this is common in another type of aircraft I have flown (wipers were used during takeoff and initial climb). When the smell persisted over the next min or so, an attempt was made to detect any smoke in the cabin. This was accomplished by use of cabin overhead lights, cockpit flood light and the flashlight. Particular attention was paid to the area of the center aisle floor adjacent to the wing spar, where the bulk of the electrical system major components reside. No smoke was found at this time and the first officer confirmed no circuit breaker's had popped. Several moments later a very strong electrical type smell was noted and smoke was seen coming from the portion of the instrument panel below the gen load meters. At this time ATC gave us the handoff to manchester approach. Because it was necessary to remove all electrical power (i.e., gens and battery) in order to prevent a self-sustaining fire, I advised ATC that we had or would be having an electrical fire and that we would reestablish contact. This advisory was delivered in great haste due to my desire to remove current from the faulty circuit, and I do not recall the exact words used. Using a flashlight, I continued flying the aircraft. An attempt was made to restore electrical power by bringing each gen and the battery on line individually for a momentary interval. At this same time the first officer called out the pertinent emergency checklist items. At this time the circuit breaker panel was rechked and the 'switch panel' lighting circuit breaker had popped. All cockpit lighting was then turned off, and the gens and battery were returned to service. At this time we reestablished contact with ATC and restored all cockpit lighting with the exception of the lower panel 'switch panel' lighting. These controls were easily seen by use of the cockpit flood light, and instrument panel indirect lighting. Because the faulty circuit had been isolated and secured when communications were re-established, and because the condition did not become self-sustaining (i.e., no flame observed) I elected to continue to the destination airport for the following reasons: 1) WX at manchester was not significantly better than at boston. 2) I didn't want to fly the published approach at leb due to terrain and lack of ATC radar coverage. 3) in the event that the problem were to reappear or another problem develop, I felt that the services available at bos were the most comprehensive available.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COMMUTER ACFT ON FERRY FLT EXPERIENCES ELECTRICAL COMPONENT FAILURE WHICH LEADS TO TEMPORARY SHUTDOWN OF THE ACFT ELECTRICAL SYSTEM.

Narrative: WHILE OPERATING FLT UNDER PART 91 TO REPOSITION TO BOSTON, UNUSUAL SMELL WAS NOTED INTERMITTENTLY DURING CLBOUT. INITIAL ACTION WAS TO TURN OFF WINDSHIELD HEAT. WHEN SMELL SEEMED TO RETURN MINS LATER, SUSPECTED WIND SHIELD WIPER MOTOR, AS THIS IS COMMON IN ANOTHER TYPE OF ACFT I HAVE FLOWN (WIPERS WERE USED DURING TKOF AND INITIAL CLB). WHEN THE SMELL PERSISTED OVER THE NEXT MIN OR SO, AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO DETECT ANY SMOKE IN THE CABIN. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY USE OF CABIN OVERHEAD LIGHTS, COCKPIT FLOOD LIGHT AND THE FLASHLIGHT. PARTICULAR ATTN WAS PAID TO THE AREA OF THE CENTER AISLE FLOOR ADJACENT TO THE WING SPAR, WHERE THE BULK OF THE ELECTRICAL SYS MAJOR COMPONENTS RESIDE. NO SMOKE WAS FOUND AT THIS TIME AND THE F/O CONFIRMED NO CB'S HAD POPPED. SEVERAL MOMENTS LATER A VERY STRONG ELECTRICAL TYPE SMELL WAS NOTED AND SMOKE WAS SEEN COMING FROM THE PORTION OF THE INST PANEL BELOW THE GEN LOAD METERS. AT THIS TIME ATC GAVE US THE HDOF TO MANCHESTER APCH. BECAUSE IT WAS NECESSARY TO REMOVE ALL ELECTRICAL PWR (I.E., GENS AND BATTERY) IN ORDER TO PREVENT A SELF-SUSTAINING FIRE, I ADVISED ATC THAT WE HAD OR WOULD BE HAVING AN ELECTRICAL FIRE AND THAT WE WOULD REESTABLISH CONTACT. THIS ADVISORY WAS DELIVERED IN GREAT HASTE DUE TO MY DESIRE TO REMOVE CURRENT FROM THE FAULTY CIRCUIT, AND I DO NOT RECALL THE EXACT WORDS USED. USING A FLASHLIGHT, I CONTINUED FLYING THE ACFT. AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO RESTORE ELECTRICAL PWR BY BRINGING EACH GEN AND THE BATTERY ON LINE INDIVIDUALLY FOR A MOMENTARY INTERVAL. AT THIS SAME TIME THE F/O CALLED OUT THE PERTINENT EMER CHKLIST ITEMS. AT THIS TIME THE CB PANEL WAS RECHKED AND THE 'SWITCH PANEL' LIGHTING CB HAD POPPED. ALL COCKPIT LIGHTING WAS THEN TURNED OFF, AND THE GENS AND BATTERY WERE RETURNED TO SVC. AT THIS TIME WE REESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH ATC AND RESTORED ALL COCKPIT LIGHTING WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE LOWER PANEL 'SWITCH PANEL' LIGHTING. THESE CTLS WERE EASILY SEEN BY USE OF THE COCKPIT FLOOD LIGHT, AND INST PANEL INDIRECT LIGHTING. BECAUSE THE FAULTY CIRCUIT HAD BEEN ISOLATED AND SECURED WHEN COMS WERE RE-ESTABLISHED, AND BECAUSE THE CONDITION DID NOT BECOME SELF-SUSTAINING (I.E., NO FLAME OBSERVED) I ELECTED TO CONTINUE TO THE DEST ARPT FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: 1) WX AT MANCHESTER WAS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY BETTER THAN AT BOSTON. 2) I DIDN'T WANT TO FLY THE PUBLISHED APCH AT LEB DUE TO TERRAIN AND LACK OF ATC RADAR COVERAGE. 3) IN THE EVENT THAT THE PROB WERE TO REAPPEAR OR ANOTHER PROB DEVELOP, I FELT THAT THE SVCS AVAILABLE AT BOS WERE THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE AVAILABLE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.