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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 179563 |
Time | |
Date | 199105 |
Day | Tue |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : lax |
State Reference | CA |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 6000 msl bound upper : 6000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : lax |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Widebody, Low Wing, 4 Turbojet Eng |
Navigation In Use | Other |
Flight Phase | descent : approach other |
Route In Use | enroute : on vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp pilot : commercial pilot : instrument pilot : cfi |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 100 flight time total : 23000 flight time type : 70 |
ASRS Report | 179563 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : commercial |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : clearance other spatial deviation |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
Taken off of smo VOR by lax approach for a radar vector to right base leg to ILS for the 24's at lax. During this radar vector, the controller suddenly asked what our heading was. We were then given amended heading and altitude and taken through the approachs to the 24's and revectored to a left base for the 25's at lax. The controller made reference to some confusion during our vector and that this would work out much better. I am sure of our initial turn to 210 degrees and descent clearance, but don't believe my first officer was the one who made the acknowledgement to ATC. Our airline has so much chatter required during the approach checks and process that while I follow it religiously, I feel it is unsafe in that it concentrates on cockpit chatter rather than on the outside and ATC environment. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: callback centered on checklist and flow requirements of the parent airline in this merged airline. Reporter credits vp operations for much of the problems of convoluted checklists and cockpit flows, which cause excessive chatter in the cockpit and questionable effectiveness of the checking function. Reporter pointed out that the vp operations has only about 900 hours experience in airline cockpits. One example he cited is that the final descent checklist is performed before the landing gear is extended. Then, upon extension of the gear, 'final items' are asked for. Another example: on taxi-out, a most likely flap setting, often 15 degrees, is set and the before takeoff checklist is performed. If weight, temperature, wind or runway changes cause the flap setting to be changed, there is no further check to see that the changes were made correctly. He thinks that a fatal accident was caused by this alleged shortcoming of their checklist procedures. He further complains that there is little standardization of SOP between different aircraft types, making it more likely to have misunderstandings in the cockpit when 1 crew member has recently xferred from another aircraft type.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: WDB TURNS TO WRONG VECTOR HEADING CAUSING APCH CTLR FLT CREW CONFUSION.
Narrative: TAKEN OFF OF SMO VOR BY LAX APCH FOR A RADAR VECTOR TO RIGHT BASE LEG TO ILS FOR THE 24'S AT LAX. DURING THIS RADAR VECTOR, THE CTLR SUDDENLY ASKED WHAT OUR HDG WAS. WE WERE THEN GIVEN AMENDED HDG AND ALT AND TAKEN THROUGH THE APCHS TO THE 24'S AND REVECTORED TO A LEFT BASE FOR THE 25'S AT LAX. THE CTLR MADE REF TO SOME CONFUSION DURING OUR VECTOR AND THAT THIS WOULD WORK OUT MUCH BETTER. I AM SURE OF OUR INITIAL TURN TO 210 DEGS AND DSNT CLRNC, BUT DON'T BELIEVE MY F/O WAS THE ONE WHO MADE THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT TO ATC. OUR AIRLINE HAS SO MUCH CHATTER REQUIRED DURING THE APCH CHKS AND PROCESS THAT WHILE I FOLLOW IT RELIGIOUSLY, I FEEL IT IS UNSAFE IN THAT IT CONCENTRATES ON COCKPIT CHATTER RATHER THAN ON THE OUTSIDE AND ATC ENVIRONMENT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: CALLBACK CENTERED ON CHKLIST AND FLOW REQUIREMENTS OF THE PARENT AIRLINE IN THIS MERGED AIRLINE. RPTR CREDITS VP OPS FOR MUCH OF THE PROBS OF CONVOLUTED CHKLISTS AND COCKPIT FLOWS, WHICH CAUSE EXCESSIVE CHATTER IN THE COCKPIT AND QUESTIONABLE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CHKING FUNCTION. RPTR POINTED OUT THAT THE VP OPS HAS ONLY ABOUT 900 HRS EXPERIENCE IN AIRLINE COCKPITS. ONE EXAMPLE HE CITED IS THAT THE FINAL DSNT CHKLIST IS PERFORMED BEFORE THE LNDG GEAR IS EXTENDED. THEN, UPON EXTENSION OF THE GEAR, 'FINAL ITEMS' ARE ASKED FOR. ANOTHER EXAMPLE: ON TAXI-OUT, A MOST LIKELY FLAP SETTING, OFTEN 15 DEGS, IS SET AND THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST IS PERFORMED. IF WT, TEMP, WIND OR RWY CHANGES CAUSE THE FLAP SETTING TO BE CHANGED, THERE IS NO FURTHER CHK TO SEE THAT THE CHANGES WERE MADE CORRECTLY. HE THINKS THAT A FATAL ACCIDENT WAS CAUSED BY THIS ALLEGED SHORTCOMING OF THEIR CHKLIST PROCS. HE FURTHER COMPLAINS THAT THERE IS LITTLE STANDARDIZATION OF SOP BTWN DIFFERENT ACFT TYPES, MAKING IT MORE LIKELY TO HAVE MISUNDERSTANDINGS IN THE COCKPIT WHEN 1 CREW MEMBER HAS RECENTLY XFERRED FROM ANOTHER ACFT TYPE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.