Narrative:

I was conducting a biennial flight review in an small aircraft with a single control wheel. The pilot was asked to fly from centennial to front range airport and made a short field landing. Several errors and poor checklist usage were noted on runway before departure. On approach to ftg, the pilot was not 'ahead of the aircraft,' and elected to turn away for one circle before reentering the pattern--on base leg. The pilot did not do a prelndg cockpit check which I, as the instrument, noted and intended to remind the pilot of later, if he didn't do it. The subsequent approach was hurried, low, with flaps coming down late and off centerline approaching the runway. The pilot still had not done the prelndg check and I, as the instrument, was distracted by watching the poor approach and also failed to catch the fact that the gear was not down before actual contact with the ground--even though I intended to, long before. Factors to prevent: 1) religious, meticulous use of checklists by pilot out loud, no matter what the distraction. 2) making a normal pattern and approach so that more time would have been available to 'remember' the checklist. 3) instrument needed to catch major error (gear not down) much before the last minute on final and remind the pilot in time to fix. 4) the pilot advised that he had not gotten a lot of sleep the night before. 5) both pilot and instrument had not flown a lot recently and needed to be more diligent. 6) it appears that the gear up warning horn was inoperative and pilot knew that. Supplemental information from acn 180046: I, as pilot, failed to lower gear and landed gear up, sliding to stop on runway 26. I realized gear was not down perhaps 1 second before ground contact. The flight was to accomplish my biannual flight review. The instrument is a co-owner of the aircraft, a long time personal friend and someone I admire and respect as a very competent instrument and pilot. I have flown with him often, and I had always tried to fly 'perfectly' when with him--not because of intimidation, but competitiveness. He had requested I demonstrate a short field landing (2000' runway length assumed) as my first landing. He also continued to offer distraction, mostly with questions and conversation. I allowed myself to focus only on the intended T/D pont and speed. The 'focus' was so intent and narrow that I completely overlooked the performance of a prelndg checklist. As I result, I failed to extend the gear--even to reach for or touch the gear retraction/extension lever. Other identifiable factors that may have been contributing to incident but are difficult or impossible to avoid: 1) my own aversion of extreme cockpit discipline; i.e., only 1 way to do things and they must be done that way every time. 2) a pilot or student subconscious attitude that the instrument will not allow any 'big' mistakes. 3) pilot/instrument relationship outside of cockpit. 4) familiarity between pilot/instrument re: strengths/weaknesses, likes/dislikes, reactions, methods of operation, behavior, etc. 5) too little discussion of plan of flight; i.e., to the point of raising doubt about what we would be doing in the next 10 mins, the next activity to follow the current activity, etc.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GEAR UP LNDG.

Narrative: I WAS CONDUCTING A BIENNIAL FLT REVIEW IN AN SMA WITH A SINGLE CTL WHEEL. THE PLT WAS ASKED TO FLY FROM CENTENNIAL TO FRONT RANGE ARPT AND MADE A SHORT FIELD LNDG. SEVERAL ERRORS AND POOR CHKLIST USAGE WERE NOTED ON RWY BEFORE DEP. ON APCH TO FTG, THE PLT WAS NOT 'AHEAD OF THE ACFT,' AND ELECTED TO TURN AWAY FOR ONE CIRCLE BEFORE REENTERING THE PATTERN--ON BASE LEG. THE PLT DID NOT DO A PRELNDG COCKPIT CHK WHICH I, AS THE INSTR, NOTED AND INTENDED TO REMIND THE PLT OF LATER, IF HE DIDN'T DO IT. THE SUBSEQUENT APCH WAS HURRIED, LOW, WITH FLAPS COMING DOWN LATE AND OFF CENTERLINE APCHING THE RWY. THE PLT STILL HAD NOT DONE THE PRELNDG CHK AND I, AS THE INSTR, WAS DISTRACTED BY WATCHING THE POOR APCH AND ALSO FAILED TO CATCH THE FACT THAT THE GEAR WAS NOT DOWN BEFORE ACTUAL CONTACT WITH THE GND--EVEN THOUGH I INTENDED TO, LONG BEFORE. FACTORS TO PREVENT: 1) RELIGIOUS, METICULOUS USE OF CHKLISTS BY PLT OUT LOUD, NO MATTER WHAT THE DISTR. 2) MAKING A NORMAL PATTERN AND APCH SO THAT MORE TIME WOULD HAVE BEEN AVAILABLE TO 'REMEMBER' THE CHKLIST. 3) INSTR NEEDED TO CATCH MAJOR ERROR (GEAR NOT DOWN) MUCH BEFORE THE LAST MINUTE ON FINAL AND REMIND THE PLT IN TIME TO FIX. 4) THE PLT ADVISED THAT HE HAD NOT GOTTEN A LOT OF SLEEP THE NIGHT BEFORE. 5) BOTH PLT AND INSTR HAD NOT FLOWN A LOT RECENTLY AND NEEDED TO BE MORE DILIGENT. 6) IT APPEARS THAT THE GEAR UP WARNING HORN WAS INOP AND PLT KNEW THAT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 180046: I, AS PLT, FAILED TO LOWER GEAR AND LANDED GEAR UP, SLIDING TO STOP ON RWY 26. I REALIZED GEAR WAS NOT DOWN PERHAPS 1 SEC BEFORE GND CONTACT. THE FLT WAS TO ACCOMPLISH MY BIANNUAL FLT REVIEW. THE INSTR IS A CO-OWNER OF THE ACFT, A LONG TIME PERSONAL FRIEND AND SOMEONE I ADMIRE AND RESPECT AS A VERY COMPETENT INSTR AND PLT. I HAVE FLOWN WITH HIM OFTEN, AND I HAD ALWAYS TRIED TO FLY 'PERFECTLY' WHEN WITH HIM--NOT BECAUSE OF INTIMIDATION, BUT COMPETITIVENESS. HE HAD REQUESTED I DEMONSTRATE A SHORT FIELD LNDG (2000' RWY LENGTH ASSUMED) AS MY FIRST LNDG. HE ALSO CONTINUED TO OFFER DISTR, MOSTLY WITH QUESTIONS AND CONVERSATION. I ALLOWED MYSELF TO FOCUS ONLY ON THE INTENDED T/D PONT AND SPD. THE 'FOCUS' WAS SO INTENT AND NARROW THAT I COMPLETELY OVERLOOKED THE PERFORMANCE OF A PRELNDG CHKLIST. AS I RESULT, I FAILED TO EXTEND THE GEAR--EVEN TO REACH FOR OR TOUCH THE GEAR RETRACTION/EXTENSION LEVER. OTHER IDENTIFIABLE FACTORS THAT MAY HAVE BEEN CONTRIBUTING TO INCIDENT BUT ARE DIFFICULT OR IMPOSSIBLE TO AVOID: 1) MY OWN AVERSION OF EXTREME COCKPIT DISCIPLINE; I.E., ONLY 1 WAY TO DO THINGS AND THEY MUST BE DONE THAT WAY EVERY TIME. 2) A PLT OR STUDENT SUBCONSCIOUS ATTITUDE THAT THE INSTR WILL NOT ALLOW ANY 'BIG' MISTAKES. 3) PLT/INSTR RELATIONSHIP OUTSIDE OF COCKPIT. 4) FAMILIARITY BTWN PLT/INSTR RE: STRENGTHS/WEAKNESSES, LIKES/DISLIKES, REACTIONS, METHODS OF OPERATION, BEHAVIOR, ETC. 5) TOO LITTLE DISCUSSION OF PLAN OF FLT; I.E., TO THE POINT OF RAISING DOUBT ABOUT WHAT WE WOULD BE DOING IN THE NEXT 10 MINS, THE NEXT ACTIVITY TO FOLLOW THE CURRENT ACTIVITY, ETC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.