Narrative:

Arrived guc, normal arrival, saw no ground vehs on or around aircraft movement areas of airport. Upon departing within 10 mins, found paint truck and painter on taxiway adjacent to our intended departure runway, runway 24. Unicom operator made no mention of this when captain called for airport advisory upon leaving chocks. I was busy with passenger briefing,checking manifest, figuring takeoff data/airspeed bugs, et. Looked up and saw captain turn away from taxiway and onto runway. He announced his intention to backtaxi on runway 24. As we turned onto the runway, I looked out my window at the approach to runway 06 and announced, 'clear right,' as is always my habit. During backtaxi down runway 24, I returned to my duties and overheard a male voice on unicom ask captain, 'is that truck going to be in your way?' we both looked ahead and to the left at the parallel taxiway and noted an additional veh, a pickup truck, on the taxiway driving away from the approach end of runway 24 toward us, but on the taxiway. As we were backtaxiing on runway 24, captain replied, 'no, we'll just taxi down here and turn around and take off.' unicom replied ok. After this I initiated taxi checklist. Read 'flaps.' captain responded, 'takeoff.' I added, 'with the gauge.' read 'takeoff data and bugs,' at which point captain interrupted: 'we'll go flaps up,' and then retracted flaps. I retrieved takeoff speed chart and looked up new V speeds, called them out and completed checklist. At this point we were at the end of runway 24. I announced to unicom, 'guc unicom and traffic, air carrier xy departing runway 24, left downwind departure.' captain began 180 degree turn on runway, and I started to read takeoff checklist. As he was busy with the turn, and due to my previous experience with his attitude toward checklists, I challenged and responded to the checklist items myself. We completed the checklist with 'power steering to go,' as he began to pus the power up for takeoff. As the aircraft accelerated 40-50 KIAS, I noticed power steering was not off. Switch is on center console and requires complete heads down to verify off. Although it is automatically disengaged at approximately 80% N1, checklist and prudence requires the 3 position toggle switch to be off. I moved switch to off and announced, 'takeoff check complete,' as we accelerated through approximately 80 KIAS. As it was warm outside and the aircraft has tendency to overtemp on takeoff due to ram rise, I had more attention inside on engine gauges than normal. As we accelerated through V1, it began to rise to red line. Upon captain's 'gear up' call, itt was above red line. I pulled gear up and quickly pulled back power levers to keep engines at red line. An exclamation from captain brought my attention outside. We both looked up at approximately 50' AGL to see a truck on the far end of runway 24 parked on the TDZ markers for runway 06. Workers were seen repainting these markers as we flew over at approximately 250' AGL. At this point I began to contact center on communication 2 for our clearance and turned off my intercom switch to communication 1. Captain was discussing the incident with a female voice over unicom/CTAF frequency. I have written a rather lengthy description because I feel this situation represents a classic human performance/factors deficiency. 1) commuter environment is fast-paces. Many actions need to be accomplished from door closure to departure. As this aircraft has no F/a, first officer is responsible for lengthy safety briefing. First officer responsible for ensure manifest, figured by ground personnel, is correct. First officer must figure V speeds for takeoff. No problem, usually, but some capts rush to depart as soon as possible, and take runway before taxi check is even started. Pressure to finish things causes errors and omissions; in this case, lack of proper vigilance to the runway being clear. Should be some language, maybe in part 135 regulations, that the captain of a 20M crew on these small commuters be aware of what the first officer is doing so that both sets of eyes can be outside the cockpit during all aircraft movement, especially when backtaxiing at uncontrolled fields. Supplemental information from acn 180280: at approximately 50-100' AGL, airborne, I saw a third truck on the runway by the white threshold lines on the approach end runway 6 (opp of us). I then called unicom and asked what this third truck was doing on the runway. She responded, 'he's painting.' I then said, 'they should have informed us that he was there.' she, unicom, then said, 'sorry.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LTT REPORTER CITES LACK OF COM IN NEAR GND CONFLICT BETWEEN ACFT AND TRUCK ON DEP END OF RWY AT NON TWR ARPT UNICOM.

Narrative: ARRIVED GUC, NORMAL ARR, SAW NO GND VEHS ON OR AROUND ACFT MOVEMENT AREAS OF ARPT. UPON DEPARTING WITHIN 10 MINS, FOUND PAINT TRUCK AND PAINTER ON TXWY ADJACENT TO OUR INTENDED DEP RWY, RWY 24. UNICOM OPERATOR MADE NO MENTION OF THIS WHEN CAPT CALLED FOR ARPT ADVISORY UPON LEAVING CHOCKS. I WAS BUSY WITH PAX BRIEFING,CHKING MANIFEST, FIGURING TKOF DATA/AIRSPD BUGS, ET. LOOKED UP AND SAW CAPT TURN AWAY FROM TXWY AND ONTO RWY. HE ANNOUNCED HIS INTENTION TO BACKTAXI ON RWY 24. AS WE TURNED ONTO THE RWY, I LOOKED OUT MY WINDOW AT THE APCH TO RWY 06 AND ANNOUNCED, 'CLR RIGHT,' AS IS ALWAYS MY HABIT. DURING BACKTAXI DOWN RWY 24, I RETURNED TO MY DUTIES AND OVERHEARD A MALE VOICE ON UNICOM ASK CAPT, 'IS THAT TRUCK GOING TO BE IN YOUR WAY?' WE BOTH LOOKED AHEAD AND TO THE LEFT AT THE PARALLEL TXWY AND NOTED AN ADDITIONAL VEH, A PICKUP TRUCK, ON THE TXWY DRIVING AWAY FROM THE APCH END OF RWY 24 TOWARD US, BUT ON THE TXWY. AS WE WERE BACKTAXIING ON RWY 24, CAPT REPLIED, 'NO, WE'LL JUST TAXI DOWN HERE AND TURN AROUND AND TAKE OFF.' UNICOM REPLIED OK. AFTER THIS I INITIATED TAXI CHKLIST. READ 'FLAPS.' CAPT RESPONDED, 'TKOF.' I ADDED, 'WITH THE GAUGE.' READ 'TKOF DATA AND BUGS,' AT WHICH POINT CAPT INTERRUPTED: 'WE'LL GO FLAPS UP,' AND THEN RETRACTED FLAPS. I RETRIEVED TKOF SPD CHART AND LOOKED UP NEW V SPDS, CALLED THEM OUT AND COMPLETED CHKLIST. AT THIS POINT WE WERE AT THE END OF RWY 24. I ANNOUNCED TO UNICOM, 'GUC UNICOM AND TFC, ACR XY DEPARTING RWY 24, LEFT DOWNWIND DEP.' CAPT BEGAN 180 DEG TURN ON RWY, AND I STARTED TO READ TKOF CHKLIST. AS HE WAS BUSY WITH THE TURN, AND DUE TO MY PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE WITH HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD CHKLISTS, I CHALLENGED AND RESPONDED TO THE CHKLIST ITEMS MYSELF. WE COMPLETED THE CHKLIST WITH 'PWR STEERING TO GO,' AS HE BEGAN TO PUS THE PWR UP FOR TKOF. AS THE ACFT ACCELERATED 40-50 KIAS, I NOTICED PWR STEERING WAS NOT OFF. SWITCH IS ON CENTER CONSOLE AND REQUIRES COMPLETE HEADS DOWN TO VERIFY OFF. ALTHOUGH IT IS AUTOMATICALLY DISENGAGED AT APPROX 80% N1, CHKLIST AND PRUDENCE REQUIRES THE 3 POS TOGGLE SWITCH TO BE OFF. I MOVED SWITCH TO OFF AND ANNOUNCED, 'TKOF CHK COMPLETE,' AS WE ACCELERATED THROUGH APPROX 80 KIAS. AS IT WAS WARM OUTSIDE AND THE ACFT HAS TENDENCY TO OVERTEMP ON TKOF DUE TO RAM RISE, I HAD MORE ATTN INSIDE ON ENG GAUGES THAN NORMAL. AS WE ACCELERATED THROUGH V1, IT BEGAN TO RISE TO RED LINE. UPON CAPT'S 'GEAR UP' CALL, ITT WAS ABOVE RED LINE. I PULLED GEAR UP AND QUICKLY PULLED BACK PWR LEVERS TO KEEP ENGS AT RED LINE. AN EXCLAMATION FROM CAPT BROUGHT MY ATTN OUTSIDE. WE BOTH LOOKED UP AT APPROX 50' AGL TO SEE A TRUCK ON THE FAR END OF RWY 24 PARKED ON THE TDZ MARKERS FOR RWY 06. WORKERS WERE SEEN REPAINTING THESE MARKERS AS WE FLEW OVER AT APPROX 250' AGL. AT THIS POINT I BEGAN TO CONTACT CENTER ON COM 2 FOR OUR CLRNC AND TURNED OFF MY INTERCOM SWITCH TO COM 1. CAPT WAS DISCUSSING THE INCIDENT WITH A FEMALE VOICE OVER UNICOM/CTAF FREQ. I HAVE WRITTEN A RATHER LENGTHY DESCRIPTION BECAUSE I FEEL THIS SITUATION REPRESENTS A CLASSIC HUMAN PERFORMANCE/FACTORS DEFICIENCY. 1) COMMUTER ENVIRONMENT IS FAST-PACES. MANY ACTIONS NEED TO BE ACCOMPLISHED FROM DOOR CLOSURE TO DEP. AS THIS ACFT HAS NO F/A, F/O IS RESPONSIBLE FOR LENGTHY SAFETY BRIEFING. F/O RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURE MANIFEST, FIGURED BY GND PERSONNEL, IS CORRECT. F/O MUST FIGURE V SPDS FOR TKOF. NO PROB, USUALLY, BUT SOME CAPTS RUSH TO DEPART ASAP, AND TAKE RWY BEFORE TAXI CHK IS EVEN STARTED. PRESSURE TO FINISH THINGS CAUSES ERRORS AND OMISSIONS; IN THIS CASE, LACK OF PROPER VIGILANCE TO THE RWY BEING CLR. SHOULD BE SOME LANGUAGE, MAYBE IN PART 135 REGS, THAT THE CAPT OF A 20M CREW ON THESE SMALL COMMUTERS BE AWARE OF WHAT THE F/O IS DOING SO THAT BOTH SETS OF EYES CAN BE OUTSIDE THE COCKPIT DURING ALL ACFT MOVEMENT, ESPECIALLY WHEN BACKTAXIING AT UNCONTROLLED FIELDS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 180280: AT APPROX 50-100' AGL, AIRBORNE, I SAW A THIRD TRUCK ON THE RWY BY THE WHITE THRESHOLD LINES ON THE APCH END RWY 6 (OPP OF US). I THEN CALLED UNICOM AND ASKED WHAT THIS THIRD TRUCK WAS DOING ON THE RWY. SHE RESPONDED, 'HE'S PAINTING.' I THEN SAID, 'THEY SHOULD HAVE INFORMED US THAT HE WAS THERE.' SHE, UNICOM, THEN SAID, 'SORRY.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.