Narrative:

Traffic was complex at the king sector, with no D side controller. ZKC called with a pointout on air carrier xy. King took radar on the aircraft, even though the automated handoff had previously been made to the ski/wab sectors. The ZKC controller then switched air carrier X climbing to FL370. FL370 is 1 of the altitudes owned by ski/wab, not king. The king controller specifically thought that FL370 had been coordination with ski/wab. The king controller turned air carrier X 15 degree left on initial contact to avoid a possible confliction with additional traffic. The ski/wab controller (trainee) electronically changed the altitude in the data block to FL330. No verbal coordination was ever made. The king controller did not notice the change of FL330 in data block. When the ski/wab sector noticed air carrier X mode C coming through FL334, question was then addressed. Air carrier X was issued an expedited descent to FL330 and a 40 degree right turn to avoid the confliction with air carrier Y wbound at FL350. Separation was lost at 2 mi and 1600 ft. A discrepancy in the interpretation of the letter of agreement in question. It has always been interpreted that the higher altitude was approved. In this case it was not clear. The inaction of the ski/wab may have contributed to the error when ski/wab did not verbally coordination the amended altitude. The inaction of not coordinating the turn of 15 degree left may have put the aircraft into closer proximity of each other. The carelessness of the ZKC controller to improperly coordination the climb to FL370 caused the mishap in my opinion. The letter of agreement interpretation was at fault. A bad procedure. Kansas city also failed to execute good judgement in climbing air carrier X to FL370. Air carrier X should have been originally stopped at FL290, and let the king sector manage the situation. Supplemental information from acn 180958: were on an assigned heading 050 and cleared to climb to 37000 ft. Ind center frequency 134.17. Control told us to stop climb at 33000 ft. I reported that we were approaching 34000 ft. Controller urgent voice said report level 33000 ft now. We stopped climb at 34000 ft and started a rapid descent to 33000 ft. As soon as we started our descent I saw air carrier on a northwest heading pass in front of us at 35000 ft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR X HAD LTSS FROM ACR Y. SYS ERROR.

Narrative: TFC WAS COMPLEX AT THE KING SECTOR, WITH NO D SIDE CTLR. ZKC CALLED WITH A POINTOUT ON ACR XY. KING TOOK RADAR ON THE ACFT, EVEN THOUGH THE AUTOMATED HDOF HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN MADE TO THE SKI/WAB SECTORS. THE ZKC CTLR THEN SWITCHED ACR X CLBING TO FL370. FL370 IS 1 OF THE ALTS OWNED BY SKI/WAB, NOT KING. THE KING CTLR SPECIFICALLY THOUGHT THAT FL370 HAD BEEN COORD WITH SKI/WAB. THE KING CTLR TURNED ACR X 15 DEG L ON INITIAL CONTACT TO AVOID A POSSIBLE CONFLICTION WITH ADDITIONAL TFC. THE SKI/WAB CTLR (TRAINEE) ELECTRONICALLY CHANGED THE ALT IN THE DATA BLOCK TO FL330. NO VERBAL COORD WAS EVER MADE. THE KING CTLR DID NOT NOTICE THE CHANGE OF FL330 IN DATA BLOCK. WHEN THE SKI/WAB SECTOR NOTICED ACR X MODE C COMING THROUGH FL334, QUESTION WAS THEN ADDRESSED. ACR X WAS ISSUED AN EXPEDITED DSCNT TO FL330 AND A 40 DEG R TURN TO AVOID THE CONFLICTION WITH ACR Y WBOUND AT FL350. SEPARATION WAS LOST AT 2 MI AND 1600 FT. A DISCREPANCY IN THE INTERPRETATION OF THE LETTER OF AGREEMENT IN QUESTION. IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN INTERPRETED THAT THE HIGHER ALT WAS APPROVED. IN THIS CASE IT WAS NOT CLR. THE INACTION OF THE SKI/WAB MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE ERROR WHEN SKI/WAB DID NOT VERBALLY COORD THE AMENDED ALT. THE INACTION OF NOT COORDINATING THE TURN OF 15 DEG L MAY HAVE PUT THE ACFT INTO CLOSER PROX OF EACH OTHER. THE CARELESSNESS OF THE ZKC CTLR TO IMPROPERLY COORD THE CLB TO FL370 CAUSED THE MISHAP IN MY OPINION. THE LETTER OF AGREEMENT INTERPRETATION WAS AT FAULT. A BAD PROC. KANSAS CITY ALSO FAILED TO EXECUTE GOOD JUDGEMENT IN CLBING ACR X TO FL370. ACR X SHOULD HAVE BEEN ORIGINALLY STOPPED AT FL290, AND LET THE KING SECTOR MANAGE THE SITUATION. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 180958: WERE ON AN ASSIGNED HDG 050 AND CLRED TO CLB TO 37000 FT. IND CENTER FREQ 134.17. CTL TOLD US TO STOP CLB AT 33000 FT. I RPTED THAT WE WERE APCHING 34000 FT. CTLR URGENT VOICE SAID RPT LEVEL 33000 FT NOW. WE STOPPED CLB AT 34000 FT AND STARTED A RAPID DSCNT TO 33000 FT. AS SOON AS WE STARTED OUR DSCNT I SAW ACR ON A NW HDG PASS IN FRONT OF US AT 35000 FT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.