Narrative:

Military charter flight xyz operated by company a was released by a certificated dispatcher from rome (lirf) to gander (cyzx), with a planned redispatch at 50 degrees west to final destination bangor (bgr), alternate brunswick (nhz). Flight was scheduled by the air carrier to operate rome-jfk, however the payload exceeded the aircraft's range and a technical stop was arranged for bgr over jfk. Problem 1: airline management (vp operations) instructed the captain to fuel to maximum takeoff weight, and instructed dispatcher to do all possible to bring the flight to jfk. (Jfk is the air carrier's base, and catering and crew change had been prearranged for this flight's continuation to grk.) management continually requested updates and computer reanalysis from me re: the continuation of this flight to jfk. Additionally, vp operations requested information on redispatching flight to bos and cyul. Position reports and fuel remaining were received from the flight every 10 degrees west, as it crossed the north atlantic via nat-J. With every position report, a new computer reanalysis from that position to jfk was run by me, per management's instructions. Additionally, reanalyses were run for redispatches to bos, cyul, bgr and phl, according to input from my chief flight dispatcher, who does not have an aircraft dispatcher's certificate. Problem 2) chief flight dispatcher interfered with my ability to exercise operational control by issuing instructions to me west/O: a) being a certificated aircraft dispatcher, and B) west/O being fully aware of the WX conditions. Terminal forecasts for bgr and jfk indicated '...chance of visibility 3/4 mi...' the captain operating the flight had less than 100 hours as a captain, therefore his landing minimum for visibility is raised by 1/2 mi to 1 mi minimum visibility. The chief dispatcher was advised of this problem, but contended that the chance conditional on the bgr and jfk forecasts could be disregarded, and the prevailing visibility constituted legal destination minimums for this new captain. As the flight approached the planned redispatch point, dispatcher received information that the flight requested redispatch information to proceed to bgr. The flight was advised by dispatch, 'redispatch in process...please stand by.' problem 3) at 50 west, the flight advised dispatch that they were proceeding to bgr. This flight was originally dispatched to yzx, and I had issued no redispatch to proceed to bgr. Captain's are only able to continue beyond their original dispatch release by exercising their emergency authority. No emergency existed, however. The flight contacted dispatch via phone patch to discuss continuing the flight to jfk. I was unable to speak with my captain, as my chief flight dispatcher wanted to speak with the flight personally. After the patch was completed, the chief dispatcher told me what was discussed. Problem 4) the far's state that the dispatcher must be abe to contact his flight at all times. Sadly, I was unable to carry out my duties because the chief dispatcher was insistent on speaking with the flight. The chief dispatcher told me that the flight was proceeding to bgr. Some time later, he told me that the flight would contact us again over yqx for redispatch information to continue to jfk. (Both bgr and jfk terminal forecasts remained below destination minimums for this new captain, and neither jfk nor bgr were legal destinations. But since the captain had proceeded beyond his original dispatch to cyqx, it made no difference since he was operating under his emergency pwrs anyway--at least that's what I thought.) I took the initiative and amended the dispatch release to destination bgr, alternate nhz once the flight was within 1 hour of bgr. I did this with the captain and I informed him that this was based on the actual WX conditions at bgr, which were above minimums for the next hour. Management pressure remained strong against proceeding to any destination other than jfk. Frankly, I had to bring him to jfk. The flight continued to the ny area, only to find 1 hour airborne holds for jfk arrs. The captain elected to divert to his alternate wri at that time, and advised me of this decision. I relayed current actual wri WX to him, and informed him that wri was anticipating his arrival.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DISPATCHER COMPLAINS THAT ATX FLT IMPROPERLY REDISPATCHED.

Narrative: MIL CHARTER FLT XYZ OPERATED BY COMPANY A WAS RELEASED BY A CERTIFICATED DISPATCHER FROM ROME (LIRF) TO GANDER (CYZX), WITH A PLANNED REDISPATCH AT 50 DEGS W TO FINAL DEST BANGOR (BGR), ALTERNATE BRUNSWICK (NHZ). FLT WAS SCHEDULED BY THE ACR TO OPERATE ROME-JFK, HOWEVER THE PAYLOAD EXCEEDED THE ACFT'S RANGE AND A TECHNICAL STOP WAS ARRANGED FOR BGR OVER JFK. PROB 1: AIRLINE MGMNT (VP OPS) INSTRUCTED THE CAPT TO FUEL TO MAX TKOF WT, AND INSTRUCTED DISPATCHER TO DO ALL POSSIBLE TO BRING THE FLT TO JFK. (JFK IS THE ACR'S BASE, AND CATERING AND CREW CHANGE HAD BEEN PREARRANGED FOR THIS FLT'S CONTINUATION TO GRK.) MGMNT CONTINUALLY REQUESTED UPDATES AND COMPUTER REANALYSIS FROM ME RE: THE CONTINUATION OF THIS FLT TO JFK. ADDITIONALLY, VP OPS REQUESTED INFO ON REDISPATCHING FLT TO BOS AND CYUL. POS RPTS AND FUEL REMAINING WERE RECEIVED FROM THE FLT EVERY 10 DEGS W, AS IT CROSSED THE NORTH ATLANTIC VIA NAT-J. WITH EVERY POS RPT, A NEW COMPUTER REANALYSIS FROM THAT POS TO JFK WAS RUN BY ME, PER MGMNT'S INSTRUCTIONS. ADDITIONALLY, REANALYSES WERE RUN FOR REDISPATCHES TO BOS, CYUL, BGR AND PHL, ACCORDING TO INPUT FROM MY CHIEF FLT DISPATCHER, WHO DOES NOT HAVE AN ACFT DISPATCHER'S CERTIFICATE. PROB 2) CHIEF FLT DISPATCHER INTERFERED WITH MY ABILITY TO EXERCISE OPERATIONAL CTL BY ISSUING INSTRUCTIONS TO ME W/O: A) BEING A CERTIFICATED ACFT DISPATCHER, AND B) W/O BEING FULLY AWARE OF THE WX CONDITIONS. TERMINAL FORECASTS FOR BGR AND JFK INDICATED '...CHANCE OF VISIBILITY 3/4 MI...' THE CAPT OPERATING THE FLT HAD LESS THAN 100 HRS AS A CAPT, THEREFORE HIS LNDG MINIMUM FOR VISIBILITY IS RAISED BY 1/2 MI TO 1 MI MINIMUM VISIBILITY. THE CHIEF DISPATCHER WAS ADVISED OF THIS PROB, BUT CONTENDED THAT THE CHANCE CONDITIONAL ON THE BGR AND JFK FORECASTS COULD BE DISREGARDED, AND THE PREVAILING VISIBILITY CONSTITUTED LEGAL DEST MINIMUMS FOR THIS NEW CAPT. AS THE FLT APCHED THE PLANNED REDISPATCH POINT, DISPATCHER RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT THE FLT REQUESTED REDISPATCH INFO TO PROCEED TO BGR. THE FLT WAS ADVISED BY DISPATCH, 'REDISPATCH IN PROCESS...PLEASE STAND BY.' PROB 3) AT 50 W, THE FLT ADVISED DISPATCH THAT THEY WERE PROCEEDING TO BGR. THIS FLT WAS ORIGINALLY DISPATCHED TO YZX, AND I HAD ISSUED NO REDISPATCH TO PROCEED TO BGR. CAPT'S ARE ONLY ABLE TO CONTINUE BEYOND THEIR ORIGINAL DISPATCH RELEASE BY EXERCISING THEIR EMER AUTHORITY. NO EMER EXISTED, HOWEVER. THE FLT CONTACTED DISPATCH VIA PHONE PATCH TO DISCUSS CONTINUING THE FLT TO JFK. I WAS UNABLE TO SPEAK WITH MY CAPT, AS MY CHIEF FLT DISPATCHER WANTED TO SPEAK WITH THE FLT PERSONALLY. AFTER THE PATCH WAS COMPLETED, THE CHIEF DISPATCHER TOLD ME WHAT WAS DISCUSSED. PROB 4) THE FAR'S STATE THAT THE DISPATCHER MUST BE ABE TO CONTACT HIS FLT AT ALL TIMES. SADLY, I WAS UNABLE TO CARRY OUT MY DUTIES BECAUSE THE CHIEF DISPATCHER WAS INSISTENT ON SPEAKING WITH THE FLT. THE CHIEF DISPATCHER TOLD ME THAT THE FLT WAS PROCEEDING TO BGR. SOME TIME LATER, HE TOLD ME THAT THE FLT WOULD CONTACT US AGAIN OVER YQX FOR REDISPATCH INFO TO CONTINUE TO JFK. (BOTH BGR AND JFK TERMINAL FORECASTS REMAINED BELOW DEST MINIMUMS FOR THIS NEW CAPT, AND NEITHER JFK NOR BGR WERE LEGAL DESTS. BUT SINCE THE CAPT HAD PROCEEDED BEYOND HIS ORIGINAL DISPATCH TO CYQX, IT MADE NO DIFFERENCE SINCE HE WAS OPERATING UNDER HIS EMER PWRS ANYWAY--AT LEAST THAT'S WHAT I THOUGHT.) I TOOK THE INITIATIVE AND AMENDED THE DISPATCH RELEASE TO DEST BGR, ALTERNATE NHZ ONCE THE FLT WAS WITHIN 1 HR OF BGR. I DID THIS WITH THE CAPT AND I INFORMED HIM THAT THIS WAS BASED ON THE ACTUAL WX CONDITIONS AT BGR, WHICH WERE ABOVE MINIMUMS FOR THE NEXT HOUR. MGMNT PRESSURE REMAINED STRONG AGAINST PROCEEDING TO ANY DEST OTHER THAN JFK. FRANKLY, I HAD TO BRING HIM TO JFK. THE FLT CONTINUED TO THE NY AREA, ONLY TO FIND 1 HR AIRBORNE HOLDS FOR JFK ARRS. THE CAPT ELECTED TO DIVERT TO HIS ALTERNATE WRI AT THAT TIME, AND ADVISED ME OF THIS DECISION. I RELAYED CURRENT ACTUAL WRI WX TO HIM, AND INFORMED HIM THAT WRI WAS ANTICIPATING HIS ARR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.