Narrative:

I was flying as first officer. Center gave us a 330 degree heading to intercept the departure radial toward craig. Shortly afterward, center gave us a turn closer to arwy heading. At this time, center gave us 330 degrees again for a vector through the arwy. The wing/body overheat light and left bleed trip light illuminated. In our company, only the first officer carries an aircraft manual containing abnormal procedures. I fished out the book for the captain to read the 2 procedures involved. We discussed the meaning of the indications and the response required. I saw the radial moving and began a turn on course. I didn't realize that center had left us on a 330 degree heading for traffic. The captain was running the abnormal checklist and didn't comment on the turn. I didn't notice anything until center called 30 seconds later and asked heading. We realized at this point that we should have still been on the heading. Center was quite vexed and told us to either stop climb at 180 degrees or turn back to 330 degree heading. This problem would not have happened if the captain and I had maintained our normal ways of communicating and if I had flown the aircraft and not gotten involved in troubleshooting systems.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW TROUBLESHOOTING A WING BODY OVERHEAT LIGHT AND BLEED TRIP LIGHT PROBLEM DEVIATED FROM ASSIGNED HEADING.

Narrative: I WAS FLYING AS F/O. CENTER GAVE US A 330 DEG HDG TO INTERCEPT THE DEP RADIAL TOWARD CRAIG. SHORTLY AFTERWARD, CENTER GAVE US A TURN CLOSER TO ARWY HDG. AT THIS TIME, CENTER GAVE US 330 DEGS AGAIN FOR A VECTOR THROUGH THE ARWY. THE WING/BODY OVERHEAT LIGHT AND LEFT BLEED TRIP LIGHT ILLUMINATED. IN OUR COMPANY, ONLY THE F/O CARRIES AN ACFT MANUAL CONTAINING ABNORMAL PROCS. I FISHED OUT THE BOOK FOR THE CAPT TO READ THE 2 PROCS INVOLVED. WE DISCUSSED THE MEANING OF THE INDICATIONS AND THE RESPONSE REQUIRED. I SAW THE RADIAL MOVING AND BEGAN A TURN ON COURSE. I DIDN'T REALIZE THAT CENTER HAD LEFT US ON A 330 DEG HDG FOR TFC. THE CAPT WAS RUNNING THE ABNORMAL CHKLIST AND DIDN'T COMMENT ON THE TURN. I DIDN'T NOTICE ANYTHING UNTIL CENTER CALLED 30 SECS LATER AND ASKED HDG. WE REALIZED AT THIS POINT THAT WE SHOULD HAVE STILL BEEN ON THE HDG. CENTER WAS QUITE VEXED AND TOLD US TO EITHER STOP CLB AT 180 DEGS OR TURN BACK TO 330 DEG HDG. THIS PROB WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED IF THE CAPT AND I HAD MAINTAINED OUR NORMAL WAYS OF COMMUNICATING AND IF I HAD FLOWN THE ACFT AND NOT GOTTEN INVOLVED IN TROUBLESHOOTING SYSTEMS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.