Narrative:

On jun/tue/91 called to lodi, ca airport to check on situation as we were planning to fly in on jun/wed/91. I spoke with an instructor who seemed familiar with operations there. I was interested in knowing specific distances both of the displaced threshold and that available for takeoff so we could plan our fuel load accordingly. There was no jet fuel available in lodi. He explained that he did not know the exact distance of the displaced threshold but estimated about 2400 ft available for landing and approximately 4000 ft available for full length takeoff. Commercial plates showed 3645 ft including the overrun so we planned our fuel load accordingly for the conditions forecast for the following day. We landed without incident and upon taxiing in noticed that there was a 2 lane highway off the departure end of runway 26. We spoke with people at the airport about our loading situation and no one there could tell us exactly how long the runway was including the overrun. We planned our departure using the 3645 ft length listed in the commercial plates. This called for positioning ourselves at the end of the runway and doing a full power runup before releasing brakes for the takeoff roll. When our passenger arrived we boarded the aircraft and departed off runway 26 as described above. The following day we were informed that the jet blast from our takeoff had damaged vehicles on the highway. All the decisions made about fuel loads were based on leaving out of lodi to head towards the east coast. Our passenger wanted to make it back with only 1 fuel stop so it was our desire to depart the airport with as much fuel as possible, requiring us to plan on using short field departure technique without ever seeing the airport. Upon landing and seeing the highway off the departure end of runway 26 I realized that the highway was a concern for departure jet blast, but at that point because of our loading we were committed to the short field technique. All persons we communicated with at the airport communicated to us that the highway should not be a concern. We were told that people departed full length all the time without incident. Obviously, I should have acted upon my own doubts rather than responding to outside pressures and advice about my departure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CPR JET MADE SHORT FIELD TKOF ON VERY SHORT RWY AND BLASTED UNITED STATES HIGHWAY 99 WITH ROCKS AND GRAVEL.

Narrative: ON JUN/TUE/91 CALLED TO LODI, CA ARPT TO CHECK ON SITUATION AS WE WERE PLANNING TO FLY IN ON JUN/WED/91. I SPOKE WITH AN INSTRUCTOR WHO SEEMED FAMILIAR WITH OPERATIONS THERE. I WAS INTERESTED IN KNOWING SPECIFIC DISTANCES BOTH OF THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD AND THAT AVAILABLE FOR TKOF SO WE COULD PLAN OUR FUEL LOAD ACCORDINGLY. THERE WAS NO JET FUEL AVAILABLE IN LODI. HE EXPLAINED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW THE EXACT DISTANCE OF THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD BUT ESTIMATED ABOUT 2400 FT AVAILABLE FOR LNDG AND APPROX 4000 FT AVAILABLE FOR FULL LENGTH TKOF. COMMERCIAL PLATES SHOWED 3645 FT INCLUDING THE OVERRUN SO WE PLANNED OUR FUEL LOAD ACCORDINGLY FOR THE CONDITIONS FORECAST FOR THE FOLLOWING DAY. WE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT AND UPON TAXIING IN NOTICED THAT THERE WAS A 2 LANE HIGHWAY OFF THE DEP END OF RWY 26. WE SPOKE WITH PEOPLE AT THE ARPT ABOUT OUR LOADING SITUATION AND NO ONE THERE COULD TELL US EXACTLY HOW LONG THE RWY WAS INCLUDING THE OVERRUN. WE PLANNED OUR DEP USING THE 3645 FT LENGTH LISTED IN THE COMMERCIAL PLATES. THIS CALLED FOR POSITIONING OURSELVES AT THE END OF THE RWY AND DOING A FULL PWR RUNUP BEFORE RELEASING BRAKES FOR THE TKOF ROLL. WHEN OUR PAX ARRIVED WE BOARDED THE ACFT AND DEPARTED OFF RWY 26 AS DESCRIBED ABOVE. THE FOLLOWING DAY WE WERE INFORMED THAT THE JET BLAST FROM OUR TKOF HAD DAMAGED VEHICLES ON THE HIGHWAY. ALL THE DECISIONS MADE ABOUT FUEL LOADS WERE BASED ON LEAVING OUT OF LODI TO HEAD TOWARDS THE EAST COAST. OUR PAX WANTED TO MAKE IT BACK WITH ONLY 1 FUEL STOP SO IT WAS OUR DESIRE TO DEPART THE ARPT WITH AS MUCH FUEL AS POSSIBLE, REQUIRING US TO PLAN ON USING SHORT FIELD DEP TECHNIQUE WITHOUT EVER SEEING THE ARPT. UPON LNDG AND SEEING THE HIGHWAY OFF THE DEP END OF RWY 26 I REALIZED THAT THE HIGHWAY WAS A CONCERN FOR DEP JET BLAST, BUT AT THAT POINT BECAUSE OF OUR LOADING WE WERE COMMITTED TO THE SHORT FIELD TECHNIQUE. ALL PERSONS WE COMMUNICATED WITH AT THE ARPT COMMUNICATED TO US THAT THE HIGHWAY SHOULD NOT BE A CONCERN. WE WERE TOLD THAT PEOPLE DEPARTED FULL LENGTH ALL THE TIME WITHOUT INCIDENT. OBVIOUSLY, I SHOULD HAVE ACTED UPON MY OWN DOUBTS RATHER THAN RESPONDING TO OUTSIDE PRESSURES AND ADVICE ABOUT MY DEP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.