Narrative:

Small aircraft X was taxied into position and hold on runway 34. A little over a min later, light transport Y was cleared to land on runway 34. In addition to these aircraft, I also had an small aircraft that departed runway 29 and proceeding wbound, an aircraft performing touch and goes in left traffic to runway 29, and a helicopter that departed midfield and proceeded wbound. 1 min and 19 seconds after receiving landing clearance, light transport Y keyed up and advised that there was an aircraft on the runway, upon which an immediate go around clearance was issued. Light transport Y informed me that he was already over the aircraft and went ahead and landed without incident. Light transport Y informed the ground controller that the small aircraft X blended in with the white runway markings and did not become visible to him until he was well into his landing confign and unable to execute the go around. 46 transmissions were made by the tower from the time small aircraft X was put into position and the time light transport Y flew over him on the runway. Small aircraft X taxied into position on the runway at a point that was not visible from the tower due to overgrown trees. When light transport Y was cleared to land, a routine scan of the runways and the approach path revealed the runways to be free of traffic, when, in fact, the small aircraft X was on the runway obscured by the trees. Without the visual clue, all appeared normal, routine, and safe. The obstruction to vision caused by the trees is a problem that the FAA has known about for at least 2 yrs, because a controller at this facility filed an unsafe condition report directly addressing this very problem. The controller who filed the report was involved in a gear up landing, and, in his statement, noted that he could not see the landing aircraft due to the trees. In addition, the FAA has, at least since 1987, had a letter to airman addressing areas of non visibility from the control tower stating that the last quarter mi of the final approach to runway 34 is not visible due to trees. I feel very strongly that if the FAA had had these trees removed, I would have seen that there was an aircraft on the runway and would have given him his takeoff clearance thereby clearing the runway for light transport Y, or, failing this, would have been able to give the light transport Y a go around clearance long before he ever got close to the threshold. Again, this incident would never have occurred if the small aircraft X was visible from the tower on the runway. Even after the light transport Y informed me that there was traffic on the runway, I had doubts. No one in the tower cabin attendant was able to spot the small aircraft X on the runway from any point in the cabin attendant. At the time of the incident, there were 3 aircraft holding short of runway 34 awaiting departure. Any one of these aircraft, upon becoming aware of the imminent danger, could have keyed up and alerted the tower and the landing aircraft of the situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CTLR CLRED AN LTT TO LAND ON AN OCCUPIED RWY. TREES BLOCKED VIEW OF SMA IN POS ON THAT RWY.

Narrative: SMA X WAS TAXIED INTO POS AND HOLD ON RWY 34. A LITTLE OVER A MIN LATER, LTT Y WAS CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 34. IN ADDITION TO THESE ACFT, I ALSO HAD AN SMA THAT DEPARTED RWY 29 AND PROCEEDING WBOUND, AN ACFT PERFORMING TOUCH AND GOES IN L TFC TO RWY 29, AND A HELI THAT DEPARTED MIDFIELD AND PROCEEDED WBOUND. 1 MIN AND 19 SECONDS AFTER RECEIVING LNDG CLRNC, LTT Y KEYED UP AND ADVISED THAT THERE WAS AN ACFT ON THE RWY, UPON WHICH AN IMMEDIATE GAR CLRNC WAS ISSUED. LTT Y INFORMED ME THAT HE WAS ALREADY OVER THE ACFT AND WENT AHEAD AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. LTT Y INFORMED THE GND CTLR THAT THE SMA X BLENDED IN WITH THE WHITE RWY MARKINGS AND DID NOT BECOME VISIBLE TO HIM UNTIL HE WAS WELL INTO HIS LNDG CONFIGN AND UNABLE TO EXECUTE THE GAR. 46 TRANSMISSIONS WERE MADE BY THE TWR FROM THE TIME SMA X WAS PUT INTO POS AND THE TIME LTT Y FLEW OVER HIM ON THE RWY. SMA X TAXIED INTO POS ON THE RWY AT A POINT THAT WAS NOT VISIBLE FROM THE TWR DUE TO OVERGROWN TREES. WHEN LTT Y WAS CLRED TO LAND, A ROUTINE SCAN OF THE RWYS AND THE APCH PATH REVEALED THE RWYS TO BE FREE OF TFC, WHEN, IN FACT, THE SMA X WAS ON THE RWY OBSCURED BY THE TREES. WITHOUT THE VISUAL CLUE, ALL APPEARED NORMAL, ROUTINE, AND SAFE. THE OBSTRUCTION TO VISION CAUSED BY THE TREES IS A PROBLEM THAT THE FAA HAS KNOWN ABOUT FOR AT LEAST 2 YRS, BECAUSE A CTLR AT THIS FACILITY FILED AN UNSAFE CONDITION RPT DIRECTLY ADDRESSING THIS VERY PROBLEM. THE CTLR WHO FILED THE RPT WAS INVOLVED IN A GEAR UP LNDG, AND, IN HIS STATEMENT, NOTED THAT HE COULD NOT SEE THE LNDG ACFT DUE TO THE TREES. IN ADDITION, THE FAA HAS, AT LEAST SINCE 1987, HAD A LETTER TO AIRMAN ADDRESSING AREAS OF NON VISIBILITY FROM THE CTL TWR STATING THAT THE LAST QUARTER MI OF THE FINAL APCH TO RWY 34 IS NOT VISIBLE DUE TO TREES. I FEEL VERY STRONGLY THAT IF THE FAA HAD HAD THESE TREES REMOVED, I WOULD HAVE SEEN THAT THERE WAS AN ACFT ON THE RWY AND WOULD HAVE GIVEN HIM HIS TKOF CLRNC THEREBY CLRING THE RWY FOR LTT Y, OR, FAILING THIS, WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO GIVE THE LTT Y A GAR CLRNC LONG BEFORE HE EVER GOT CLOSE TO THE THRESHOLD. AGAIN, THIS INCIDENT WOULD NEVER HAVE OCCURRED IF THE SMA X WAS VISIBLE FROM THE TWR ON THE RWY. EVEN AFTER THE LTT Y INFORMED ME THAT THERE WAS TFC ON THE RWY, I HAD DOUBTS. NO ONE IN THE TWR CAB WAS ABLE TO SPOT THE SMA X ON THE RWY FROM ANY POINT IN THE CAB. AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT, THERE WERE 3 ACFT HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 34 AWAITING DEP. ANY ONE OF THESE ACFT, UPON BECOMING AWARE OF THE IMMINENT DANGER, COULD HAVE KEYED UP AND ALERTED THE TWR AND THE LNDG ACFT OF THE SITUATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.