Narrative:

This narration deals with the incident which occurred with flight mon, jul, 91, (aircraft large transport) dtw-dca, and my part in this incident as the dispatcher of the flight. Flight dtw-dca received a dispatch release from me based on the WX forecast, sequence WX reports and radar observations of the washington area. The WX forecast for the washington area called for VFR conditions, and the WX sequence for this area, at the time flight blocked out of dtw stations were all VFR. Flight blocked out of dtw at xx:56 Z and lifted off at xy:06Z. A the time of departure there was no indication that there would be a WX problem getting into dca. The dispatch release called for a fuel load of 25200 pounds which broke down as follows: taxi and en route burn, 10900 pounds; alternate fuel (iad was listed as an alternate), 2700 pounds; FAA required reserve, 7000 pounds; contingency fuel (approximately 30 mins of fuel), 4600 pounds; total 25200 pounds. Between the time flight departed dtw and the time the captain of the flight advised me that he was in a holding pattern west of dca due to thunderstorms impacting dca, iad and bwi the WX specials indicated thunderstorm activity at the 3 airports. At Y:10Z the captain of flight advised me that he was in a holding pattern west of dca and due to iad (his alternate airport) also being impacted by thunderstorms, and requested his alternate be changed to mdt. He also stated that he had 14000 pounds of fuel remaining. After reviewing a current radar picture of the dca area, I amended flight's release to delete iad as an alternate and add orf as his alternate for dca. The amendment was signed by me at Y:15Z. At the same time I requested the flight hold until they had 11000 pounds of fuel remaining. At Y:20Z flight called back to state that if I wanted to use orf as an alternate for dca he would have to proceed to his alternate now, but if I switched his alternate to mdt he would be able to hold a little longer. After reviewing the WX for mdt (believing it to be a legal alternate for an large transport), and asking the pilot his actual position in relation to dca (which he stated was 90 mi due west of dca and just south of mdt), I again amended his release, now deleting orf as an alternate and adding mdt as his alternate for dca. The new release was signed by me at Y:20Z. At this point I called mdt operations and alerted them to the possibility of getting a diversion, that it was an large transport and that the flight had a full load of passengers. I also advised the agent at mdt that if the flight diverted to them, we would only be stopping for fuel and heading back to dca as soon as possible. At Y:30Z captain advised me that he was proceeding to his alternate. I acknowledged the transmission and called mdt back to advise them that flight was diverting to mdt. At Y:40Z captain radioed me to advise that mdt operations had advised him that they never had worked an large transport before. At this point there were radio problems between myself and the flight; I was no longer able to communication with captain directly. After determining that there was in fact a communications problem, I checked the company's operation-specification's authorized terminal section and found that mdt was not an authorized airport for our lgts. I immediately called mdt to find out if they were in radio contact with flight. The agent stated he was. I requested that the agent contact the flight to see if they had enough fuel to proceed on to pit, and to advise the captain that mdt was not an authorized airport for our lgts. The crew replied that they were now committed to landing at mdt. Realizing that I had just dispatched a flight to an unauthorized airport I immediately advised company dispatch management of the problem. They then contacted company flight standards and performance engineering to have them run large transport performance data for mdt. Company flight standards contacted the local FAA office and advised them of the problem. The FAA advised company flight standards that with the proper large transport runway performance data for mdt and a company flight standard's briefing of the captain of flight of possible concerns for an large transport with respect to mdt as an airport, he would authorize flight to depart mdt for dca as a revenue flight. After the conditions of the above paragraph were met, flight was released from mdt and landed at dca without further incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DIVERSION TO AND LNDG AT UNAUTHORIZED ALTERNATE ARPT AFTER ENCOUNTERS WITH TSTM ACTIVITY.

Narrative: THIS NARRATION DEALS WITH THE INCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED WITH FLT MON, JUL, 91, (ACFT LGT) DTW-DCA, AND MY PART IN THIS INCIDENT AS THE DISPATCHER OF THE FLT. FLT DTW-DCA RECEIVED A DISPATCH RELEASE FROM ME BASED ON THE WX FORECAST, SEQUENCE WX RPTS AND RADAR OBSERVATIONS OF THE WASHINGTON AREA. THE WX FORECAST FOR THE WASHINGTON AREA CALLED FOR VFR CONDITIONS, AND THE WX SEQUENCE FOR THIS AREA, AT THE TIME FLT BLOCKED OUT OF DTW STATIONS WERE ALL VFR. FLT BLOCKED OUT OF DTW AT XX:56 Z AND LIFTED OFF AT XY:06Z. A THE TIME OF DEP THERE WAS NO INDICATION THAT THERE WOULD BE A WX PROBLEM GETTING INTO DCA. THE DISPATCH RELEASE CALLED FOR A FUEL LOAD OF 25200 LBS WHICH BROKE DOWN AS FOLLOWS: TAXI AND ENRTE BURN, 10900 LBS; ALTERNATE FUEL (IAD WAS LISTED AS AN ALTERNATE), 2700 LBS; FAA REQUIRED RESERVE, 7000 LBS; CONTINGENCY FUEL (APPROX 30 MINS OF FUEL), 4600 LBS; TOTAL 25200 LBS. BTWN THE TIME FLT DEPARTED DTW AND THE TIME THE CAPT OF THE FLT ADVISED ME THAT HE WAS IN A HOLDING PATTERN W OF DCA DUE TO TSTMS IMPACTING DCA, IAD AND BWI THE WX SPECIALS INDICATED TSTM ACTIVITY AT THE 3 ARPTS. AT Y:10Z THE CAPT OF FLT ADVISED ME THAT HE WAS IN A HOLDING PATTERN W OF DCA AND DUE TO IAD (HIS ALTERNATE ARPT) ALSO BEING IMPACTED BY TSTMS, AND REQUESTED HIS ALTERNATE BE CHANGED TO MDT. HE ALSO STATED THAT HE HAD 14000 LBS OF FUEL REMAINING. AFTER REVIEWING A CURRENT RADAR PICTURE OF THE DCA AREA, I AMENDED FLT'S RELEASE TO DELETE IAD AS AN ALTERNATE AND ADD ORF AS HIS ALTERNATE FOR DCA. THE AMENDMENT WAS SIGNED BY ME AT Y:15Z. AT THE SAME TIME I REQUESTED THE FLT HOLD UNTIL THEY HAD 11000 LBS OF FUEL REMAINING. AT Y:20Z FLT CALLED BACK TO STATE THAT IF I WANTED TO USE ORF AS AN ALTERNATE FOR DCA HE WOULD HAVE TO PROCEED TO HIS ALTERNATE NOW, BUT IF I SWITCHED HIS ALTERNATE TO MDT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO HOLD A LITTLE LONGER. AFTER REVIEWING THE WX FOR MDT (BELIEVING IT TO BE A LEGAL ALTERNATE FOR AN LGT), AND ASKING THE PLT HIS ACTUAL POS IN RELATION TO DCA (WHICH HE STATED WAS 90 MI DUE W OF DCA AND JUST S OF MDT), I AGAIN AMENDED HIS RELEASE, NOW DELETING ORF AS AN ALTERNATE AND ADDING MDT AS HIS ALTERNATE FOR DCA. THE NEW RELEASE WAS SIGNED BY ME AT Y:20Z. AT THIS POINT I CALLED MDT OPS AND ALERTED THEM TO THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTING A DIVERSION, THAT IT WAS AN LGT AND THAT THE FLT HAD A FULL LOAD OF PAXS. I ALSO ADVISED THE AGENT AT MDT THAT IF THE FLT DIVERTED TO THEM, WE WOULD ONLY BE STOPPING FOR FUEL AND HDG BACK TO DCA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AT Y:30Z CAPT ADVISED ME THAT HE WAS PROCEEDING TO HIS ALTERNATE. I ACKNOWLEDGED THE XMISSION AND CALLED MDT BACK TO ADVISE THEM THAT FLT WAS DIVERTING TO MDT. AT Y:40Z CAPT RADIOED ME TO ADVISE THAT MDT OPS HAD ADVISED HIM THAT THEY NEVER HAD WORKED AN LGT BEFORE. AT THIS POINT THERE WERE RADIO PROBLEMS BTWN MYSELF AND THE FLT; I WAS NO LONGER ABLE TO COM WITH CAPT DIRECTLY. AFTER DETERMINING THAT THERE WAS IN FACT A COMS PROBLEM, I CHKED THE COMPANY'S OP-SPEC'S AUTHORIZED TERMINAL SECTION AND FOUND THAT MDT WAS NOT AN AUTHORIZED ARPT FOR OUR LGTS. I IMMEDIATELY CALLED MDT TO FIND OUT IF THEY WERE IN RADIO CONTACT WITH FLT. THE AGENT STATED HE WAS. I REQUESTED THAT THE AGENT CONTACT THE FLT TO SEE IF THEY HAD ENOUGH FUEL TO PROCEED ON TO PIT, AND TO ADVISE THE CAPT THAT MDT WAS NOT AN AUTHORIZED ARPT FOR OUR LGTS. THE CREW REPLIED THAT THEY WERE NOW COMMITTED TO LNDG AT MDT. REALIZING THAT I HAD JUST DISPATCHED A FLT TO AN UNAUTHORIZED ARPT I IMMEDIATELY ADVISED COMPANY DISPATCH MGMNT OF THE PROBLEM. THEY THEN CONTACTED COMPANY FLT STANDARDS AND PERFORMANCE ENGINEERING TO HAVE THEM RUN LGT PERFORMANCE DATA FOR MDT. COMPANY FLT STANDARDS CONTACTED THE LCL FAA OFFICE AND ADVISED THEM OF THE PROBLEM. THE FAA ADVISED COMPANY FLT STANDARDS THAT WITH THE PROPER LGT RWY PERFORMANCE DATA FOR MDT AND A COMPANY FLT STANDARD'S BRIEFING OF THE CAPT OF FLT OF POSSIBLE CONCERNS FOR AN LGT WITH RESPECT TO MDT AS AN ARPT, HE WOULD AUTHORIZE FLT TO DEPART MDT FOR DCA AS A REVENUE FLT. AFTER THE CONDITIONS OF THE ABOVE PARAGRAPH WERE MET, FLT WAS RELEASED FROM MDT AND LANDED AT DCA WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.