Narrative:

On final approach just outside the OM we got a faint, short, intermittent fire warning bell but no lights on any panel, first officer was flying. Eventually we got a louder longer intermittent fire warning bell and a light in #1 engine fire switch. I shut down #1 engine, took control of the aircraft and told the crew to fight the fire and complete all the checklists. I landed the aircraft and we continued to get the intermittent bell and light in #1 engine during landing and rollout. I turned off the runway, stopped the aircraft, set the parking brake, retracted the ground spoilers, left the flaps extended, and told the first officer to fire the second fire bottle to #1 engine and the so to tell the flight attendants to prepare for an evacuate/evacuation. I then told the first officer to tell the tower we had a fire warning in #1 engine; that we had discharged both fire bottles and were still getting the fire warning in #1 engine and to send out the emergency equipment. I then picked up the PA and ordered the flight attendants to evacuate the aircraft on the right side only. I told the so to put essential power selector on standby and told the crew to do the emergency evacuation checklist. I then went into the cabin and found the flight attendant at the forward right emergency exit yelling at the passengers to leave their bags in the seats. They were trying to take their bags and belongings with them. I picked up the forward flight attendants PA microphone and told the passengers everything was under control, don't push, don't shove, and leave their bags on the airplane in the seats. Many passengers continued to take the bags to the emergency exit where I assisted the flight attendant by taking the bags from them and throwing them into the seats across from the exit. I subsequently found out that most of the passengers in tour group were from italy and could not understand english. During the evacuation which was orderly and expeditious a few passengers received minor scratches and bruises and were given first aid by the flight attendants and emergency medical technicians. One flight attendant injured her thumb while taking a large bag from a passenger a the emergency exit. Another flight attendant received minor scratches and bruises during the evacuation. They were both removed from duty and replaced for the return trip to laguardia airport in new york at xx:30 pm that evening. The other 2 flight attendants that afternoon had a let down and at about X pm asked to be replaced. The company tried to send the 2 additional flight attendants to replace them but their flight out of newark was delayed about 2 hours and they could not make the new xy:30 pm departure time so the 2 uninjured flight attendants volunteered to work the return flight. We pilots had been on duty since B:45 am with a hotel room break from 3-7:30 and arrived back at la guardia at ab:07 pm, 16 hours and 22 mins. The 18 hour FAA maximum on duty rule is ridiculous. After an emergency the whole crew should be replaced! Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information. He had other experiences with the large transport type aircraft operated by this carrier of similar nature, ie, false fire warnings due to defective loops or harnesses in the engine fire waring system. The maintenance is performed on a daily basis by company personnel but the major overhaul work is done by a contract facility. One mechanic reported that a fuel tank examination after work performed by the other facility disclosed a plastic bag and some rags that had been left in the fuel tank. Captain's biggest surprise in this incident was the evacuation and the attendant problem encountered with the language barrier. The local FSDO office asked the captain how long the evacuation took and the captain could only estimate the time as 90 seconds, but he knew he was wrong, for it was much longer than that. Analyst raised the question of the far regarding the requirement for briefings to passenger and that is the main concern in this event along with the facility maintenance procedures. The same aircraft had been grounded only two days before for the same problem.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LGT PIC RPTS ON FALSE FIRE WARNING CREATING THE NEED FOR AN EMER EVAC. ACFT EVAC WITH SOME DIFFICULTY AS PAX INFO EXCHANGE NOT AVAILABLE TO PAX ACCOUNT LANGUAGE BARRIER.

Narrative: ON FINAL APCH JUST OUTSIDE THE OM WE GOT A FAINT, SHORT, INTERMITTENT FIRE WARNING BELL BUT NO LIGHTS ON ANY PANEL, FO WAS FLYING. EVENTUALLY WE GOT A LOUDER LONGER INTERMITTENT FIRE WARNING BELL AND A LIGHT IN #1 ENG FIRE SWITCH. I SHUT DOWN #1 ENG, TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND TOLD THE CREW TO FIGHT THE FIRE AND COMPLETE ALL THE CHKLISTS. I LANDED THE ACFT AND WE CONTINUED TO GET THE INTERMITTENT BELL AND LIGHT IN #1 ENG DURING LNDG AND ROLLOUT. I TURNED OFF THE RWY, STOPPED THE ACFT, SET THE PARKING BRAKE, RETRACTED THE GND SPOILERS, L THE FLAPS EXTENDED, AND TOLD THE FO TO FIRE THE SECOND FIRE BOTTLE TO #1 ENG AND THE SO TO TELL THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO PREPARE FOR AN EVAC. I THEN TOLD THE FO TO TELL THE TWR WE HAD A FIRE WARNING IN #1 ENG; THAT WE HAD DISCHARGED BOTH FIRE BOTTLES AND WERE STILL GETTING THE FIRE WARNING IN #1 ENG AND TO SEND OUT THE EMER EQUIP. I THEN PICKED UP THE PA AND ORDERED THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO EVACUATE THE ACFT ON THE R SIDE ONLY. I TOLD THE SO TO PUT ESSENTIAL PWR SELECTOR ON STANDBY AND TOLD THE CREW TO DO THE EMER EVACUATION CHKLIST. I THEN WENT INTO THE CABIN AND FOUND THE FLT ATTENDANT AT THE FORWARD R EMER EXIT YELLING AT THE PAXS TO LEAVE THEIR BAGS IN THE SEATS. THEY WERE TRYING TO TAKE THEIR BAGS AND BELONGINGS WITH THEM. I PICKED UP THE FORWARD FLT ATTENDANTS PA MICROPHONE AND TOLD THE PAXS EVERYTHING WAS UNDER CTL, DON'T PUSH, DON'T SHOVE, AND LEAVE THEIR BAGS ON THE AIRPLANE IN THE SEATS. MANY PAXS CONTINUED TO TAKE THE BAGS TO THE EMER EXIT WHERE I ASSISTED THE FLT ATTENDANT BY TAKING THE BAGS FROM THEM AND THROWING THEM INTO THE SEATS ACROSS FROM THE EXIT. I SUBSEQUENTLY FOUND OUT THAT MOST OF THE PAXS IN TOUR GROUP WERE FROM ITALY AND COULD NOT UNDERSTAND ENGLISH. DURING THE EVACUATION WHICH WAS ORDERLY AND EXPEDITIOUS A FEW PAXS RECEIVED MINOR SCRATCHES AND BRUISES AND WERE GIVEN FIRST AID BY THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND EMER MEDICAL TECHNICIANS. ONE FLT ATTENDANT INJURED HER THUMB WHILE TAKING A LARGE BAG FROM A PAX A THE EMER EXIT. ANOTHER FLT ATTENDANT RECEIVED MINOR SCRATCHES AND BRUISES DURING THE EVACUATION. THEY WERE BOTH REMOVED FROM DUTY AND REPLACED FOR THE RETURN TRIP TO LAGUARDIA ARPT IN NEW YORK AT XX:30 PM THAT EVENING. THE OTHER 2 FLT ATTENDANTS THAT AFTERNOON HAD A LET DOWN AND AT ABOUT X PM ASKED TO BE REPLACED. THE COMPANY TRIED TO SEND THE 2 ADDITIONAL FLT ATTENDANTS TO REPLACE THEM BUT THEIR FLT OUT OF NEWARK WAS DELAYED ABOUT 2 HRS AND THEY COULD NOT MAKE THE NEW XY:30 PM DEP TIME SO THE 2 UNINJURED FLT ATTENDANTS VOLUNTEERED TO WORK THE RETURN FLT. WE PLTS HAD BEEN ON DUTY SINCE B:45 AM WITH A HOTEL ROOM BREAK FROM 3-7:30 AND ARRIVED BACK AT LA GUARDIA AT AB:07 PM, 16 HRS AND 22 MINS. THE 18 HR FAA MAX ON DUTY RULE IS RIDICULOUS. AFTER AN EMER THE WHOLE CREW SHOULD BE REPLACED! CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO. HE HAD OTHER EXPERIENCES WITH THE LGT TYPE ACFT OPERATED BY THIS CARRIER OF SIMILAR NATURE, IE, FALSE FIRE WARNINGS DUE TO DEFECTIVE LOOPS OR HARNESSES IN THE ENG FIRE WARING SYS. THE MAINT IS PERFORMED ON A DAILY BASIS BY COMPANY PERSONNEL BUT THE MAJOR OVERHAUL WORK IS DONE BY A CONTRACT FACILITY. ONE MECH RPTED THAT A FUEL TANK EXAM AFTER WORK PERFORMED BY THE OTHER FACILITY DISCLOSED A PLASTIC BAG AND SOME RAGS THAT HAD BEEN L IN THE FUEL TANK. CAPT'S BIGGEST SURPRISE IN THIS INCIDENT WAS THE EVACUATION AND THE ATTENDANT PROBLEM ENCOUNTERED WITH THE LANGUAGE BARRIER. THE LCL FSDO OFFICE ASKED THE CAPT HOW LONG THE EVACUATION TOOK AND THE CAPT COULD ONLY ESTIMATE THE TIME AS 90 SECONDS, BUT HE KNEW HE WAS WRONG, FOR IT WAS MUCH LONGER THAN THAT. ANALYST RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE FAR REGARDING THE REQUIREMENT FOR BRIEFINGS TO PAX AND THAT IS THE MAIN CONCERN IN THIS EVENT ALONG WITH THE FACILITY MAINT PROCS. THE SAME ACFT HAD BEEN GNDED ONLY TWO DAYS BEFORE FOR THE SAME PROBLEM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.