Narrative:

After pushback from our gate we were instructed to taxi to runway 27L by mia ground. Taxi from a gate to airplane taxi out is a very short taxi and as first officer on a glass airplane taxi out is a very busy time. Before a takeoff checklist can be done we must enter our final weights into our computer. Our weights were sent to us over our ACARS but there was a discrepancy between the passenger count our F/as gave us and the count our load planers had. This is not a big deal just a quick call to load planning and it's taken care of but it was one more thing for me to do in an already busy time compounded by the short taxi that would keep me busy inside the airplane and not able to look outside. Our new weights were sent to us and I entered them into the computer and made the changes to our takeoff trim and takeoff speeds and then began to read the takeoff checklist. During the takeoff checklist ground instructed us to contact tower. We contacted tower and he instructed us to follow the second air carrier X airplane (there were 3 of them). We completed our takeoff checklist and the airplane that we were instructed to follow was on runway 27L pulled up close behind his company airplane that was holding short of runway 30. Well the line moved up just seconds later and my captain moved up right behind the air carrier X airplane and xed the hold short line. This is when the tower advised air carrier X that he was on an active runway and advised us that we were passed the hold short line. As the line moved up the mistake that air carrier X made snowballed and we too were now on the runway. Air carrier X making this mistake is no excuse for us to make the same mistake. I also feel that if I was not as busy as I was with my eyes mostly inside the airplane, I maybe could have helped prevent this. I also feel that my captain may have been a little bit confused and may not have realized that he was on an active runway because the area around runway 27L and runway 30 is such a wide open area with not much definition between ramp area, taxiway and runway. Also having an airplane directly ahead of him on the runway and being instructed to follow him definitely added to the problem. I feel that they should better mark the area around runway 27L and runway 30 with signs to help differentiate between ramp area, taxiway and runway. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information. Callback placed in conjunction with structured callback on runway incursions. Reporter said that he considered the ground controller's instruction to follow traffic to be ambiguous because that traffic was not going to the same runway, although he was following the same route. He suggested that when multiple runway operations are in effect, controllers be more careful about the phraseology and the clarity of their clrncs. He felt that the captain was probably unaware that he had encroached the runway because the markings are faded and there are not good signs at the location of the incursion. Captain probably thought that the aircraft he was following was also going to runway 27L. Reporter said that captain was aware that first officer was out of the loop because the first officer always announces 'head down' in accordance with training suggestion.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF MLG ACR IS TOLD TO FOLLOW OTHER ACFT TO RWY 27L AT MIA. CAPT INADVERTENTLY FOLLOWS ACFT AHEAD TAXIING TO RWY 30, AND FAILS TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27L. FO IS HEAD DOWN CONFIGURING FMC DURING SHORT VERY SHORT TAXI OUT.

Narrative: AFTER PUSHBACK FROM OUR GATE WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO TAXI TO RWY 27L BY MIA GND. TAXI FROM A GATE TO AIRPLANE TAXI OUT IS A VERY SHORT TAXI AND AS F/O ON A GLASS AIRPLANE TAXI OUT IS A VERY BUSY TIME. BEFORE A TKOF CHKLIST CAN BE DONE WE MUST ENTER OUR FINAL WEIGHTS INTO OUR COMPUTER. OUR WEIGHTS WERE SENT TO US OVER OUR ACARS BUT THERE WAS A DISCREPANCY BTWN THE PAX COUNT OUR F/AS GAVE US AND THE COUNT OUR LOAD PLANERS HAD. THIS IS NOT A BIG DEAL JUST A QUICK CALL TO LOAD PLANNING AND IT'S TAKEN CARE OF BUT IT WAS ONE MORE THING FOR ME TO DO IN AN ALREADY BUSY TIME COMPOUNDED BY THE SHORT TAXI THAT WOULD KEEP ME BUSY INSIDE THE AIRPLANE AND NOT ABLE TO LOOK OUTSIDE. OUR NEW WEIGHTS WERE SENT TO US AND I ENTERED THEM INTO THE COMPUTER AND MADE THE CHANGES TO OUR TKOF TRIM AND TKOF SPDS AND THEN BEGAN TO READ THE TKOF CHKLIST. DURING THE TKOF CHKLIST GND INSTRUCTED US TO CONTACT TWR. WE CONTACTED TWR AND HE INSTRUCTED US TO FOLLOW THE SEC ACR X AIRPLANE (THERE WERE 3 OF THEM). WE COMPLETED OUR TKOF CHKLIST AND THE AIRPLANE THAT WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO FOLLOW WAS ON RWY 27L PULLED UP CLOSE BEHIND HIS COMPANY AIRPLANE THAT WAS HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 30. WELL THE LINE MOVED UP JUST SECS LATER AND MY CAPT MOVED UP R BEHIND THE ACR X AIRPLANE AND XED THE HOLD SHORT LINE. THIS IS WHEN THE TWR ADVISED ACR X THAT HE WAS ON AN ACTIVE RWY AND ADVISED US THAT WE WERE PASSED THE HOLD SHORT LINE. AS THE LINE MOVED UP THE MISTAKE THAT ACR X MADE SNOWBALLED AND WE TOO WERE NOW ON THE RWY. ACR X MAKING THIS MISTAKE IS NO EXCUSE FOR US TO MAKE THE SAME MISTAKE. I ALSO FEEL THAT IF I WAS NOT AS BUSY AS I WAS WITH MY EYES MOSTLY INSIDE THE AIRPLANE, I MAYBE COULD HAVE HELPED PREVENT THIS. I ALSO FEEL THAT MY CAPT MAY HAVE BEEN A LITTLE BIT CONFUSED AND MAY NOT HAVE REALIZED THAT HE WAS ON AN ACTIVE RWY BECAUSE THE AREA AROUND RWY 27L AND RWY 30 IS SUCH A WIDE OPEN AREA WITH NOT MUCH DEFINITION BTWN RAMP AREA, TXWY AND RWY. ALSO HAVING AN AIRPLANE DIRECTLY AHEAD OF HIM ON THE RWY AND BEING INSTRUCTED TO FOLLOW HIM DEFINITELY ADDED TO THE PROB. I FEEL THAT THEY SHOULD BETTER MARK THE AREA AROUND RWY 27L AND RWY 30 WITH SIGNS TO HELP DIFFERENTIATE BTWN RAMP AREA, TXWY AND RWY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO. CALLBACK PLACED IN CONJUNCTION WITH STRUCTURED CALLBACK ON RWY INCURSIONS. RPTR SAID THAT HE CONSIDERED THE GND CTLR'S INSTRUCTION TO FOLLOW TFC TO BE AMBIGUOUS BECAUSE THAT TFC WAS NOT GOING TO THE SAME RWY, ALTHOUGH HE WAS FOLLOWING THE SAME RTE. HE SUGGESTED THAT WHEN MULTIPLE RWY OPS ARE IN EFFECT, CTLRS BE MORE CAREFUL ABOUT THE PHRASEOLOGY AND THE CLARITY OF THEIR CLRNCS. HE FELT THAT THE CAPT WAS PROBABLY UNAWARE THAT HE HAD ENCROACHED THE RWY BECAUSE THE MARKINGS ARE FADED AND THERE ARE NOT GOOD SIGNS AT THE LOCATION OF THE INCURSION. CAPT PROBABLY THOUGHT THAT THE ACFT HE WAS FOLLOWING WAS ALSO GOING TO RWY 27L. RPTR SAID THAT CAPT WAS AWARE THAT F/O WAS OUT OF THE LOOP BECAUSE THE F/O ALWAYS ANNOUNCES 'HEAD DOWN' IN ACCORDANCE WITH TRNING SUGGESTION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.