Narrative:

Stl commissioned the ASR9 on 7/X/91. We have had numerous procedural and equipment related problems since 7/X/91. Staff puts out notice after notice admitting they have bungled the job and then thinks nothing of pawning off the unsatisfactory condition on the controller work force. The latest problem, and the biggest in my opinion came to light today. I was on my first day back and as a union official was called to the deputies office as soon as I reported for work. We were running ILS 12R and lca/DME 12L approachs for the first time since we commissioned the ASR9 and controllers discovered when 2 aircraft run down final tied or nearly tied the target of the aircraft that the sweep hits first (ILS 12R) disappears. Final monitor controller is responsible for separation and must keep aircraft out of the no transgression zone. With no target what are they to do? The obvious answer is cancel the simultaneous approachs, but this was not acceptable to management due to the high amount of delays we would run. They said this problem had never been noticed at any other site with ASR9 because none of the other sites ran approachs that are so close together. They also said they have no idea how to rectify this radar problem. In the interim I bought off on staggering the aircraft 1 mi and if it ever gets to less than 1/2 mi 1 of the aircraft gets yanked off the approach. All controllers working final monitor position do so under article 65 of the natca/FAA contract. (Basically we work with immunity because of what we feel is an unsafe situation). I don't know if this situation is legal, and it is definitely unsafe. The first few days the ASR9 was operational targets would go into coast with no beacon, sometimes not even any primary returns. We worked under article 65. That situation is now rectified. We still work with bad coverage between the ASR9 035-040 radials and are working with large areas of the stl-ZKC boundaries not depicted. It seems to me stl is an accident waiting to happen and although management has shown concern the controllers are left in the lurch while permanent solutions to temporarily unsafe conditions are sought. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information. Reporter experience 9 yrs radar. Reporter stated all problems with non coverage areas of the ASR9 have been resolved. The incorrect radar mapping was resolved. The interim reduced separation procedure is still in effect due to the target cancellation problem.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: STL NEW ASR-9 INSTALLATION LOSS OF DATA TARGETS ON FINAL APCH WHEN ACFT TOO CLOSE.

Narrative: STL COMMISSIONED THE ASR9 ON 7/X/91. WE HAVE HAD NUMEROUS PROCEDURAL AND EQUIP RELATED PROBLEMS SINCE 7/X/91. STAFF PUTS OUT NOTICE AFTER NOTICE ADMITTING THEY HAVE BUNGLED THE JOB AND THEN THINKS NOTHING OF PAWNING OFF THE UNSATISFACTORY CONDITION ON THE CTLR WORK FORCE. THE LATEST PROBLEM, AND THE BIGGEST IN MY OPINION CAME TO LIGHT TODAY. I WAS ON MY FIRST DAY BACK AND AS A UNION OFFICIAL WAS CALLED TO THE DEPUTIES OFFICE AS SOON AS I RPTED FOR WORK. WE WERE RUNNING ILS 12R AND LCA/DME 12L APCHS FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE WE COMMISSIONED THE ASR9 AND CTLRS DISCOVERED WHEN 2 ACFT RUN DOWN FINAL TIED OR NEARLY TIED THE TARGET OF THE ACFT THAT THE SWEEP HITS FIRST (ILS 12R) DISAPPEARS. FINAL MONITOR CTLR IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SEPARATION AND MUST KEEP ACFT OUT OF THE NO TRANSGRESSION ZONE. WITH NO TARGET WHAT ARE THEY TO DO? THE OBVIOUS ANSWER IS CANCEL THE SIMULTANEOUS APCHS, BUT THIS WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO MGMNT DUE TO THE HIGH AMOUNT OF DELAYS WE WOULD RUN. THEY SAID THIS PROBLEM HAD NEVER BEEN NOTICED AT ANY OTHER SITE WITH ASR9 BECAUSE NONE OF THE OTHER SITES RAN APCHS THAT ARE SO CLOSE TOGETHER. THEY ALSO SAID THEY HAVE NO IDEA HOW TO RECTIFY THIS RADAR PROBLEM. IN THE INTERIM I BOUGHT OFF ON STAGGERING THE ACFT 1 MI AND IF IT EVER GETS TO LESS THAN 1/2 MI 1 OF THE ACFT GETS YANKED OFF THE APCH. ALL CTLRS WORKING FINAL MONITOR POS DO SO UNDER ARTICLE 65 OF THE NATCA/FAA CONTRACT. (BASICALLY WE WORK WITH IMMUNITY BECAUSE OF WHAT WE FEEL IS AN UNSAFE SITUATION). I DON'T KNOW IF THIS SITUATION IS LEGAL, AND IT IS DEFINITELY UNSAFE. THE FIRST FEW DAYS THE ASR9 WAS OPERATIONAL TARGETS WOULD GO INTO COAST WITH NO BEACON, SOMETIMES NOT EVEN ANY PRIMARY RETURNS. WE WORKED UNDER ARTICLE 65. THAT SITUATION IS NOW RECTIFIED. WE STILL WORK WITH BAD COVERAGE BTWN THE ASR9 035-040 RADIALS AND ARE WORKING WITH LARGE AREAS OF THE STL-ZKC BOUNDARIES NOT DEPICTED. IT SEEMS TO ME STL IS AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN AND ALTHOUGH MGMNT HAS SHOWN CONCERN THE CTLRS ARE LEFT IN THE LURCH WHILE PERMANENT SOLUTIONS TO TEMPORARILY UNSAFE CONDITIONS ARE SOUGHT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO. RPTR EXPERIENCE 9 YRS RADAR. RPTR STATED ALL PROBLEMS WITH NON COVERAGE AREAS OF THE ASR9 HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. THE INCORRECT RADAR MAPPING WAS RESOLVED. THE INTERIM REDUCED SEPARATION PROC IS STILL IN EFFECT DUE TO THE TARGET CANCELLATION PROBLEM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.