Narrative:

Due to inadequate airline staffing, I am the only reserve pilot (captain or first officer) available in my base. I have repeatedly been assigned to fly as a first officer; I have found ambiguous definition of duties in some instances due to vague/contradictory manual and contract language and due to total lack of CRM training, all of which promote a wide variety of preferences and techniques. Additionally, I am not used to, nor do I enjoy, acting as a second in command to some of my colleagues. In these uncomfortable circumstances, information 'sharing' can be difficult. In this instance, the PIC (PF) misread the DME data displayed on his ehsi, which caused him to break out on the ILS too high, too fast, to land on the ILS runway (34R). I had queried him, as had the tower, as to whether he could complete a landing. I did not realize he was disoriented. Felt he was obstinately pressing on. As immediate safety was not in question, I took no action. On reaching VFR conditions, the captain realized his error, was quite startled. We executed a VFR go around to a VFR landing, in the course of which the captain exceeded the altitude issued by the tower (to maintain at or below 1500 MSL), as well as the 200 KIAS air traffic area speed limit. I pointed out these deviations; he made no obvious effort to correct them. The tower made no comment. I have found this captain to have poor eyesight, to be very hard of hearing.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RPTR OBJECTS TO FLYING AS FO TO LESS COMPETENT OLDER, MORE INFIRM PLTS.

Narrative: DUE TO INADEQUATE AIRLINE STAFFING, I AM THE ONLY RESERVE PLT (CAPT OR FO) AVAILABLE IN MY BASE. I HAVE REPEATEDLY BEEN ASSIGNED TO FLY AS A FO; I HAVE FOUND AMBIGUOUS DEFINITION OF DUTIES IN SOME INSTANCES DUE TO VAGUE/CONTRADICTORY MANUAL AND CONTRACT LANGUAGE AND DUE TO TOTAL LACK OF CRM TRAINING, ALL OF WHICH PROMOTE A WIDE VARIETY OF PREFERENCES AND TECHNIQUES. ADDITIONALLY, I AM NOT USED TO, NOR DO I ENJOY, ACTING AS A SECOND IN COMMAND TO SOME OF MY COLLEAGUES. IN THESE UNCOMFORTABLE CIRCUMSTANCES, INFO 'SHARING' CAN BE DIFFICULT. IN THIS INSTANCE, THE PIC (PF) MISREAD THE DME DATA DISPLAYED ON HIS EHSI, WHICH CAUSED HIM TO BREAK OUT ON THE ILS TOO HIGH, TOO FAST, TO LAND ON THE ILS RWY (34R). I HAD QUERIED HIM, AS HAD THE TWR, AS TO WHETHER HE COULD COMPLETE A LNDG. I DID NOT REALIZE HE WAS DISORIENTED. FELT HE WAS OBSTINATELY PRESSING ON. AS IMMEDIATE SAFETY WAS NOT IN QUESTION, I TOOK NO ACTION. ON REACHING VFR CONDITIONS, THE CAPT REALIZED HIS ERROR, WAS QUITE STARTLED. WE EXECUTED A VFR GAR TO A VFR LNDG, IN THE COURSE OF WHICH THE CAPT EXCEEDED THE ALT ISSUED BY THE TWR (TO MAINTAIN AT OR BELOW 1500 MSL), AS WELL AS THE 200 KIAS ATA SPD LIMIT. I POINTED OUT THESE DEVS; HE MADE NO OBVIOUS EFFORT TO CORRECT THEM. THE TWR MADE NO COMMENT. I HAVE FOUND THIS CAPT TO HAVE POOR EYESIGHT, TO BE VERY HARD OF HEARING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.