Narrative:

I was working TCA which was quiet at the time of the incident. Local and ground were both busy. The tmc in the tower received via landline a coordination from new york approach reference an small aircraft X 15 mi southwest of jfk wishing to return to frg due to an indication in the cockpit of low oil pressure. Simultaneously I noticed the aircraft go into handoff mode for my acceptance. I manually accepted the handoff at the same time the tmc verbally informed me of the coordination from new york approach. Almost immediately I received initial call up from the aircraft, and noticed new york approach had descended the aircraft to 1500. The aircraft requested direct frg a satellite airport 15 mi east of jfk where the aircraft was based. I then asked the aircraft how he planned to navigate, and his response was not positive. I suggested vectors direct and the pilot readily agreed. The supervisor in the tower cabin attendant was directly behind me at this time, not monitoring the position. He immediately ordered me to issue the aircraft a 060 heading, his reasons being that jfk departures would not have to be stopped for small aircraft X flight to frg. He was completely unaware the aircraft had requested vectors direct. Previous experience with this supervisor has taught me that his orders are easier to carry out then to argue against and even though the slightly off course 060 heading would add 3 or 4 mi to small aircraft X trip, I issued it to the aircraft. At this time, small aircraft X experienced total loss of oil pressure, I began to search for a place to land. His radar track was erratic and he appeared to be heading sebound. A later conversation with the pilot confirmed the syncronicity of the loss of oil pressure and my observation of the erratic radar track. Apparently at this point the pilot abandoned the issued heading and began a controled glide toward floyd bennett field directly beneath his present position. In the cabin attendant, I noticed the pilot heading sebound, and adjusted the 060 heading accordingly, issuing a 030 heading to the pilot. The pilot then responded 'I've lost all pressure and I'm going down!' this was all occurring directly beneath the standard arrival course for runway 13L at jfk, and new york approach did not discontinue arrs. Small aircraft X began making left traffic for floyd bennett field, which took him dangerously close to a widebody transport on approach. The local controller observed this and immediately climbed the widebody transport to maintain separation. The supervisor behind me ignored my statement the plane (small aircraft X) was going down, and began screaming at me about small aircraft X's position. I raised my left hand in an attempt to hush the supervisor so that I could hear small aircraft X's next transmission, which I never did hear. The supervisor continued his rampage, even though now he was aware the aircraft was making an emergency landing. This supervisor often carries on well beyond the parameters of his job description. In this particular event, his continual bantering about small aircraft X's flight track (caused by his attempt to circle back to floyd bennett field) prevented me from further communication with the airplane. Floyd bennett field is located 5 mi southwest of jfk, is an operating heliport for nypd aviation and USCG. There are runways at the field that have been closed for yrs, dangerously overgrown and in bad condition. I am an experienced pilot in similar aircraft to small aircraft X, and extensively familiar with this area. I intended to inform small aircraft X of the condition of floyd bennett field, the runway alignments, the wind, the existence of the nypd and ngcg units at the field, and even offer immediate clearance to jfk if the pilot felt this would be a better alternative considering the conditions of floyd bennett field. The supervisor began making judgemental comments about the situation, calling the operation 'terrible' and screaming at me completely unaware of the situation as it had now developed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CTLR RPTR WORKING AN EMER ACFT IS DISTR BY SUPVR.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING TCA WHICH WAS QUIET AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT. LCL AND GND WERE BOTH BUSY. THE TMC IN THE TWR RECEIVED VIA LANDLINE A COORD FROM NEW YORK APCH REF AN SMA X 15 MI SW OF JFK WISHING TO RETURN TO FRG DUE TO AN INDICATION IN THE COCKPIT OF LOW OIL PRESSURE. SIMULTANEOUSLY I NOTICED THE ACFT GO INTO HDOF MODE FOR MY ACCEPTANCE. I MANUALLY ACCEPTED THE HDOF AT THE SAME TIME THE TMC VERBALLY INFORMED ME OF THE COORD FROM NEW YORK APCH. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY I RECEIVED INITIAL CALL UP FROM THE ACFT, AND NOTICED NEW YORK APCH HAD DSNDED THE ACFT TO 1500. THE ACFT REQUESTED DIRECT FRG A SATELLITE ARPT 15 MI E OF JFK WHERE THE ACFT WAS BASED. I THEN ASKED THE ACFT HOW HE PLANNED TO NAVIGATE, AND HIS RESPONSE WAS NOT POSITIVE. I SUGGESTED VECTORS DIRECT AND THE PLT READILY AGREED. THE SUPVR IN THE TWR CAB WAS DIRECTLY BEHIND ME AT THIS TIME, NOT MONITORING THE POS. HE IMMEDIATELY ORDERED ME TO ISSUE THE ACFT A 060 HDG, HIS REASONS BEING THAT JFK DEPS WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE STOPPED FOR SMA X FLT TO FRG. HE WAS COMPLETELY UNAWARE THE ACFT HAD REQUESTED VECTORS DIRECT. PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE WITH THIS SUPVR HAS TAUGHT ME THAT HIS ORDERS ARE EASIER TO CARRY OUT THEN TO ARGUE AGAINST AND EVEN THOUGH THE SLIGHTLY OFF COURSE 060 HDG WOULD ADD 3 OR 4 MI TO SMA X TRIP, I ISSUED IT TO THE ACFT. AT THIS TIME, SMA X EXPERIENCED TOTAL LOSS OF OIL PRESSURE, I BEGAN TO SEARCH FOR A PLACE TO LAND. HIS RADAR TRACK WAS ERRATIC AND HE APPEARED TO BE HDG SEBOUND. A LATER CONVERSATION WITH THE PLT CONFIRMED THE SYNCRONICITY OF THE LOSS OF OIL PRESSURE AND MY OBSERVATION OF THE ERRATIC RADAR TRACK. APPARENTLY AT THIS POINT THE PLT ABANDONED THE ISSUED HDG AND BEGAN A CTLED GLIDE TOWARD FLOYD BENNETT FIELD DIRECTLY BENEATH HIS PRESENT POS. IN THE CAB, I NOTICED THE PLT HDG SEBOUND, AND ADJUSTED THE 060 HDG ACCORDINGLY, ISSUING A 030 HDG TO THE PLT. THE PLT THEN RESPONDED 'I'VE LOST ALL PRESSURE AND I'M GOING DOWN!' THIS WAS ALL OCCURRING DIRECTLY BENEATH THE STANDARD ARR COURSE FOR RWY 13L AT JFK, AND NEW YORK APCH DID NOT DISCONTINUE ARRS. SMA X BEGAN MAKING L TFC FOR FLOYD BENNETT FIELD, WHICH TOOK HIM DANGEROUSLY CLOSE TO A WDB ON APCH. THE LCL CTLR OBSERVED THIS AND IMMEDIATELY CLBED THE WDB TO MAINTAIN SEPARATION. THE SUPVR BEHIND ME IGNORED MY STATEMENT THE PLANE (SMA X) WAS GOING DOWN, AND BEGAN SCREAMING AT ME ABOUT SMA X'S POS. I RAISED MY L HAND IN AN ATTEMPT TO HUSH THE SUPVR SO THAT I COULD HEAR SMA X'S NEXT XMISSION, WHICH I NEVER DID HEAR. THE SUPVR CONTINUED HIS RAMPAGE, EVEN THOUGH NOW HE WAS AWARE THE ACFT WAS MAKING AN EMER LNDG. THIS SUPVR OFTEN CARRIES ON WELL BEYOND THE PARAMETERS OF HIS JOB DESCRIPTION. IN THIS PARTICULAR EVENT, HIS CONTINUAL BANTERING ABOUT SMA X'S FLT TRACK (CAUSED BY HIS ATTEMPT TO CIRCLE BACK TO FLOYD BENNETT FIELD) PREVENTED ME FROM FURTHER COM WITH THE AIRPLANE. FLOYD BENNETT FIELD IS LOCATED 5 MI SW OF JFK, IS AN OPERATING HELIPORT FOR NYPD AVIATION AND USCG. THERE ARE RWYS AT THE FIELD THAT HAVE BEEN CLOSED FOR YRS, DANGEROUSLY OVERGROWN AND IN BAD CONDITION. I AM AN EXPERIENCED PLT IN SIMILAR ACFT TO SMA X, AND EXTENSIVELY FAMILIAR WITH THIS AREA. I INTENDED TO INFORM SMA X OF THE CONDITION OF FLOYD BENNETT FIELD, THE RWY ALIGNMENTS, THE WIND, THE EXISTENCE OF THE NYPD AND NGCG UNITS AT THE FIELD, AND EVEN OFFER IMMEDIATE CLRNC TO JFK IF THE PLT FELT THIS WOULD BE A BETTER ALTERNATIVE CONSIDERING THE CONDITIONS OF FLOYD BENNETT FIELD. THE SUPVR BEGAN MAKING JUDGEMENTAL COMMENTS ABOUT THE SITUATION, CALLING THE OP 'TERRIBLE' AND SCREAMING AT ME COMPLETELY UNAWARE OF THE SITUATION AS IT HAD NOW DEVELOPED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.