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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 188940 |
Time | |
Date | 199107 |
Day | Fri |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : tpl |
State Reference | TX |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 7000 msl bound upper : 12500 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : grk |
Operator | general aviation : personal |
Make Model Name | Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Recip Eng |
Flight Phase | climbout : intermediate altitude |
Flight Plan | VFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Recip Eng |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | Other |
Function | flight crew : single pilot |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : flight engineer pilot : commercial pilot : cfi pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 150 flight time total : 4400 flight time type : 300 |
ASRS Report | 188940 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | Other |
Function | flight crew : single pilot |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : commercial |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : nmac other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other other : unspecified cockpit |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted none taken : unable |
Consequence | Other |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 0 vertical : 200 |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Situations | |
Airport | procedure or policy : unspecified |
Narrative:
En route to 12500 ft overhead the temple airport to drop a load of skydivers we had a near miss with an small transport. Though the near miss is important, the circumstances causing the incident are the real cause of this potential mid air. The airport manager at temple municipal airport has been on a personal campaign to rid the airport of skydiving operations. Having been involved in skydiving operations for over 12 yrs and currently owning and operating a skydiving business I feel justified to say that the operators are none other than truly professional and safety minded. Though operation had so far been able to thwart the airport manager's efforts, the situation had degraded to the point that if anyone is being exposed to unnecessary dangers it is the skydivers themselves. In an effort to compel operation to find a new home the airport manager has imposed a series of requirements that are outside of his authority. The airport manager has decided that it is his authority to direct operation to make unnecessary and restrictive radio xmissions to both unicom and approach control. Regardless of the fact that far 91 and 105, AC- 105, and aim part 135 do not require these, the airport manager requires the following, all skydiving aircraft will: contact unicom for an aeronautical advisory prior to each taxi. Make all xmissions while in the airport pattern. Call unicom 5 mins before dropping skydivers to receive another aeronautical advisory. Call gray approach 5 mins prior, even if approach had not requested such a call. Call unicom 1 min prior to drop for yet another aeronautical advisory. Call gray approach 1 min prior to drop. Call unicom when skydivers are in the air. Call gray approach when skydivers are in the air. Make all traffic pattern xmissions. The only radio transmission required by FARS when dropping skydivers are those directed to the nearest controling facility, in this case gray approach control. All other xmissions on unicom are advisory in nature and specified so in the aim. This ASRS report is filed to clarify the near miss with the small transport. The near miss was caused by unnecessary workload placedupon the pilot by the airport manager. Instead of complying with the see and be seen concept of VFR operations the pilot of the skydiving aircraft was forced to manipulate multiple frequencys when he should have been maintaining a vigilant scan for traffic while in a constant climbing attitude. The airport manager at temple has attempted to remove the authority of the PIC to determine when it is safe to drop his skydivers. He has specified that each contact to unicom for an advisory include the WX, winds, altimeter and any known traffic. In a letter posted to the airport line personnel, the airport manager specified that if the skydiving aircraft drop their load with 'any aircraft in the area' he is to be notified immediately. When asked by the owners of skydiving operation to define this statement the airport manager refused and led the line personnel to believe that the skydiving aircraft were not allowed to drop if any aircraft had made contact with unicom. The airport manager has no authority to force the pilots of skydiving aircraft to obtain clearance from the line personnel to drop their load. It is ludicrous to think that a line person has better situational awareness of potential traffic conflicts with exiting skydivers than does the pilot of the skydiving aircraft and ATC. Further complicating the situation is frequency congestion on unicom. At 12500 ft the reception and transmission range of a VHF radio can be hundreds of mi. This forces the pilots of the skydive aircraft great difficulty in communicating with temple unicom. It is no enhancement to safety to congest the unicom with unnecessary xmissions for hundreds of mi around, blocking xmissions of aircraft in traffic patterns not even related to the airport where the skydiving operations are being conducted. 1 min prior to the skydivers exiting the aircraft the pilot has his hands full. The requirements imposed at temple cause the pilot to make 4 separate radio xmissions and 5 frequency changes all within 1 min prior to exit. This is a time when the pilot is transitioning from climb to level flight, changing power setting, aircraft confign, trim, adjusting to cg shiftsas the skydivers position over themselves for exit, searching for traffic and making final adjustments to the acfts position over the airport. Compounding all of this with more radio xmissions is not safety enhancing. The true safety hazard is allowing a person in a position of authority to abuse that position by imposing their personal belief upon others. The airport manager at temple municipal airport has expressed his personal dislike for skydiving operations. He is currently attempting to achieve his personal desire to rid temple airport of skydiving under the cloak of 'safety.' however his attempts are more detrimental to safety than the perceived danger that skydivers pose to the airport. It is important to remember that the city of temple has received funds for the improvement of the temple airport and with those funds come an obligation to not discriminate between bonafide aeronautical uses. No other users of the temple airport have been forced to comply with any type of restrictions that skydive operation has had to deal with.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: COMPLAINT REF UNFAIR PRACTICES BY ARPT MGR WHO OBJECTS TO SKYDIVE OPS AT ARPT.
Narrative: ENRTE TO 12500 FT OVERHEAD THE TEMPLE ARPT TO DROP A LOAD OF SKYDIVERS WE HAD A NEAR MISS WITH AN SMT. THOUGH THE NEAR MISS IS IMPORTANT, THE CIRCUMSTANCES CAUSING THE INCIDENT ARE THE REAL CAUSE OF THIS POTENTIAL MID AIR. THE ARPT MGR AT TEMPLE MUNICIPAL ARPT HAS BEEN ON A PERSONAL CAMPAIGN TO RID THE ARPT OF SKYDIVING OPS. HAVING BEEN INVOLVED IN SKYDIVING OPS FOR OVER 12 YRS AND CURRENTLY OWNING AND OPERATING A SKYDIVING BUSINESS I FEEL JUSTIFIED TO SAY THAT THE OPERATORS ARE NONE OTHER THAN TRULY PROFESSIONAL AND SAFETY MINDED. THOUGH OP HAD SO FAR BEEN ABLE TO THWART THE ARPT MGR'S EFFORTS, THE SITUATION HAD DEGRADED TO THE POINT THAT IF ANYONE IS BEING EXPOSED TO UNNECESSARY DANGERS IT IS THE SKYDIVERS THEMSELVES. IN AN EFFORT TO COMPEL OP TO FIND A NEW HOME THE ARPT MGR HAS IMPOSED A SERIES OF REQUIREMENTS THAT ARE OUTSIDE OF HIS AUTHORITY. THE ARPT MGR HAS DECIDED THAT IT IS HIS AUTHORITY TO DIRECT OP TO MAKE UNNECESSARY AND RESTRICTIVE RADIO XMISSIONS TO BOTH UNICOM AND APCH CTL. REGARDLESS OF THE FACT THAT FAR 91 AND 105, AC- 105, AND AIM PART 135 DO NOT REQUIRE THESE, THE ARPT MGR REQUIRES THE FOLLOWING, ALL SKYDIVING ACFT WILL: CONTACT UNICOM FOR AN AERONAUTICAL ADVISORY PRIOR TO EACH TAXI. MAKE ALL XMISSIONS WHILE IN THE ARPT PATTERN. CALL UNICOM 5 MINS BEFORE DROPPING SKYDIVERS TO RECEIVE ANOTHER AERONAUTICAL ADVISORY. CALL GRAY APCH 5 MINS PRIOR, EVEN IF APCH HAD NOT REQUESTED SUCH A CALL. CALL UNICOM 1 MIN PRIOR TO DROP FOR YET ANOTHER AERONAUTICAL ADVISORY. CALL GRAY APCH 1 MIN PRIOR TO DROP. CALL UNICOM WHEN SKYDIVERS ARE IN THE AIR. CALL GRAY APCH WHEN SKYDIVERS ARE IN THE AIR. MAKE ALL TFC PATTERN XMISSIONS. THE ONLY RADIO XMISSION REQUIRED BY FARS WHEN DROPPING SKYDIVERS ARE THOSE DIRECTED TO THE NEAREST CTLING FACILITY, IN THIS CASE GRAY APCH CTL. ALL OTHER XMISSIONS ON UNICOM ARE ADVISORY IN NATURE AND SPECIFIED SO IN THE AIM. THIS ASRS RPT IS FILED TO CLARIFY THE NEAR MISS WITH THE SMT. THE NEAR MISS WAS CAUSED BY UNNECESSARY WORKLOAD PLACEDUPON THE PLT BY THE ARPT MGR. INSTEAD OF COMPLYING WITH THE SEE AND BE SEEN CONCEPT OF VFR OPS THE PLT OF THE SKYDIVING ACFT WAS FORCED TO MANIPULATE MULTIPLE FREQS WHEN HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN MAINTAINING A VIGILANT SCAN FOR TFC WHILE IN A CONSTANT CLBING ATTITUDE. THE ARPT MGR AT TEMPLE HAS ATTEMPTED TO REMOVE THE AUTHORITY OF THE PIC TO DETERMINE WHEN IT IS SAFE TO DROP HIS SKYDIVERS. HE HAS SPECIFIED THAT EACH CONTACT TO UNICOM FOR AN ADVISORY INCLUDE THE WX, WINDS, ALTIMETER AND ANY KNOWN TFC. IN A LETTER POSTED TO THE ARPT LINE PERSONNEL, THE ARPT MGR SPECIFIED THAT IF THE SKYDIVING ACFT DROP THEIR LOAD WITH 'ANY ACFT IN THE AREA' HE IS TO BE NOTIFIED IMMEDIATELY. WHEN ASKED BY THE OWNERS OF SKYDIVING OP TO DEFINE THIS STATEMENT THE ARPT MGR REFUSED AND LED THE LINE PERSONNEL TO BELIEVE THAT THE SKYDIVING ACFT WERE NOT ALLOWED TO DROP IF ANY ACFT HAD MADE CONTACT WITH UNICOM. THE ARPT MGR HAS NO AUTHORITY TO FORCE THE PLTS OF SKYDIVING ACFT TO OBTAIN CLRNC FROM THE LINE PERSONNEL TO DROP THEIR LOAD. IT IS LUDICROUS TO THINK THAT A LINE PERSON HAS BETTER SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF POTENTIAL TFC CONFLICTS WITH EXITING SKYDIVERS THAN DOES THE PLT OF THE SKYDIVING ACFT AND ATC. FURTHER COMPLICATING THE SITUATION IS FREQ CONGESTION ON UNICOM. AT 12500 FT THE RECEPTION AND XMISSION RANGE OF A VHF RADIO CAN BE HUNDREDS OF MI. THIS FORCES THE PLTS OF THE SKYDIVE ACFT GREAT DIFFICULTY IN COMMUNICATING WITH TEMPLE UNICOM. IT IS NO ENHANCEMENT TO SAFETY TO CONGEST THE UNICOM WITH UNNECESSARY XMISSIONS FOR HUNDREDS OF MI AROUND, BLOCKING XMISSIONS OF ACFT IN TFC PATTERNS NOT EVEN RELATED TO THE ARPT WHERE THE SKYDIVING OPS ARE BEING CONDUCTED. 1 MIN PRIOR TO THE SKYDIVERS EXITING THE ACFT THE PLT HAS HIS HANDS FULL. THE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED AT TEMPLE CAUSE THE PLT TO MAKE 4 SEPARATE RADIO XMISSIONS AND 5 FREQ CHANGES ALL WITHIN 1 MIN PRIOR TO EXIT. THIS IS A TIME WHEN THE PLT IS TRANSITIONING FROM CLB TO LEVEL FLT, CHANGING PWR SETTING, ACFT CONFIGN, TRIM, ADJUSTING TO CG SHIFTSAS THE SKYDIVERS POS OVER THEMSELVES FOR EXIT, SEARCHING FOR TFC AND MAKING FINAL ADJUSTMENTS TO THE ACFTS POS OVER THE ARPT. COMPOUNDING ALL OF THIS WITH MORE RADIO XMISSIONS IS NOT SAFETY ENHANCING. THE TRUE SAFETY HAZARD IS ALLOWING A PERSON IN A POS OF AUTHORITY TO ABUSE THAT POS BY IMPOSING THEIR PERSONAL BELIEF UPON OTHERS. THE ARPT MGR AT TEMPLE MUNICIPAL ARPT HAS EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL DISLIKE FOR SKYDIVING OPS. HE IS CURRENTLY ATTEMPTING TO ACHIEVE HIS PERSONAL DESIRE TO RID TEMPLE ARPT OF SKYDIVING UNDER THE CLOAK OF 'SAFETY.' HOWEVER HIS ATTEMPTS ARE MORE DETRIMENTAL TO SAFETY THAN THE PERCEIVED DANGER THAT SKYDIVERS POSE TO THE ARPT. IT IS IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER THAT THE CITY OF TEMPLE HAS RECEIVED FUNDS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE TEMPLE ARPT AND WITH THOSE FUNDS COME AN OBLIGATION TO NOT DISCRIMINATE BTWN BONAFIDE AERONAUTICAL USES. NO OTHER USERS OF THE TEMPLE ARPT HAVE BEEN FORCED TO COMPLY WITH ANY TYPE OF RESTRICTIONS THAT SKYDIVE OP HAS HAD TO DEAL WITH.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.