Narrative:

I was instructed to hold short of 25R (at 42). Tower control said something I thought was for our aircraft. I asked my first officer to clarify what they had said. 'They said we are cleared to cross 25R'. I then instructed him to look up the runway 25R and make certain it was clear. My first officer responded to ground control '1236 cleared to cross 25R'. After turning to his right, looking up the runway, my first officer stated 'I don't see a thing', so we crossed 25R. After doing so, I was instructed to telephone the tower. When I talked to the supervisor he told me that transmission to cross 25 right was for an air carrier with almost identical call sign to ours. The tower supervisor also told me that there was an air carrier light transport who had to abort his takeoff roll. I, in turn, told the supervisor what had happened from our end and that we were sorry about the mix-up. Supplemental information from acn 189098: the only change in our actions which could have prevented this situation would have been for me to ask tower to confirm the call was for our flight, necessitating a repeat of the instructions by tower -- a third verbalization. Lax tower could have assisted in preventing this situation by: 1) if no response received from the aircraft addressed, querying them or repeating instructions to them (as is normal practice at lax). This was not done here, and other instructions continued to be given to other aircraft. Due to congestion and traffic, little time was available, if any, for responses. Possibly tower could have slowed down all operations which would enhance communications and safety. 2) if a wrong aircraft responded to tower instructions, immediate correction could have been made, i.e., negative, hold short, etc. (Normal practice at lax.) neither of the above normal practices were done in this situation which contributed to any potential safety compromise.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RWY INCURSION CREATES NECESSITY FOR ANOTHER COMMUTER ACR TO ABORT TKOF. UNAUTHORIZED UNCOORD RWY ENTRY XING.

Narrative: I WAS INSTRUCTED TO HOLD SHORT OF 25R (AT 42). TWR CTL SAID SOMETHING I THOUGHT WAS FOR OUR ACFT. I ASKED MY FO TO CLARIFY WHAT THEY HAD SAID. 'THEY SAID WE ARE CLRED TO CROSS 25R'. I THEN INSTRUCTED HIM TO LOOK UP THE RWY 25R AND MAKE CERTAIN IT WAS CLR. MY FO RESPONDED TO GND CTL '1236 CLRED TO CROSS 25R'. AFTER TURNING TO HIS R, LOOKING UP THE RWY, MY FO STATED 'I DON'T SEE A THING', SO WE CROSSED 25R. AFTER DOING SO, I WAS INSTRUCTED TO TELEPHONE THE TWR. WHEN I TALKED TO THE SUPVR HE TOLD ME THAT XMISSION TO CROSS 25 R WAS FOR AN ACR WITH ALMOST IDENTICAL CALL SIGN TO OURS. THE TWR SUPVR ALSO TOLD ME THAT THERE WAS AN ACR LTT WHO HAD TO ABORT HIS TKOF ROLL. I, IN TURN, TOLD THE SUPVR WHAT HAD HAPPENED FROM OUR END AND THAT WE WERE SORRY ABOUT THE MIX-UP. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 189098: THE ONLY CHANGE IN OUR ACTIONS WHICH COULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS SITUATION WOULD HAVE BEEN FOR ME TO ASK TWR TO CONFIRM THE CALL WAS FOR OUR FLT, NECESSITATING A REPEAT OF THE INSTRUCTIONS BY TWR -- A THIRD VERBALIZATION. LAX TWR COULD HAVE ASSISTED IN PREVENTING THIS SITUATION BY: 1) IF NO RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE ACFT ADDRESSED, QUERYING THEM OR REPEATING INSTRUCTIONS TO THEM (AS IS NORMAL PRACTICE AT LAX). THIS WAS NOT DONE HERE, AND OTHER INSTRUCTIONS CONTINUED TO BE GIVEN TO OTHER ACFT. DUE TO CONGESTION AND TFC, LITTLE TIME WAS AVAILABLE, IF ANY, FOR RESPONSES. POSSIBLY TWR COULD HAVE SLOWED DOWN ALL OPS WHICH WOULD ENHANCE COMS AND SAFETY. 2) IF A WRONG ACFT RESPONDED TO TWR INSTRUCTIONS, IMMEDIATE CORRECTION COULD HAVE BEEN MADE, I.E., NEGATIVE, HOLD SHORT, ETC. (NORMAL PRACTICE AT LAX.) NEITHER OF THE ABOVE NORMAL PRACTICES WERE DONE IN THIS SITUATION WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO ANY POTENTIAL SAFETY COMPROMISE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.