Narrative:

We had an XA00 hour show time for a XB00 departure to repos the aircraft to roc from syr, then an XC00 departure time from roc to alb. When we showed up, the airplane had just been signed off by the mechanics for a preflight inspection. The first officer and I were doing the preflight inspection when we first noticed no charts in the aircraft for VFR. The first officer went and told the mechanics and 1 of them said, 'fxx you, it's not my problem'. Then after starting the engines, I noticed that the 'right bleed air fail light' was illuminated. So I shut them down and got a mechanic. The first thing he does is take the bulbs out of the light and break them, then he tells me to MEL it. The way that the MEL is written you have to MEL the annunciator light. So I started up again, this time with the left bleed air fail light on. So another mechanic came to check it out. He said to leave it as it was written up and to take it like that. Mistake #1. Then while taxiing out in the rain and darkness expecting runway 28, I was advised that runway 32 was available from 'a' for immediate departure. Since we were running late with the maintenance problems we decided to take the immediate, which required a 90 degree left turn onto 'a' then a quick left 90 degree turn again onto the runway. I had just turned the aircraft control over to the first officer since it was to be his leg to fly. Taxiway a parallels runway 28 and as we turned onto 'a' another aircraft was about to flare to land on 28. So I, at the request of the first officer, turned the taxi light out. Also as we turned onto 'a' the first officer noticed and advised me that his attitude indicator had rolled to a 10 degree bank to the right. Simultaneously, I had my head in the cockpit completing the 'final items' checklist, we were already cleared for takeoff, when I heard a pop and looked up. The first officer (with 1500+ hours of night flight experience) had apparently taxied over a runway or taxiway light. He had initially lined up with the left edge lights thinking it was the centerline lights. At that time the tower asked if we were rolling yet. Not thinking of propeller damage and thinking, since the tower didn't see us do anything wrong, we decided to takeoff. Our flight to roc went uneventfully from that point. Mistake #2. Upon landing at roc I instructed the first officer to inspect the aircraft for damage. It was still dark and raining and we were 20 mins late with the right engine still turning, the passenger coming down the stairs, I was getting the IFR clearance and doing the weight and balance while monitoring ground operations when the first officer advised me that the left propeller was damaged. So I asked him how bad it was and he said, bad. I was ready to shut down and cancel the flight when the first officer came on board and said he thought it would be ok to take the aircraft on the next leg. Taking into account his 10 yrs experience as an a and P mechanic, I told him to go out and rotate the propellers' worst blade damage for my best view from the cockpit. He did so, and I peered through the tiny opening into the rainy darkness at the backside of a feathered propeller with damage to the leading edge. It didn't look that bad at that time, and I was pressured with making a quick decision, taking into account how much we already let slide, the company's chapter 11 bankruptcy status, the need for revenue, the consequences of my decision, the safety, and the fact that the flight went smooth on the previous leg, as far as propeller imbal or vibrations was concerned. I decided to depart in the darkness for the daylight at alb to further inspect the propeller and to give myself some time to evaluate the situation. Upon landing and engine shutdown at alb, we took a better look at the propeller and decided to immediately report the whole incident. Mistake #3, and the one that cost me my job, was the decision to continue from roc to alb. It was poor judgement and not in the best interest of safety and a bad decision. It is much better to err on the side of safety. I'm just glad nobody was hurt. When things go wrong you must stop the 'chain' of bad events, and the sooner the better. I stopped before an accident but too late to save my job, hopefully soon enough to save my ticket.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC UNAWARE OF DAMAGE TO PROP ON TKOF SYR, NOTICED AT ROC, CONTINUED OP TO ALB. PROP INSPECTED IN DAYLIGHT AND ACFT GNDED. CAPT LOST JOB ACCOUNT FLYING NON AIRWORTHY ACFT. TAXIWAY RWY EXCURSION.

Narrative: WE HAD AN XA00 HR SHOW TIME FOR A XB00 DEP TO REPOS THE ACFT TO ROC FROM SYR, THEN AN XC00 DEP TIME FROM ROC TO ALB. WHEN WE SHOWED UP, THE AIRPLANE HAD JUST BEEN SIGNED OFF BY THE MECHS FOR A PREFLT INSPECTION. THE FO AND I WERE DOING THE PREFLT INSPECTION WHEN WE FIRST NOTICED NO CHARTS IN THE ACFT FOR VFR. THE FO WENT AND TOLD THE MECHS AND 1 OF THEM SAID, 'FXX YOU, IT'S NOT MY PROBLEM'. THEN AFTER STARTING THE ENGS, I NOTICED THAT THE 'R BLEED AIR FAIL LIGHT' WAS ILLUMINATED. SO I SHUT THEM DOWN AND GOT A MECH. THE FIRST THING HE DOES IS TAKE THE BULBS OUT OF THE LIGHT AND BREAK THEM, THEN HE TELLS ME TO MEL IT. THE WAY THAT THE MEL IS WRITTEN YOU HAVE TO MEL THE ANNUNCIATOR LIGHT. SO I STARTED UP AGAIN, THIS TIME WITH THE L BLEED AIR FAIL LIGHT ON. SO ANOTHER MECH CAME TO CHK IT OUT. HE SAID TO LEAVE IT AS IT WAS WRITTEN UP AND TO TAKE IT LIKE THAT. MISTAKE #1. THEN WHILE TAXIING OUT IN THE RAIN AND DARKNESS EXPECTING RWY 28, I WAS ADVISED THAT RWY 32 WAS AVAILABLE FROM 'A' FOR IMMEDIATE DEP. SINCE WE WERE RUNNING LATE WITH THE MAINT PROBLEMS WE DECIDED TO TAKE THE IMMEDIATE, WHICH REQUIRED A 90 DEG L TURN ONTO 'A' THEN A QUICK L 90 DEG TURN AGAIN ONTO THE RWY. I HAD JUST TURNED THE ACFT CTL OVER TO THE FO SINCE IT WAS TO BE HIS LEG TO FLY. TAXIWAY A PARALLELS RWY 28 AND AS WE TURNED ONTO 'A' ANOTHER ACFT WAS ABOUT TO FLARE TO LAND ON 28. SO I, AT THE REQUEST OF THE FO, TURNED THE TAXI LIGHT OUT. ALSO AS WE TURNED ONTO 'A' THE FO NOTICED AND ADVISED ME THAT HIS ATTITUDE INDICATOR HAD ROLLED TO A 10 DEG BANK TO THE R. SIMULTANEOUSLY, I HAD MY HEAD IN THE COCKPIT COMPLETING THE 'FINAL ITEMS' CHKLIST, WE WERE ALREADY CLRED FOR TKOF, WHEN I HEARD A POP AND LOOKED UP. THE FO (WITH 1500+ HRS OF NIGHT FLT EXPERIENCE) HAD APPARENTLY TAXIED OVER A RWY OR TAXIWAY LIGHT. HE HAD INITIALLY LINED UP WITH THE L EDGE LIGHTS THINKING IT WAS THE CENTERLINE LIGHTS. AT THAT TIME THE TWR ASKED IF WE WERE ROLLING YET. NOT THINKING OF PROP DAMAGE AND THINKING, SINCE THE TWR DIDN'T SEE US DO ANYTHING WRONG, WE DECIDED TO TKOF. OUR FLT TO ROC WENT UNEVENTFULLY FROM THAT POINT. MISTAKE #2. UPON LNDG AT ROC I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO INSPECT THE ACFT FOR DAMAGE. IT WAS STILL DARK AND RAINING AND WE WERE 20 MINS LATE WITH THE R ENG STILL TURNING, THE PAX COMING DOWN THE STAIRS, I WAS GETTING THE IFR CLRNC AND DOING THE WT AND BAL WHILE MONITORING GND OPS WHEN THE FO ADVISED ME THAT THE L PROP WAS DAMAGED. SO I ASKED HIM HOW BAD IT WAS AND HE SAID, BAD. I WAS READY TO SHUT DOWN AND CANCEL THE FLT WHEN THE FO CAME ON BOARD AND SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE OK TO TAKE THE ACFT ON THE NEXT LEG. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT HIS 10 YRS EXPERIENCE AS AN A AND P MECH, I TOLD HIM TO GO OUT AND ROTATE THE PROPS' WORST BLADE DAMAGE FOR MY BEST VIEW FROM THE COCKPIT. HE DID SO, AND I PEERED THROUGH THE TINY OPENING INTO THE RAINY DARKNESS AT THE BACKSIDE OF A FEATHERED PROP WITH DAMAGE TO THE LEADING EDGE. IT DIDN'T LOOK THAT BAD AT THAT TIME, AND I WAS PRESSURED WITH MAKING A QUICK DECISION, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT HOW MUCH WE ALREADY LET SLIDE, THE COMPANY'S CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY STATUS, THE NEED FOR REVENUE, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MY DECISION, THE SAFETY, AND THE FACT THAT THE FLT WENT SMOOTH ON THE PREVIOUS LEG, AS FAR AS PROP IMBAL OR VIBRATIONS WAS CONCERNED. I DECIDED TO DEPART IN THE DARKNESS FOR THE DAYLIGHT AT ALB TO FURTHER INSPECT THE PROP AND TO GIVE MYSELF SOME TIME TO EVALUATE THE SITUATION. UPON LNDG AND ENG SHUTDOWN AT ALB, WE TOOK A BETTER LOOK AT THE PROP AND DECIDED TO IMMEDIATELY RPT THE WHOLE INCIDENT. MISTAKE #3, AND THE ONE THAT COST ME MY JOB, WAS THE DECISION TO CONTINUE FROM ROC TO ALB. IT WAS POOR JUDGEMENT AND NOT IN THE BEST INTEREST OF SAFETY AND A BAD DECISION. IT IS MUCH BETTER TO ERR ON THE SIDE OF SAFETY. I'M JUST GLAD NOBODY WAS HURT. WHEN THINGS GO WRONG YOU MUST STOP THE 'CHAIN' OF BAD EVENTS, AND THE SOONER THE BETTER. I STOPPED BEFORE AN ACCIDENT BUT TOO LATE TO SAVE MY JOB, HOPEFULLY SOON ENOUGH TO SAVE MY TICKET.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.