Narrative:

Air carrier X on final for 16R at ksea, on the GS, inside the OM, we received an advisory from the tower of opposite direction traffic at 11 O'clock nd approximately 1/2 mi at 900 ft. When I picked out the traffic from the haze a few seconds later he was just about to go under our left wing approximately 300-400 ft below us. I glanced at the altimeter which read 1300 ft MSL. It all happened so fast we had no time to react or take any type of evasive action which I would have done. Although the WX was VFR with about 5-6 mi in haze, the only reason we did not hit that aircraft was fate. Had we been slightly low on the GS or he slightly higher, we would have been unable to miss him. In questioning the tower afterward the controller told us that he had that traffic in contact and that it was routine for him to be there as he was in the traffic pattern for 1 of the other airports in the close vicinity of ksea. I find it incredible that traffic in the opposite direction of the localizer is being routinely rted directly beneath a commercial heavy jet on final in this fashion. We were dirty with the landing gear down and full flaps, approximately 1000 ft AGL, on an instrument approach with an airspeed of about 140 KTS. If this type separation is normal in seattle hen in my opinion there is a great potential for disaster. At the very least we need more time to identify the traffic so as not to descend into him -- and what if he is off his altitude, etc. I would like to make a few additional comments. As I perceive the ATC system operation, a subtle dangerous change is occurring. The pilots are often on the firing line with approachs, WX, mechanics, etc, and are used to that. However the pilots used to be considered the last report, the last stopgap, before operational disasters but are now increasingly being used as a primary factor to avoid the problems rather than having flawed procedures changed. This instrument approach is 1 example of what I consider flawed procedures. We were looking into the sun and haze and the system tolerances were such that the old see and be seen concept was used for traffic separation in a very confined area where there was little or no margin for error -- and we were out of the loop because we were told too late to do anything about it and we couldn't see him anyway! We were at his mercy of not erring but still responsible for the safe conduct of our flight. Another example is the approach into sfo. ATC vectors 1 aircraft to fly the quiet bridge approach and another aircraft flying the tip toe approach to 'join up' to fly wing tip to wing tip to land simultaneously on runways 28L and 28R. There is only 750 ft separating these runways. The wingspan on the widebody transport is 156 ft 1 inch. If 2 wdbs were on the approach, there would be only 613 ft 10 inches lateral separation with no vertical separation at all and no staggering. Another example is the problem occurring again and again with noise abatement (not even counting the ridiculous departure at santa ana). We are being forced into taking off and landing at the operating tailwind limits of the aircraft as defined in our flight manual's limitation section due solely to noise considerations. More times than I am able to mention, the tower is reporting winds of 9- 10 KTS on the tail whereas our IRS winds are 15-20 KTS of tailwind. Whose winds do we use? Where are we required to go around? At 20 ft? At 10? And do we have enough fuel to wait for them to decide to turn the airport around? On the takeoff we don't know until we break ground, but it is no fun to stagger off a runway and find you have considerably more tailwind than that reported by the tower.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR X HAD NMAC WITH ACFT Y VISUAL SEPARATION IN USE IN TCA. SEE AND AVOID CONCEPT.

Narrative: ACR X ON FINAL FOR 16R AT KSEA, ON THE GS, INSIDE THE OM, WE RECEIVED AN ADVISORY FROM THE TWR OF OPPOSITE DIRECTION TFC AT 11 O'CLOCK ND APPROX 1/2 MI AT 900 FT. WHEN I PICKED OUT THE TFC FROM THE HAZE A FEW SECONDS LATER HE WAS JUST ABOUT TO GO UNDER OUR L WING APPROX 300-400 FT BELOW US. I GLANCED AT THE ALTIMETER WHICH READ 1300 FT MSL. IT ALL HAPPENED SO FAST WE HAD NO TIME TO REACT OR TAKE ANY TYPE OF EVASIVE ACTION WHICH I WOULD HAVE DONE. ALTHOUGH THE WX WAS VFR WITH ABOUT 5-6 MI IN HAZE, THE ONLY REASON WE DID NOT HIT THAT ACFT WAS FATE. HAD WE BEEN SLIGHTLY LOW ON THE GS OR HE SLIGHTLY HIGHER, WE WOULD HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO MISS HIM. IN QUESTIONING THE TWR AFTERWARD THE CTLR TOLD US THAT HE HAD THAT TFC IN CONTACT AND THAT IT WAS ROUTINE FOR HIM TO BE THERE AS HE WAS IN THE TFC PATTERN FOR 1 OF THE OTHER ARPTS IN THE CLOSE VICINITY OF KSEA. I FIND IT INCREDIBLE THAT TFC IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION OF THE LOC IS BEING ROUTINELY RTED DIRECTLY BENEATH A COMMERCIAL HVY JET ON FINAL IN THIS FASHION. WE WERE DIRTY WITH THE LNDG GEAR DOWN AND FULL FLAPS, APPROX 1000 FT AGL, ON AN INST APCH WITH AN AIRSPD OF ABOUT 140 KTS. IF THIS TYPE SEPARATION IS NORMAL IN SEATTLE HEN IN MY OPINION THERE IS A GREAT POTENTIAL FOR DISASTER. AT THE VERY LEAST WE NEED MORE TIME TO IDENT THE TFC SO AS NOT TO DSND INTO HIM -- AND WHAT IF HE IS OFF HIS ALT, ETC. I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A FEW ADDITIONAL COMMENTS. AS I PERCEIVE THE ATC SYS OP, A SUBTLE DANGEROUS CHANGE IS OCCURRING. THE PLTS ARE OFTEN ON THE FIRING LINE WITH APCHS, WX, MECHS, ETC, AND ARE USED TO THAT. HOWEVER THE PLTS USED TO BE CONSIDERED THE LAST RPT, THE LAST STOPGAP, BEFORE OPERATIONAL DISASTERS BUT ARE NOW INCREASINGLY BEING USED AS A PRIMARY FACTOR TO AVOID THE PROBLEMS RATHER THAN HAVING FLAWED PROCS CHANGED. THIS INST APCH IS 1 EXAMPLE OF WHAT I CONSIDER FLAWED PROCS. WE WERE LOOKING INTO THE SUN AND HAZE AND THE SYS TOLERANCES WERE SUCH THAT THE OLD SEE AND BE SEEN CONCEPT WAS USED FOR TFC SEPARATION IN A VERY CONFINED AREA WHERE THERE WAS LITTLE OR NO MARGIN FOR ERROR -- AND WE WERE OUT OF THE LOOP BECAUSE WE WERE TOLD TOO LATE TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT AND WE COULDN'T SEE HIM ANYWAY! WE WERE AT HIS MERCY OF NOT ERRING BUT STILL RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFE CONDUCT OF OUR FLT. ANOTHER EXAMPLE IS THE APCH INTO SFO. ATC VECTORS 1 ACFT TO FLY THE QUIET BRIDGE APCH AND ANOTHER ACFT FLYING THE TIP TOE APCH TO 'JOIN UP' TO FLY WING TIP TO WING TIP TO LAND SIMULTANEOUSLY ON RWYS 28L AND 28R. THERE IS ONLY 750 FT SEPARATING THESE RWYS. THE WINGSPAN ON THE WDB IS 156 FT 1 INCH. IF 2 WDBS WERE ON THE APCH, THERE WOULD BE ONLY 613 FT 10 INCHES LATERAL SEPARATION WITH NO VERT SEPARATION AT ALL AND NO STAGGERING. ANOTHER EXAMPLE IS THE PROBLEM OCCURRING AGAIN AND AGAIN WITH NOISE ABATEMENT (NOT EVEN COUNTING THE RIDICULOUS DEP AT SANTA ANA). WE ARE BEING FORCED INTO TAKING OFF AND LNDG AT THE OPERATING TAILWIND LIMITS OF THE ACFT AS DEFINED IN OUR FLT MANUAL'S LIMITATION SECTION DUE SOLELY TO NOISE CONSIDERATIONS. MORE TIMES THAN I AM ABLE TO MENTION, THE TWR IS RPTING WINDS OF 9- 10 KTS ON THE TAIL WHEREAS OUR IRS WINDS ARE 15-20 KTS OF TAILWIND. WHOSE WINDS DO WE USE? WHERE ARE WE REQUIRED TO GAR? AT 20 FT? AT 10? AND DO WE HAVE ENOUGH FUEL TO WAIT FOR THEM TO DECIDE TO TURN THE ARPT AROUND? ON THE TKOF WE DON'T KNOW UNTIL WE BREAK GND, BUT IT IS NO FUN TO STAGGER OFF A RWY AND FIND YOU HAVE CONSIDERABLY MORE TAILWIND THAN THAT RPTED BY THE TWR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.