37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 191161 |
Time | |
Date | 199110 |
Day | Sat |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : jfk |
State Reference | NY |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 24000 msl bound upper : 24000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zbw |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Large Transport, Low Wing, 3 Turbojet Eng |
Flight Phase | cruise other descent other |
Route In Use | enroute airway : zbw |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : commercial pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 75 flight time total : 15000 flight time type : 6500 |
ASRS Report | 191161 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | other spatial deviation |
Independent Detector | other controllera other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance flight crew : returned to intended course or assigned course |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
During our 3 day trip together I noticed on the first officer's leg to fly, he would start about 20-25 NM inbound to a VOR station and let the airplane drift off the centerline of the airway. He would pass about over the top of the VOR, but not from the airway we were flying inbound on. On the last leg inbound to boston I mentioned this to him in a friendly way. For the next 15 mins or so he wouldn't speak and pouted. I tried to tell him it was just a suggestion that he maintain the airway centerline and that he otherwise was doing a good job. I told him that his pouting and defensive attitude wasn't in the best interest or cockpit resource management. He became very argumentative. During this discussion we were supposed to turn direct to pvd at the jfk 60 degree 60 NM fix on the raulf arrival. We missed the turn by 2 mi and the center had to tell us to go direct to providence. At this time we were at 24000 ft. Again the center called us and said, 'descend to 23000 ft.' I'm not sure if he had given this clearance to us before, I might have missed it with the discussion that was going on. From the time we passed over the jfk VOR until the pvd VOR there was some type of conversation by the first officer defending himself by saying it was ok to drift off the airway prior to the VOR. His attitude took too much of my attention during our descent. Instead of trying to correct a cockpit resource management problem on the descent, I should have waited until we were at the gate. I think that cockpit resource management is good, except for the fact that some crew members feel that if you have any criticism of their actions, you are not a nice captain and you yourself are not showing good cockpit resource management by bringing up their mistakes.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ACR LGT TRACK HDG DEV PLUS CAPT COMPLAINT ABOUT FO'S AIRWAY TRACKING PROC.
Narrative: DURING OUR 3 DAY TRIP TOGETHER I NOTICED ON THE FO'S LEG TO FLY, HE WOULD START ABOUT 20-25 NM INBOUND TO A VOR STATION AND LET THE AIRPLANE DRIFT OFF THE CENTERLINE OF THE AIRWAY. HE WOULD PASS ABOUT OVER THE TOP OF THE VOR, BUT NOT FROM THE AIRWAY WE WERE FLYING INBOUND ON. ON THE LAST LEG INBOUND TO BOSTON I MENTIONED THIS TO HIM IN A FRIENDLY WAY. FOR THE NEXT 15 MINS OR SO HE WOULDN'T SPEAK AND POUTED. I TRIED TO TELL HIM IT WAS JUST A SUGGESTION THAT HE MAINTAIN THE AIRWAY CENTERLINE AND THAT HE OTHERWISE WAS DOING A GOOD JOB. I TOLD HIM THAT HIS POUTING AND DEFENSIVE ATTITUDE WASN'T IN THE BEST INTEREST OR COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT. HE BECAME VERY ARGUMENTATIVE. DURING THIS DISCUSSION WE WERE SUPPOSED TO TURN DIRECT TO PVD AT THE JFK 60 DEG 60 NM FIX ON THE RAULF ARR. WE MISSED THE TURN BY 2 MI AND THE CENTER HAD TO TELL US TO GO DIRECT TO PROVIDENCE. AT THIS TIME WE WERE AT 24000 FT. AGAIN THE CENTER CALLED US AND SAID, 'DSND TO 23000 FT.' I'M NOT SURE IF HE HAD GIVEN THIS CLRNC TO US BEFORE, I MIGHT HAVE MISSED IT WITH THE DISCUSSION THAT WAS GOING ON. FROM THE TIME WE PASSED OVER THE JFK VOR UNTIL THE PVD VOR THERE WAS SOME TYPE OF CONVERSATION BY THE FO DEFENDING HIMSELF BY SAYING IT WAS OK TO DRIFT OFF THE AIRWAY PRIOR TO THE VOR. HIS ATTITUDE TOOK TOO MUCH OF MY ATTN DURING OUR DSCNT. INSTEAD OF TRYING TO CORRECT A COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT PROBLEM ON THE DSCNT, I SHOULD HAVE WAITED UNTIL WE WERE AT THE GATE. I THINK THAT COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT IS GOOD, EXCEPT FOR THE FACT THAT SOME CREW MEMBERS FEEL THAT IF YOU HAVE ANY CRITICISM OF THEIR ACTIONS, YOU ARE NOT A NICE CAPT AND YOU YOURSELF ARE NOT SHOWING GOOD COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT BY BRINGING UP THEIR MISTAKES.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.