Narrative:

During the turnaround before departure I (captain) asked to have the windshields washed. When I returned to the aircraft from operations I noticed the utility personnel having trouble opening the cockpit sliding windows. I gave the 2 men a quick lesson and went to the cabin to wait for them to finish. We noted no abnormalities during our preflight checks. First officer was making the takeoff on boston's runway 27. On takeoff roll, a loud wind noise started at the first officer's window, indicating that it wasn't fully closed. I took control of the aircraft at about 60 KTS and expected first officer to close his window. I thought it would be an uneventful process, but first officer could not get the window to close. By the time I realized that it wouldn't close we were too fast for an uneventful abort (we were at about 90 KTS) and I decided to continue the takeoff. Passing 1000 ft we were handed off from tower to departure control. Although I was still hoping that we could get the window closed and continue our flight, before I switched the frequency I notified tower that we would need to return to the field in order to have the window closed. I climbed to about 3000 ft and accelerated to about 200 KTS. The biggest problem we had once we got airborne was communication. First officer was right beside the noise source and could not hear me at all, even through his earpiece with the aircraft intercom. At this time I was still flying the airplane and handling all radio communications because he was unable to hear. First officer was occupied attempting to close his window (at my request). My boom microphone was a big safety feature, since I didn't have to remove a hand from the controls to pick up a microphone. In order to improve our communications I slowed the aircraft to 150 KTS but the cockpit got only slightly quieter. At this speed we were able to communication somewhat, and once I deselected open ic (hot intercom microphone) the cockpit speakers became loud enough to allow both of us to hear the controller clearly. I had to deselect open ic on the jumpseat audio panel, as well as my own panel, to allow the speakers to return to full volume. The medium large transport cockpit speaker system, with a volume control right on each speaker, would have created fewer distrs. As soon as we got the aircraft slowed down I depressurized the aircraft to take some of the pressure off the window so that first officer might be able to close it. The procedure didn't seem to be working, and first officer was uncomfortable with the idea that the window might come open without the pressurization to hold it closed, so I repressurized. I directed first officer to tell our passenger that we would be returning to the airport for landing, and I followed the instructions from approach control to a 10 mi final. We received expeditious handling from boston approach control and landed without incident. During taxi to the gate first officer discovered that the window was off its track. Nothing we could do would have fixed it. The mechanic who met us had the window fixed and signed off in less than 5 mins and we were on our way. Final note: if utility personnel are expected to use the cockpit windows for access they should be instructed in their operation and should have some respect for the adjustments involved. In this case the entire event could have been avoided if the utility person had informed someone that the window wasn't closed. It's possible that he didn't know that the window wasn't closed. Training should address that issue as well.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR FINDS COCKPIT WINDOW NOT CLOSED LOCKED ON TKOF ROLL. UNABLE TO SECURE.

Narrative: DURING THE TURNAROUND BEFORE DEP I (CAPT) ASKED TO HAVE THE WINDSHIELDS WASHED. WHEN I RETURNED TO THE ACFT FROM OPS I NOTICED THE UTILITY PERSONNEL HAVING TROUBLE OPENING THE COCKPIT SLIDING WINDOWS. I GAVE THE 2 MEN A QUICK LESSON AND WENT TO THE CABIN TO WAIT FOR THEM TO FINISH. WE NOTED NO ABNORMALITIES DURING OUR PREFLT CHKS. FO WAS MAKING THE TKOF ON BOSTON'S RWY 27. ON TKOF ROLL, A LOUD WIND NOISE STARTED AT THE FO'S WINDOW, INDICATING THAT IT WASN'T FULLY CLOSED. I TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AT ABOUT 60 KTS AND EXPECTED FO TO CLOSE HIS WINDOW. I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE AN UNEVENTFUL PROCESS, BUT FO COULD NOT GET THE WINDOW TO CLOSE. BY THE TIME I REALIZED THAT IT WOULDN'T CLOSE WE WERE TOO FAST FOR AN UNEVENTFUL ABORT (WE WERE AT ABOUT 90 KTS) AND I DECIDED TO CONTINUE THE TKOF. PASSING 1000 FT WE WERE HANDED OFF FROM TWR TO DEP CTL. ALTHOUGH I WAS STILL HOPING THAT WE COULD GET THE WINDOW CLOSED AND CONTINUE OUR FLT, BEFORE I SWITCHED THE FREQ I NOTIFIED TWR THAT WE WOULD NEED TO RETURN TO THE FIELD IN ORDER TO HAVE THE WINDOW CLOSED. I CLBED TO ABOUT 3000 FT AND ACCELERATED TO ABOUT 200 KTS. THE BIGGEST PROBLEM WE HAD ONCE WE GOT AIRBORNE WAS COM. FO WAS RIGHT BESIDE THE NOISE SOURCE AND COULD NOT HEAR ME AT ALL, EVEN THROUGH HIS EARPIECE WITH THE ACFT INTERCOM. AT THIS TIME I WAS STILL FLYING THE AIRPLANE AND HANDLING ALL RADIO COMS BECAUSE HE WAS UNABLE TO HEAR. FO WAS OCCUPIED ATTEMPTING TO CLOSE HIS WINDOW (AT MY REQUEST). MY BOOM MICROPHONE WAS A BIG SAFETY FEATURE, SINCE I DIDN'T HAVE TO REMOVE A HAND FROM THE CTLS TO PICK UP A MICROPHONE. IN ORDER TO IMPROVE OUR COMS I SLOWED THE ACFT TO 150 KTS BUT THE COCKPIT GOT ONLY SLIGHTLY QUIETER. AT THIS SPD WE WERE ABLE TO COM SOMEWHAT, AND ONCE I DESELECTED OPEN IC (HOT INTERCOM MICROPHONE) THE COCKPIT SPEAKERS BECAME LOUD ENOUGH TO ALLOW BOTH OF US TO HEAR THE CTLR CLRLY. I HAD TO DESELECT OPEN IC ON THE JUMPSEAT AUDIO PANEL, AS WELL AS MY OWN PANEL, TO ALLOW THE SPEAKERS TO RETURN TO FULL VOLUME. THE MLG COCKPIT SPEAKER SYS, WITH A VOLUME CTL RIGHT ON EACH SPEAKER, WOULD HAVE CREATED FEWER DISTRS. AS SOON AS WE GOT THE ACFT SLOWED DOWN I DEPRESSURIZED THE ACFT TO TAKE SOME OF THE PRESSURE OFF THE WINDOW SO THAT FO MIGHT BE ABLE TO CLOSE IT. THE PROC DIDN'T SEEM TO BE WORKING, AND FO WAS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE IDEA THAT THE WINDOW MIGHT COME OPEN WITHOUT THE PRESSURIZATION TO HOLD IT CLOSED, SO I REPRESSURIZED. I DIRECTED FO TO TELL OUR PAX THAT WE WOULD BE RETURNING TO THE ARPT FOR LNDG, AND I FOLLOWED THE INSTRUCTIONS FROM APCH CTL TO A 10 MI FINAL. WE RECEIVED EXPEDITIOUS HANDLING FROM BOSTON APCH CTL AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. DURING TAXI TO THE GATE FO DISCOVERED THAT THE WINDOW WAS OFF ITS TRACK. NOTHING WE COULD DO WOULD HAVE FIXED IT. THE MECH WHO MET US HAD THE WINDOW FIXED AND SIGNED OFF IN LESS THAN 5 MINS AND WE WERE ON OUR WAY. FINAL NOTE: IF UTILITY PERSONNEL ARE EXPECTED TO USE THE COCKPIT WINDOWS FOR ACCESS THEY SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED IN THEIR OP AND SHOULD HAVE SOME RESPECT FOR THE ADJUSTMENTS INVOLVED. IN THIS CASE THE ENTIRE EVENT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF THE UTILITY PERSON HAD INFORMED SOMEONE THAT THE WINDOW WASN'T CLOSED. IT'S POSSIBLE THAT HE DIDN'T KNOW THAT THE WINDOW WASN'T CLOSED. TRAINING SHOULD ADDRESS THAT ISSUE AS WELL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.