Narrative:

An indisputable operational error occurred between air carrier X and air carrier Y due to controller error. The controller at fault was required to recertify on the particular sector, and the error was reflected in his training file. The facility had been under fire for other operrors, so in order to avert further scrutiny the facility has downgraded the incident to a non-occurrence. The information was removed from the training file and the controller instead got an 'unsatisfactory performance' report in his personal file. Lax ARTCC has a history of covering up their misdeeds, and finds ways to punish those that report incidents that reflect unfavorably on the facility. Having knowledge of this, I am reporting it in order that this will provide me some sort of protection from prosecution for not reporting it. Enclosed is a copy of the facility's initial assessment of the error. On 9/91, an operational error occurred at sector 31. The error occurred at julian VORTAC between air carrier X departing san diego towards the northeast, and air carrier Y inbound from mexico landing los angeles. Sector 31 was staffed with a radar specialist performing all duties. At the time of the operational error the traffic workload and complexity were light. Air carrier Y checked on frequency level at FL350 awaiting a clearance to los angeles. The radar specialist cleared air carrier Y via jli JLI2 arrival. Once air carrier Y crossed the international border the controller then issued a restriction for air carrier Y to cross jli at and maintain FL240. As air carrier Y approached jli from the southeast, the specialist at sector 40 initiated a pvd to display air carrier X data block onto sector 31. This action then became the topic of discussion between the controllers at sector 30 and 31 prior to and after coordination with sector 40. The radar specialist at sector 40 called sector 31 to point out air carrier X in order to continue the aircraft's climb. The controller at sector 31 then pvds air carrier Y to sector 40 and stated 'reference air carrier Y who is descending to cross jli at FL240, point out approved.' the specialist at sector 40 then negotiated FL250 for air carrier X by suggesting the controller at sector 31 stop air carrier Y at FL260. The controller at sector 31 concurred. The radar specialist at sector 31 entered the revised altitude of FL260 into the data block of air carrier Y, then wrote down the altitude of FL260 in black on the flight progress strip of air carrier Y. He did not, however, issue the altitude assignment to the pilot of air carrier Y. Air carrier Y climbed to FL250 and air carrier X continued to descend to FL240. By the time the controller at sector 31 figured out what had happened, it was too late and separation was lost.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR X HAD LTSS FROM ACR Y SYS ERROR.

Narrative: AN INDISPUTABLE OPERROR OCCURRED BTWN ACR X AND ACR Y DUE TO CTLR ERROR. THE CTLR AT FAULT WAS REQUIRED TO RECERTIFY ON THE PARTICULAR SECTOR, AND THE ERROR WAS REFLECTED IN HIS TRAINING FILE. THE FACILITY HAD BEEN UNDER FIRE FOR OTHER OPERRORS, SO IN ORDER TO AVERT FURTHER SCRUTINY THE FACILITY HAS DOWNGRADED THE INCIDENT TO A NON-OCCURRENCE. THE INFO WAS REMOVED FROM THE TRAINING FILE AND THE CTLR INSTEAD GOT AN 'UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE' RPT IN HIS PERSONAL FILE. LAX ARTCC HAS A HISTORY OF COVERING UP THEIR MISDEEDS, AND FINDS WAYS TO PUNISH THOSE THAT RPT INCIDENTS THAT REFLECT UNFAVORABLY ON THE FACILITY. HAVING KNOWLEDGE OF THIS, I AM RPTING IT IN ORDER THAT THIS WILL PROVIDE ME SOME SORT OF PROTECTION FROM PROSECUTION FOR NOT RPTING IT. ENCLOSED IS A COPY OF THE FACILITY'S INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF THE ERROR. ON 9/91, AN OPERROR OCCURRED AT SECTOR 31. THE ERROR OCCURRED AT JULIAN VORTAC BTWN ACR X DEPARTING SAN DIEGO TOWARDS THE NE, AND ACR Y INBOUND FROM MEXICO LNDG LOS ANGELES. SECTOR 31 WAS STAFFED WITH A RADAR SPECIALIST PERFORMING ALL DUTIES. AT THE TIME OF THE OPERROR THE TFC WORKLOAD AND COMPLEXITY WERE LIGHT. ACR Y CHKED ON FREQ LEVEL AT FL350 AWAITING A CLRNC TO LOS ANGELES. THE RADAR SPECIALIST CLRED ACR Y VIA JLI JLI2 ARR. ONCE ACR Y CROSSED THE INTL BORDER THE CTLR THEN ISSUED A RESTRICTION FOR ACR Y TO CROSS JLI AT AND MAINTAIN FL240. AS ACR Y APCHED JLI FROM THE SE, THE SPECIALIST AT SECTOR 40 INITIATED A PVD TO DISPLAY ACR X DATA BLOCK ONTO SECTOR 31. THIS ACTION THEN BECAME THE TOPIC OF DISCUSSION BTWN THE CTLRS AT SECTOR 30 AND 31 PRIOR TO AND AFTER COORD WITH SECTOR 40. THE RADAR SPECIALIST AT SECTOR 40 CALLED SECTOR 31 TO POINT OUT ACR X IN ORDER TO CONTINUE THE ACFT'S CLB. THE CTLR AT SECTOR 31 THEN PVDS ACR Y TO SECTOR 40 AND STATED 'REF ACR Y WHO IS DSNDING TO CROSS JLI AT FL240, POINT OUT APPROVED.' THE SPECIALIST AT SECTOR 40 THEN NEGOTIATED FL250 FOR ACR X BY SUGGESTING THE CTLR AT SECTOR 31 STOP ACR Y AT FL260. THE CTLR AT SECTOR 31 CONCURRED. THE RADAR SPECIALIST AT SECTOR 31 ENTERED THE REVISED ALT OF FL260 INTO THE DATA BLOCK OF ACR Y, THEN WROTE DOWN THE ALT OF FL260 IN BLACK ON THE FLT PROGRESS STRIP OF ACR Y. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, ISSUE THE ALT ASSIGNMENT TO THE PLT OF ACR Y. ACR Y CLBED TO FL250 AND ACR X CONTINUED TO DSND TO FL240. BY THE TIME THE CTLR AT SECTOR 31 FIGURED OUT WHAT HAD HAPPENED, IT WAS TOO LATE AND SEPARATION WAS LOST.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.