Narrative:

I was the captain on flight ord to ewr the night of oct, 1991. From ord clearance delivery we had been 'cleared as filed...' everything about the flight was normal during takeoff, climb and cruise at FL370 until we were eastbound on J584 approaching slate run VOR. From past experience, I know that in this area there is usually a frequency change from cleveland center to new york center. As I passed slate run VOR I attempted to contact center. However there was no response. The only thing I heard was an air carrier Y aircraft talking to center but could not hear center's responses to air carrier Y. I talked to and heard air carrier Y who relayed my request for proper frequency. By this time I was at williamsport VOR. Because I was in visual flight conditions and could remain so, in the positive control area, and my flight plan included the williamsport 1 arrival to ewr (which includes 'expect clearance to cross hayed, 1 /T 118 degree/35 NM, at lowest usable flight level'), I directed the copilot to initiate a descent out of FL370 to cross hayed at FL180. We had waited as long as possible and still comply with the arrival while trying to obtain the proper frequency. I squawked 7600 (I should have done 7700 for 1 min then 7600) prior to starting to descend. During the descent I was able to obtain the correct frequency and talk to the proper controller. He instructed me to descend so as to cross hayed at FL180 which I did do using idle power and speed brakes extended. As time permitted we talked of my situation. He stated that he had expected me to stay at FL370 until over ewr and then spiral down to land at ewr. I stated my reasons for starting the descent and then asked him if there was a 'problem' (ie, if he were going to initiate violation procedures, etc). He asked me to stand by (apparently to check with previous controllers, his supervisor, etc). He came back and stated that there was 'no problem.' later in the flight time permitted a discussion between myself and newark approach control. That controller indicated that his workload would have been greatly increased had I stayed at altitude until over ewr. I believe he thought my action was preferable to that of staying at FL370.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG FLC STARTED DSCNT TO FOLLOW FLT PLAN BEFORE REESTABLISHING RADIO CONTACT.

Narrative: I WAS THE CAPT ON FLT ORD TO EWR THE NIGHT OF OCT, 1991. FROM ORD CLRNC DELIVERY WE HAD BEEN 'CLRED AS FILED...' EVERYTHING ABOUT THE FLT WAS NORMAL DURING TKOF, CLB AND CRUISE AT FL370 UNTIL WE WERE EBOUND ON J584 APCHING SLATE RUN VOR. FROM PAST EXPERIENCE, I KNOW THAT IN THIS AREA THERE IS USUALLY A FREQ CHANGE FROM CLEVELAND CENTER TO NEW YORK CENTER. AS I PASSED SLATE RUN VOR I ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT CENTER. HOWEVER THERE WAS NO RESPONSE. THE ONLY THING I HEARD WAS AN ACR Y ACFT TALKING TO CENTER BUT COULD NOT HEAR CENTER'S RESPONSES TO ACR Y. I TALKED TO AND HEARD ACR Y WHO RELAYED MY REQUEST FOR PROPER FREQ. BY THIS TIME I WAS AT WILLIAMSPORT VOR. BECAUSE I WAS IN VISUAL FLT CONDITIONS AND COULD REMAIN SO, IN THE PCA, AND MY FLT PLAN INCLUDED THE WILLIAMSPORT 1 ARR TO EWR (WHICH INCLUDES 'EXPECT CLRNC TO CROSS HAYED, 1 /T 118 DEG/35 NM, AT LOWEST USABLE FLT LEVEL'), I DIRECTED THE COPLT TO INITIATE A DSCNT OUT OF FL370 TO CROSS HAYED AT FL180. WE HAD WAITED AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AND STILL COMPLY WITH THE ARR WHILE TRYING TO OBTAIN THE PROPER FREQ. I SQUAWKED 7600 (I SHOULD HAVE DONE 7700 FOR 1 MIN THEN 7600) PRIOR TO STARTING TO DSND. DURING THE DSCNT I WAS ABLE TO OBTAIN THE CORRECT FREQ AND TALK TO THE PROPER CTLR. HE INSTRUCTED ME TO DSND SO AS TO CROSS HAYED AT FL180 WHICH I DID DO USING IDLE PWR AND SPD BRAKES EXTENDED. AS TIME PERMITTED WE TALKED OF MY SITUATION. HE STATED THAT HE HAD EXPECTED ME TO STAY AT FL370 UNTIL OVER EWR AND THEN SPIRAL DOWN TO LAND AT EWR. I STATED MY REASONS FOR STARTING THE DSCNT AND THEN ASKED HIM IF THERE WAS A 'PROBLEM' (IE, IF HE WERE GOING TO INITIATE VIOLATION PROCS, ETC). HE ASKED ME TO STAND BY (APPARENTLY TO CHK WITH PREVIOUS CTLRS, HIS SUPVR, ETC). HE CAME BACK AND STATED THAT THERE WAS 'NO PROBLEM.' LATER IN THE FLT TIME PERMITTED A DISCUSSION BTWN MYSELF AND NEWARK APCH CTL. THAT CTLR INDICATED THAT HIS WORKLOAD WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATLY INCREASED HAD I STAYED AT ALT UNTIL OVER EWR. I BELIEVE HE THOUGHT MY ACTION WAS PREFERABLE TO THAT OF STAYING AT FL370.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.