Narrative:

After receiving a late clearance to descend from 10000 followed by a late turn to intercept the localizer, causing us to overshoot the localizer, ATC then reissued a new heading to reintercept then asked us if we had the runway or airport in sight? The captain/instructor acknowledged that he had the runway in sight. Since I did not have the runway in sight, the captain momentarily took the controls and lined up the aircraft and gave the controls back to me, and I landed the aircraft. Note: ATC had cleared us for a visual approach once the captain had acknowledged airport in sight. After landing and clearing the runway we realized that we had no landing clrncs and we were still on approach frequency. I feel that the contributing factors to this situation were 1) confusion of crew member duties, since during the approach the captain had the flight controls for short period of time and still working the radios. 2) miscom between controller and flight crew. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter participated in structured callback for runway incursion study. This was first flight for reporter into mia airport. He was flying the aircraft from right seat. At night and airport lights blended with city lights. PNF (PIC) was also instructor on this ferry flight and he saw the airport first so took controls and lined aircraft up with the runway. For a min or so the ATC communication function responsibility was not clear. Says the 'slam dunk' procedures at mia cause heavy last min cockpit workload. Reporter says that better cockpit coordination was needed to make sure that one of them got landing clearance. No passenger of this flight. On final they received a TCASII TA and both looked outside for traffic. This was a distraction. Reporter was new to company and aircraft type. First leg as PF.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LNDG WITHOUT CLRNC BY COMMUTER.

Narrative: AFTER RECEIVING A LATE CLRNC TO DSND FROM 10000 FOLLOWED BY A LATE TURN TO INTERCEPT THE LOC, CAUSING US TO OVERSHOOT THE LOC, ATC THEN REISSUED A NEW HDG TO REINTERCEPT THEN ASKED US IF WE HAD THE RWY OR ARPT IN SIGHT? THE CAPT/INSTRUCTOR ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE HAD THE RWY IN SIGHT. SINCE I DID NOT HAVE THE RWY IN SIGHT, THE CAPT MOMENTARILY TOOK THE CTLS AND LINED UP THE ACFT AND GAVE THE CTLS BACK TO ME, AND I LANDED THE ACFT. NOTE: ATC HAD CLRED US FOR A VISUAL APCH ONCE THE CAPT HAD ACKNOWLEDGED ARPT IN SIGHT. AFTER LNDG AND CLRING THE RWY WE REALIZED THAT WE HAD NO LNDG CLRNCS AND WE WERE STILL ON APCH FREQ. I FEEL THAT THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS SITUATION WERE 1) CONFUSION OF CREW MEMBER DUTIES, SINCE DURING THE APCH THE CAPT HAD THE FLT CTLS FOR SHORT PERIOD OF TIME AND STILL WORKING THE RADIOS. 2) MISCOM BTWN CTLR AND FLC. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR PARTICIPATED IN STRUCTURED CALLBACK FOR RWY INCURSION STUDY. THIS WAS FIRST FLT FOR RPTR INTO MIA ARPT. HE WAS FLYING THE ACFT FROM R SEAT. AT NIGHT AND ARPT LIGHTS BLENDED WITH CITY LIGHTS. PNF (PIC) WAS ALSO INSTRUCTOR ON THIS FERRY FLT AND HE SAW THE ARPT FIRST SO TOOK CTLS AND LINED ACFT UP WITH THE RWY. FOR A MIN OR SO THE ATC COM FUNCTION RESPONSIBILITY WAS NOT CLR. SAYS THE 'SLAM DUNK' PROCS AT MIA CAUSE HVY LAST MIN COCKPIT WORKLOAD. RPTR SAYS THAT BETTER COCKPIT COORD WAS NEEDED TO MAKE SURE THAT ONE OF THEM GOT LNDG CLRNC. NO PAX OF THIS FLT. ON FINAL THEY RECEIVED A TCASII TA AND BOTH LOOKED OUTSIDE FOR TFC. THIS WAS A DISTR. RPTR WAS NEW TO COMPANY AND ACFT TYPE. FIRST LEG AS PF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.