Narrative:

Off runway 13 turned to heading 175 until the 2.5 DME then turned to heading 040. Climbed to 5000. We were then advised to turn to heading 310, and climb to 8000. Our next instructions were to climb to 15000 and expedite through 10000. First officer was hand flying the aircraft. He initiated the climb, which stabilized at approximately 4000 FPM. As we climbed through 10000 we received an RA. The vsi was displaying a red arc throughout the entire vertical range, with the exception of a green 'fly to' region at approximately 2500 FPM down. A solid red square was depicted at 11 O'clock inside the 2 mi circle. There were showers in the area so we had the radar selected to the wxr/TCASII mode. I glanced at the radar screen to try and get an overview of the situation, however the amount of clutter in this mode prevented a quick assessment. First officer had terminated the climb and was attempting to place the vsi needle within the green arc. The TCASII audio was stating 'increase descent, increase descent'. I leaned forward in order to read the altitude displayed next to the traffic symbol on the vsi. My first observation was that of an arrow pointed downward, and - 07. The arrow disappeared almost immediately and I told the first officer the traffic appeared to be below us, and that he should stop the descent. At this time, the rate of descent was almost 2500 FPM. As he slowed the descent, the altitude displayed next to the traffic symbol went to -05, -04, -03, etc, until, as we leveled off, it read '0'. At this time, the traffic symbol was off our left wing at approximately 1.5 mi. The traffic symbol then changed to yellow, and the audio stated 'clear of conflict'. I called ATC and advised them that we had received a TCASII alert and had descended in order to comply. We then resumed our climb to 15000. Concerns: first officer and I had discussed TCASII on this trip prior to the incident. We both agreed that due to lack of training and 'hands on' experience with the various scenarios, we felt at a loss to interpret the information and act in a timely manner. In addition, due to the excessive number of nuisance advisories during the takeoff and landing phases, flcs have developed a 'cry wolf' attitude towards TCASII, thus rendering the system ineffective, and dangerous. Conclusion: as a result of our experience with TCASII on flight, and information I have received subsequently, I feel strongly that the system is not fully developed and is placing pilots and passenger in the role of guinea pigs. Therefore, I feel that the system should be turned off until such time as it is fully developed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR RECEIVES TCASII RA WITH NO ADVANCE TA. DSNDS BUT HAS INDICATION OF TFC BEING BELOW. STOPS DSCNT.

Narrative: OFF RWY 13 TURNED TO HDG 175 UNTIL THE 2.5 DME THEN TURNED TO HDG 040. CLBED TO 5000. WE WERE THEN ADVISED TO TURN TO HDG 310, AND CLB TO 8000. OUR NEXT INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO CLB TO 15000 AND EXPEDITE THROUGH 10000. FO WAS HAND FLYING THE ACFT. HE INITIATED THE CLB, WHICH STABILIZED AT APPROX 4000 FPM. AS WE CLBED THROUGH 10000 WE RECEIVED AN RA. THE VSI WAS DISPLAYING A RED ARC THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE VERT RANGE, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A GREEN 'FLY TO' REGION AT APPROX 2500 FPM DOWN. A SOLID RED SQUARE WAS DEPICTED AT 11 O'CLOCK INSIDE THE 2 MI CIRCLE. THERE WERE SHOWERS IN THE AREA SO WE HAD THE RADAR SELECTED TO THE WXR/TCASII MODE. I GLANCED AT THE RADAR SCREEN TO TRY AND GET AN OVERVIEW OF THE SITUATION, HOWEVER THE AMOUNT OF CLUTTER IN THIS MODE PREVENTED A QUICK ASSESSMENT. FO HAD TERMINATED THE CLB AND WAS ATTEMPTING TO PLACE THE VSI NEEDLE WITHIN THE GREEN ARC. THE TCASII AUDIO WAS STATING 'INCREASE DSCNT, INCREASE DSCNT'. I LEANED FORWARD IN ORDER TO READ THE ALT DISPLAYED NEXT TO THE TFC SYMBOL ON THE VSI. MY FIRST OBSERVATION WAS THAT OF AN ARROW POINTED DOWNWARD, AND - 07. THE ARROW DISAPPEARED ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AND I TOLD THE FO THE TFC APPEARED TO BE BELOW US, AND THAT HE SHOULD STOP THE DSCNT. AT THIS TIME, THE RATE OF DSCNT WAS ALMOST 2500 FPM. AS HE SLOWED THE DSCNT, THE ALT DISPLAYED NEXT TO THE TFC SYMBOL WENT TO -05, -04, -03, ETC, UNTIL, AS WE LEVELED OFF, IT READ '0'. AT THIS TIME, THE TFC SYMBOL WAS OFF OUR L WING AT APPROX 1.5 MI. THE TFC SYMBOL THEN CHANGED TO YELLOW, AND THE AUDIO STATED 'CLR OF CONFLICT'. I CALLED ATC AND ADVISED THEM THAT WE HAD RECEIVED A TCASII ALERT AND HAD DSNDED IN ORDER TO COMPLY. WE THEN RESUMED OUR CLB TO 15000. CONCERNS: FO AND I HAD DISCUSSED TCASII ON THIS TRIP PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT. WE BOTH AGREED THAT DUE TO LACK OF TRAINING AND 'HANDS ON' EXPERIENCE WITH THE VARIOUS SCENARIOS, WE FELT AT A LOSS TO INTERPRET THE INFO AND ACT IN A TIMELY MANNER. IN ADDITION, DUE TO THE EXCESSIVE NUMBER OF NUISANCE ADVISORIES DURING THE TKOF AND LNDG PHASES, FLCS HAVE DEVELOPED A 'CRY WOLF' ATTITUDE TOWARDS TCASII, THUS RENDERING THE SYS INEFFECTIVE, AND DANGEROUS. CONCLUSION: AS A RESULT OF OUR EXPERIENCE WITH TCASII ON FLT, AND INFO I HAVE RECEIVED SUBSEQUENTLY, I FEEL STRONGLY THAT THE SYS IS NOT FULLY DEVELOPED AND IS PLACING PLTS AND PAX IN THE ROLE OF GUINEA PIGS. THEREFORE, I FEEL THAT THE SYS SHOULD BE TURNED OFF UNTIL SUCH TIME AS IT IS FULLY DEVELOPED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.