Narrative:

After departure; the first officer began the after takeoff flow checklist. Subsequently placing the landing gear in the 'up' position. Shortly thereafter; I heard the hydraulic pump continue to run; indicating that the landing gear was not completely retracted. I confirmed this by looking at the in-transit light and observing that it was still illuminated. At this point in time; the first officer motioned toward the gear handle; to inform me of our situation. I told him to keep doing his flow checklist and radio calls; and I will continue climbing to our assigned departure altitude (essentially; continuing to fly normally); except that I did not accelerate to 160 KTS. At the MSA; I continued to climb out at 150 KTS; not knowing the landing gear's true location. Once we leveled off at our assigned altitude; we completed a positive xfer of controls and the first officer began to fly the aircraft. Meanwhile; the hydraulic pump continued to run and the in-transit light stayed illuminated. Additionally; I informed ATC that we had a landing gear indication problem and I would update him momentarily; that we needed delay vectors while we worked the issue and that we would be restricting ourselves to 150 KTS for the time being. I then began the QRH for a landing gear up unsafe indication. One of the procedures the QRH directed us to complete is a 'recycle' of the landing gear. We followed the guidance of the QRH and I placed the landing gear handle in the 'down' position. Once the 3 green down indications illuminated; the hydraulic pump and in-transit light turned off. With all normal indication; the QRH ended. After completion of the QRH; I contacted dispatch to inform them of our situation and that we would be returning to ZZZ shortly. It was at this time that I began to attempt to contact maintenance control. I initially called maintenance control a minimum of 4 or 5 times. None of my attempts were successful. For the time being I gave up on maintenance control to speak with the flight attendant and to inform the passenger. Overall; this took a minimum of 5 mins to complete. During this period of time; maintenance control never returned any of my previous calls. Upon completion of my briefing to the passenger and flight attendant; I tried contacting maintenance control again -- they still did not answer. After this attempt; I contacted dispatch (who answered on the first call) and asked them to get maintenance for me -- this worked. I explained what happened; what the first officer and I did (ie; QRH) followed by asking maintenance if they had any concerns that we should be aware of upon returning to ZZZ for a precautionary landing. Maintenance confirmed that they felt it was safe to return and land. Subsequently; dispatch and I confirmed that we were under our maximum landing weight; that dispatch would contact ZZZ to inform them we were returning; and that I would call back once safely on the ground. It was at this point that I informed ATC of the extent of our situation and that we would be returning for a precautionary landing in ZZZ. Furthermore; I stressed to ATC that the landing gear was down and locked; that we expected a normal landing; however; if something did go wrong upon touchdown; that we would like crash fire rescue equipment on the side of the runway standing by. ATC complied; crash fire rescue equipment was standing by and we turned onto a vector for the airport. Once the aircraft stabilized on the new heading; the first officer and I again performed a positive exchange of controls and I began to fly the aircraft again. During the approach brief; the first officer and I discussed possible issues that could arise and what each of us would do in the event that the worst happened (ie; gear collapse on touchdown). Moreover; we briefed the visual approach; continued inbound to ZZZ and landed uneventfully. Upon clearing the runway; we canceled our crash fire rescue equipment response and continued to the gate.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AFTER TKOF SF340 FLT CREW RECEIVES UNSAFE UP INDICATION ON THE LANDING GEAR. QRH PROCEDURES ARE COMPLIED WITH; THE GEAR EXTENDS NORMALLY; AND AN UNEVENTFUL LANDING ENSUES.

Narrative: AFTER DEP; THE FO BEGAN THE AFTER TKOF FLOW CHKLIST. SUBSEQUENTLY PLACING THE LNDG GEAR IN THE 'UP' POS. SHORTLY THEREAFTER; I HEARD THE HYD PUMP CONTINUE TO RUN; INDICATING THAT THE LNDG GEAR WAS NOT COMPLETELY RETRACTED. I CONFIRMED THIS BY LOOKING AT THE IN-TRANSIT LIGHT AND OBSERVING THAT IT WAS STILL ILLUMINATED. AT THIS POINT IN TIME; THE FO MOTIONED TOWARD THE GEAR HANDLE; TO INFORM ME OF OUR SIT. I TOLD HIM TO KEEP DOING HIS FLOW CHKLIST AND RADIO CALLS; AND I WILL CONTINUE CLBING TO OUR ASSIGNED DEP ALT (ESSENTIALLY; CONTINUING TO FLY NORMALLY); EXCEPT THAT I DID NOT ACCELERATE TO 160 KTS. AT THE MSA; I CONTINUED TO CLB OUT AT 150 KTS; NOT KNOWING THE LNDG GEAR'S TRUE LOCATION. ONCE WE LEVELED OFF AT OUR ASSIGNED ALT; WE COMPLETED A POSITIVE XFER OF CTLS AND THE FO BEGAN TO FLY THE ACFT. MEANWHILE; THE HYD PUMP CONTINUED TO RUN AND THE IN-TRANSIT LIGHT STAYED ILLUMINATED. ADDITIONALLY; I INFORMED ATC THAT WE HAD A LNDG GEAR INDICATION PROB AND I WOULD UPDATE HIM MOMENTARILY; THAT WE NEEDED DELAY VECTORS WHILE WE WORKED THE ISSUE AND THAT WE WOULD BE RESTRICTING OURSELVES TO 150 KTS FOR THE TIME BEING. I THEN BEGAN THE QRH FOR A LNDG GEAR UP UNSAFE INDICATION. ONE OF THE PROCS THE QRH DIRECTED US TO COMPLETE IS A 'RECYCLE' OF THE LNDG GEAR. WE FOLLOWED THE GUIDANCE OF THE QRH AND I PLACED THE LNDG GEAR HANDLE IN THE 'DOWN' POS. ONCE THE 3 GREEN DOWN INDICATIONS ILLUMINATED; THE HYD PUMP AND IN-TRANSIT LIGHT TURNED OFF. WITH ALL NORMAL INDICATION; THE QRH ENDED. AFTER COMPLETION OF THE QRH; I CONTACTED DISPATCH TO INFORM THEM OF OUR SIT AND THAT WE WOULD BE RETURNING TO ZZZ SHORTLY. IT WAS AT THIS TIME THAT I BEGAN TO ATTEMPT TO CONTACT MAINT CTL. I INITIALLY CALLED MAINT CTL A MINIMUM OF 4 OR 5 TIMES. NONE OF MY ATTEMPTS WERE SUCCESSFUL. FOR THE TIME BEING I GAVE UP ON MAINT CTL TO SPEAK WITH THE FLT ATTENDANT AND TO INFORM THE PAX. OVERALL; THIS TOOK A MINIMUM OF 5 MINS TO COMPLETE. DURING THIS PERIOD OF TIME; MAINT CTL NEVER RETURNED ANY OF MY PREVIOUS CALLS. UPON COMPLETION OF MY BRIEFING TO THE PAX AND FLT ATTENDANT; I TRIED CONTACTING MAINT CTL AGAIN -- THEY STILL DID NOT ANSWER. AFTER THIS ATTEMPT; I CONTACTED DISPATCH (WHO ANSWERED ON THE FIRST CALL) AND ASKED THEM TO GET MAINT FOR ME -- THIS WORKED. I EXPLAINED WHAT HAPPENED; WHAT THE FO AND I DID (IE; QRH) FOLLOWED BY ASKING MAINT IF THEY HAD ANY CONCERNS THAT WE SHOULD BE AWARE OF UPON RETURNING TO ZZZ FOR A PRECAUTIONARY LNDG. MAINT CONFIRMED THAT THEY FELT IT WAS SAFE TO RETURN AND LAND. SUBSEQUENTLY; DISPATCH AND I CONFIRMED THAT WE WERE UNDER OUR MAX LNDG WT; THAT DISPATCH WOULD CONTACT ZZZ TO INFORM THEM WE WERE RETURNING; AND THAT I WOULD CALL BACK ONCE SAFELY ON THE GND. IT WAS AT THIS POINT THAT I INFORMED ATC OF THE EXTENT OF OUR SIT AND THAT WE WOULD BE RETURNING FOR A PRECAUTIONARY LNDG IN ZZZ. FURTHERMORE; I STRESSED TO ATC THAT THE LNDG GEAR WAS DOWN AND LOCKED; THAT WE EXPECTED A NORMAL LNDG; HOWEVER; IF SOMETHING DID GO WRONG UPON TOUCHDOWN; THAT WE WOULD LIKE CFR ON THE SIDE OF THE RWY STANDING BY. ATC COMPLIED; CFR WAS STANDING BY AND WE TURNED ONTO A VECTOR FOR THE ARPT. ONCE THE ACFT STABILIZED ON THE NEW HDG; THE FO AND I AGAIN PERFORMED A POSITIVE EXCHANGE OF CTLS AND I BEGAN TO FLY THE ACFT AGAIN. DURING THE APCH BRIEF; THE FO AND I DISCUSSED POSSIBLE ISSUES THAT COULD ARISE AND WHAT EACH OF US WOULD DO IN THE EVENT THAT THE WORST HAPPENED (IE; GEAR COLLAPSE ON TOUCHDOWN). MOREOVER; WE BRIEFED THE VISUAL APCH; CONTINUED INBOUND TO ZZZ AND LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. UPON CLRING THE RWY; WE CANCELED OUR CFR RESPONSE AND CONTINUED TO THE GATE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.