Narrative:

For the second time I have recently encountered the situation where the cleared route delivered to the crew, by a clearance delivery facility, and the route which the center controller had was not the same. Our originally filed route, which was copied by the crews via the automatic ACARS clearance delivery, was alter rescinded because it infringed on a temporary restr area activated for a planned missile firing. The original cleared route was lost because the departure time of the trip was delayed due to an aircraft change. While preflting the replacement aircraft we again requested our clearance using ACARS. The same clearance information was again received. Since we knew of the NOTAM, we checked with clearance delivery while, taxiing for takeoff, for the possibility of a route change. At first clearance delivery said that there was no change; they quickly corrected this and issued us an entirely different route. That caused further delay and traffic problems as, by now, the flight was at the taxiway entrance to the active runway. Because the new route was much longer, it required an amount of time to rechk the time and fuel figures. As soon as the flight was passed to center after takeoff, the center controller requested our estimate for the over water entry point for the original route. A confirmation of the route was requested and the controller read the original cleared route. We told the controller that was the route we would prefer but not what we had been given by clearance delivery and acknowledged by us. Upon rechking, center confirmed that our correct cleared route was the second one given to us by clearance delivery. This was almost the identical situation to my previous experience where center did not have the new route I had requested and been given by clearance delivery. After takeoff, center indicated they had no knowledge of the new route and that it was not available to us at all. Since it had been filed as a swap route because of thunderstorms, I refused to accept the route center tried to make us use. Only then did they allow that there might have ben a mistake and we were permitted to continue on our requested route. Follow up by my company was inconclusive and was passed off as a singular anomaly which could not really have happened as I had reported. At that time I assumed that it was an uncommon occurrence and accepted some of the answers given. However, since this new occurrence, I feel less confident in the system. If we had become airborne without knowing of the change we would started flown the wrong route or, worse yet, been reclred while airborne and not had enough fuel to safely reach our destination. If we are going to continue to rely on automated systems for actions as critical as route clearance, then there must be improved safeguards developed to prevent these mistakes from happening. In another instance I have been given a clearance for a flight number that had been replaced because of a conflict with another flight. This could result in 2 different aircraft being airborne at the same time with the same call sign in the same center airspace with the same transponder code.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CLRNC DELIVERY AT IAD GAVE TRIP A CLRNC THAT WAS INCORRECT; ARTCC EXPECTED THE ACFT TO FLY A DIFFERENT RTE.

Narrative: FOR THE SECOND TIME I HAVE RECENTLY ENCOUNTERED THE SITUATION WHERE THE CLRED RTE DELIVERED TO THE CREW, BY A CLRNC DELIVERY FACILITY, AND THE RTE WHICH THE CENTER CTLR HAD WAS NOT THE SAME. OUR ORIGINALLY FILED RTE, WHICH WAS COPIED BY THE CREWS VIA THE AUTOMATIC ACARS CLRNC DELIVERY, WAS ALTER RESCINDED BECAUSE IT INFRINGED ON A TEMPORARY RESTR AREA ACTIVATED FOR A PLANNED MISSILE FIRING. THE ORIGINAL CLRED RTE WAS LOST BECAUSE THE DEP TIME OF THE TRIP WAS DELAYED DUE TO AN ACFT CHANGE. WHILE PREFLTING THE REPLACEMENT ACFT WE AGAIN REQUESTED OUR CLRNC USING ACARS. THE SAME CLRNC INFO WAS AGAIN RECEIVED. SINCE WE KNEW OF THE NOTAM, WE CHKED WITH CLRNC DELIVERY WHILE, TAXIING FOR TKOF, FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF A RTE CHANGE. AT FIRST CLRNC DELIVERY SAID THAT THERE WAS NO CHANGE; THEY QUICKLY CORRECTED THIS AND ISSUED US AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT RTE. THAT CAUSED FURTHER DELAY AND TFC PROBLEMS AS, BY NOW, THE FLT WAS AT THE TAXIWAY ENTRANCE TO THE ACTIVE RWY. BECAUSE THE NEW RTE WAS MUCH LONGER, IT REQUIRED AN AMOUNT OF TIME TO RECHK THE TIME AND FUEL FIGURES. AS SOON AS THE FLT WAS PASSED TO CENTER AFTER TKOF, THE CENTER CTLR REQUESTED OUR ESTIMATE FOR THE OVER WATER ENTRY POINT FOR THE ORIGINAL RTE. A CONFIRMATION OF THE RTE WAS REQUESTED AND THE CTLR READ THE ORIGINAL CLRED RTE. WE TOLD THE CTLR THAT WAS THE RTE WE WOULD PREFER BUT NOT WHAT WE HAD BEEN GIVEN BY CLRNC DELIVERY AND ACKNOWLEDGED BY US. UPON RECHKING, CENTER CONFIRMED THAT OUR CORRECT CLRED RTE WAS THE SECOND ONE GIVEN TO US BY CLRNC DELIVERY. THIS WAS ALMOST THE IDENTICAL SITUATION TO MY PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE WHERE CENTER DID NOT HAVE THE NEW RTE I HAD REQUESTED AND BEEN GIVEN BY CLRNC DELIVERY. AFTER TKOF, CENTER INDICATED THEY HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE NEW RTE AND THAT IT WAS NOT AVAILABLE TO US AT ALL. SINCE IT HAD BEEN FILED AS A SWAP RTE BECAUSE OF TSTMS, I REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE RTE CENTER TRIED TO MAKE US USE. ONLY THEN DID THEY ALLOW THAT THERE MIGHT HAVE BEN A MISTAKE AND WE WERE PERMITTED TO CONTINUE ON OUR REQUESTED RTE. FOLLOW UP BY MY COMPANY WAS INCONCLUSIVE AND WAS PASSED OFF AS A SINGULAR ANOMALY WHICH COULD NOT REALLY HAVE HAPPENED AS I HAD RPTED. AT THAT TIME I ASSUMED THAT IT WAS AN UNCOMMON OCCURRENCE AND ACCEPTED SOME OF THE ANSWERS GIVEN. HOWEVER, SINCE THIS NEW OCCURRENCE, I FEEL LESS CONFIDENT IN THE SYS. IF WE HAD BECOME AIRBORNE WITHOUT KNOWING OF THE CHANGE WE WOULD STARTED FLOWN THE WRONG RTE OR, WORSE YET, BEEN RECLRED WHILE AIRBORNE AND NOT HAD ENOUGH FUEL TO SAFELY REACH OUR DEST. IF WE ARE GOING TO CONTINUE TO RELY ON AUTOMATED SYSTEMS FOR ACTIONS AS CRITICAL AS RTE CLRNC, THEN THERE MUST BE IMPROVED SAFEGUARDS DEVELOPED TO PREVENT THESE MISTAKES FROM HAPPENING. IN ANOTHER INSTANCE I HAVE BEEN GIVEN A CLRNC FOR A FLT NUMBER THAT HAD BEEN REPLACED BECAUSE OF A CONFLICT WITH ANOTHER FLT. THIS COULD RESULT IN 2 DIFFERENT ACFT BEING AIRBORNE AT THE SAME TIME WITH THE SAME CALL SIGN IN THE SAME CENTER AIRSPACE WITH THE SAME TRANSPONDER CODE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.