Narrative:

Approximately 110 NM southeast of ord, ATC commenced our descent with the knox 1 arrival. Anticipating the crossing and speed restrictions at halie intersection the FMS was programmed for a knox VOR crossing of 16000 ft and a halie intersection crossing of 11000 ft and 250 KIAS. Ultimately, the knox crossing was removed as further clearance removed its applicability. ATC issued clearance to maintain 300 KIAS which was accomplished to within approximately 5 NM of halie at which point the aircraft was slowed to 250 KIAS. This speed was maintained crossing halie and until handoff to ord approach control. Passing halie the controller inquired as to our speed and I replied '250 KTS.' the controller stated, 'weren't you given 300 KIAS to maintain.' I replied, 'we slowed for the halie intersection speed restriction.' nothing more was said until the controller handed us off to ord approach control with the parting comment of 'thanks for the help.' this comment caused this report to be filed, after some internal soul- searching, inasmuch as there appeared to be some question in the mind of the controller as to the circumstances surrounding the speed change. On initial contact with ord approach we were slowed to 210 KIAS and continued to land uneventfully on runway 27L. It is unknown whether, in fact, ATC had a problem with the speed reduction or not. There appeared to be some concern, but not dynamically stated. However, on reflection, it appeared that there might be several concerns arising out of this incident. First, the 'glass cockpit' environment is pushing more and more toward automating the entire flight and the crews are to a greater or lesser extent being lulled into an operational complacency. Had we not programmed the FMS the chances of the speed reduction occurring would no doubt have been reduced without someone questioning what was going on. This dependence on automation does 2 things: 1) it develops a false sense of operational reliance on the equipment to do the job, and 2) it reduces situational awareness owing to comfort with 1) above. Second, those crews operating a 'glass cockpit' almost invariably want to utilize the new equipment to its fullest and to become that much more comfortable with the new devices and techniques. Consequently, if the crew programs the FMS to carry out restrictions contained in an arrival procedure, as an example, the rote carrying out of this procedure by the computer may draw the crew into inadvertent deviations from prior clrncs. Thirdly, it is possible that the portrayal on arrival and approach procedures of 'expect clearance to cross' procedures may further draw the 'glass' crewmember into the trap. Perhaps, a different method of providing the crews with operational potentials would be appropriate. The restrictions appearing alongside the route may be inappropriate and some attention should be given to placing informational data elsewhere on the chart.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG SPD DEV. FMS PROGRAMMING CONTRIBUTED TO THE ERROR.

Narrative: APPROX 110 NM SE OF ORD, ATC COMMENCED OUR DSCNT WITH THE KNOX 1 ARR. ANTICIPATING THE XING AND SPD RESTRICTIONS AT HALIE INTXN THE FMS WAS PROGRAMMED FOR A KNOX VOR XING OF 16000 FT AND A HALIE INTXN XING OF 11000 FT AND 250 KIAS. ULTIMATELY, THE KNOX XING WAS REMOVED AS FURTHER CLRNC REMOVED ITS APPLICABILITY. ATC ISSUED CLRNC TO MAINTAIN 300 KIAS WHICH WAS ACCOMPLISHED TO WITHIN APPROX 5 NM OF HALIE AT WHICH POINT THE ACFT WAS SLOWED TO 250 KIAS. THIS SPD WAS MAINTAINED XING HALIE AND UNTIL HDOF TO ORD APCH CTL. PASSING HALIE THE CTLR INQUIRED AS TO OUR SPD AND I REPLIED '250 KTS.' THE CTLR STATED, 'WEREN'T YOU GIVEN 300 KIAS TO MAINTAIN.' I REPLIED, 'WE SLOWED FOR THE HALIE INTXN SPD RESTRICTION.' NOTHING MORE WAS SAID UNTIL THE CTLR HANDED US OFF TO ORD APCH CTL WITH THE PARTING COMMENT OF 'THANKS FOR THE HELP.' THIS COMMENT CAUSED THIS RPT TO BE FILED, AFTER SOME INTERNAL SOUL- SEARCHING, INASMUCH AS THERE APPEARED TO BE SOME QUESTION IN THE MIND OF THE CTLR AS TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE SPD CHANGE. ON INITIAL CONTACT WITH ORD APCH WE WERE SLOWED TO 210 KIAS AND CONTINUED TO LAND UNEVENTFULLY ON RWY 27L. IT IS UNKNOWN WHETHER, IN FACT, ATC HAD A PROBLEM WITH THE SPD REDUCTION OR NOT. THERE APPEARED TO BE SOME CONCERN, BUT NOT DYNAMICALLY STATED. HOWEVER, ON REFLECTION, IT APPEARED THAT THERE MIGHT BE SEVERAL CONCERNS ARISING OUT OF THIS INCIDENT. FIRST, THE 'GLASS COCKPIT' ENVIRONMENT IS PUSHING MORE AND MORE TOWARD AUTOMATING THE ENTIRE FLT AND THE CREWS ARE TO A GREATER OR LESSER EXTENT BEING LULLED INTO AN OPERATIONAL COMPLACENCY. HAD WE NOT PROGRAMMED THE FMS THE CHANCES OF THE SPD REDUCTION OCCURRING WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE BEEN REDUCED WITHOUT SOMEONE QUESTIONING WHAT WAS GOING ON. THIS DEPENDENCE ON AUTOMATION DOES 2 THINGS: 1) IT DEVELOPS A FALSE SENSE OF OPERATIONAL RELIANCE ON THE EQUIP TO DO THE JOB, AND 2) IT REDUCES SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OWING TO COMFORT WITH 1) ABOVE. SECOND, THOSE CREWS OPERATING A 'GLASS COCKPIT' ALMOST INVARIABLY WANT TO UTILIZE THE NEW EQUIP TO ITS FULLEST AND TO BECOME THAT MUCH MORE COMFORTABLE WITH THE NEW DEVICES AND TECHNIQUES. CONSEQUENTLY, IF THE CREW PROGRAMS THE FMS TO CARRY OUT RESTRICTIONS CONTAINED IN AN ARR PROC, AS AN EXAMPLE, THE ROTE CARRYING OUT OF THIS PROC BY THE COMPUTER MAY DRAW THE CREW INTO INADVERTENT DEVS FROM PRIOR CLRNCS. THIRDLY, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE PORTRAYAL ON ARR AND APCH PROCS OF 'EXPECT CLRNC TO CROSS' PROCS MAY FURTHER DRAW THE 'GLASS' CREWMEMBER INTO THE TRAP. PERHAPS, A DIFFERENT METHOD OF PROVIDING THE CREWS WITH OPERATIONAL POTENTIALS WOULD BE APPROPRIATE. THE RESTRICTIONS APPEARING ALONGSIDE THE RTE MAY BE INAPPROPRIATE AND SOME ATTN SHOULD BE GIVEN TO PLACING INFORMATIONAL DATA ELSEWHERE ON THE CHART.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.