Narrative:

On an extended final captain selected gear down and called for landing final items. Simultaneously the captain and I noticed the aircraft only indicated 2 main gear greens, no nose green, and the handle remained illuminated. The captain and I discussed our situation and agreed that all cockpit warnings indicated the nose gear was possibly not in a down and locked position. The captain asked the tower for a low approach over 13, and give us a visual indication of our gear. During the low approach the tower advised us that the nose gear was down and out of the well, but was unable to determine if it was in the 'locked' position. To be safe we would have to assume that the nose gear could collapse when weight is placed on it. We decided to return to tampa for numerous safety reasons. En route to tampa the captain slowed the aircraft and selected gear down. We then proceeded through a manual gear extension checklist, an another try to lock the nose gear. The procedure produced the same results. While holding captain briefed me on each crew member's responsibilities for preparing the aircraft, cabin, and passengers for the emergency landing nd evacuate/evacuation, if needed. The captain and I discussed and agreed to shut down the engines prior to touchdown, to lessen the likelihood of fire. When time permitted in holding I went into the cabin and prepared the passengers by: moving them to row 6 exits. Briefed them how to open the exits. Stow any articles under the seats. Review emergency card. Demonstrated and assume the crash position, on my command. Evacuate/evacuation after the plane stops and on the captain or my command, if needed. The captain circled left for a downwind to 27. Within gliding distance of the runway he shut down the right engine. He continued for a high final approach at which time I told the passengers to assume the crash position. Over the runway the captain shut down the left engine. He made a normal landing and held off the nose gear for as long as practical. As the nose gear touched the pavement we received a green nose gear light, and the handle light extinguished . The captain restarted the engines and taxied to the gate and deplaned the passengers. We then taxied to the hangar 1, and released the aircraft to maintenance to determine the problem. They determined that a down and lock switch was faulty.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: UPON GEAR EXTENSION, HAD GEAR UNSAFE LIGHT FOR NOSE WHEEL. RETURNED TO TPA FOR LNDG AT MAINT BASE. UPON LNDG GEAR UNSAFE LIGHT WENT OUT.

Narrative: ON AN EXTENDED FINAL CAPT SELECTED GEAR DOWN AND CALLED FOR LNDG FINAL ITEMS. SIMULTANEOUSLY THE CAPT AND I NOTICED THE ACFT ONLY INDICATED 2 MAIN GEAR GREENS, NO NOSE GREEN, AND THE HANDLE REMAINED ILLUMINATED. THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED OUR SITUATION AND AGREED THAT ALL COCKPIT WARNINGS INDICATED THE NOSE GEAR WAS POSSIBLY NOT IN A DOWN AND LOCKED POS. THE CAPT ASKED THE TWR FOR A LOW APCH OVER 13, AND GIVE US A VISUAL INDICATION OF OUR GEAR. DURING THE LOW APCH THE TWR ADVISED US THAT THE NOSE GEAR WAS DOWN AND OUT OF THE WELL, BUT WAS UNABLE TO DETERMINE IF IT WAS IN THE 'LOCKED' POS. TO BE SAFE WE WOULD HAVE TO ASSUME THAT THE NOSE GEAR COULD COLLAPSE WHEN WT IS PLACED ON IT. WE DECIDED TO RETURN TO TAMPA FOR NUMEROUS SAFETY REASONS. ENRTE TO TAMPA THE CAPT SLOWED THE ACFT AND SELECTED GEAR DOWN. WE THEN PROCEEDED THROUGH A MANUAL GEAR EXTENSION CHKLIST, AN ANOTHER TRY TO LOCK THE NOSE GEAR. THE PROC PRODUCED THE SAME RESULTS. WHILE HOLDING CAPT BRIEFED ME ON EACH CREW MEMBER'S RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PREPARING THE ACFT, CABIN, AND PAXS FOR THE EMER LNDG ND EVAC, IF NEEDED. THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED AND AGREED TO SHUT DOWN THE ENGS PRIOR TO TOUCHDOWN, TO LESSEN THE LIKELIHOOD OF FIRE. WHEN TIME PERMITTED IN HOLDING I WENT INTO THE CABIN AND PREPARED THE PAXS BY: MOVING THEM TO ROW 6 EXITS. BRIEFED THEM HOW TO OPEN THE EXITS. STOW ANY ARTICLES UNDER THE SEATS. REVIEW EMER CARD. DEMONSTRATED AND ASSUME THE CRASH POS, ON MY COMMAND. EVAC AFTER THE PLANE STOPS AND ON THE CAPT OR MY COMMAND, IF NEEDED. THE CAPT CIRCLED L FOR A DOWNWIND TO 27. WITHIN GLIDING DISTANCE OF THE RWY HE SHUT DOWN THE R ENG. HE CONTINUED FOR A HIGH FINAL APCH AT WHICH TIME I TOLD THE PAXS TO ASSUME THE CRASH POS. OVER THE RWY THE CAPT SHUT DOWN THE L ENG. HE MADE A NORMAL LNDG AND HELD OFF THE NOSE GEAR FOR AS LONG AS PRACTICAL. AS THE NOSE GEAR TOUCHED THE PAVEMENT WE RECEIVED A GREEN NOSE GEAR LIGHT, AND THE HANDLE LIGHT EXTINGUISHED . THE CAPT RESTARTED THE ENGS AND TAXIED TO THE GATE AND DEPLANED THE PAXS. WE THEN TAXIED TO THE HANGAR 1, AND RELEASED THE ACFT TO MAINT TO DETERMINE THE PROBLEM. THEY DETERMINED THAT A DOWN AND LOCK SWITCH WAS FAULTY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.