Narrative:

The event took place in phx on jan/xx/92. We were given a takeoff clearance on runway 8L. Phx north tower said that there was traffic departing runway 8R and report it in sight. We reported the traffic in sight shortly after takeoff. ATC told us to maintain visual separation from that traffic. The first restriction in the paso 6 departure was to cross the 4 DME of salt river at or below 3000. Our clearance was to maintain 8000. The normal procedure is to climb to 1000 ft AGL at V2 plus 10 KTS then clean up and climb out at 0 flap maneuver to 3000 ft AGL. On this day, we (air carrier X) had all the seats full, the takeoff weight was 292000 and our 0 flap maneuver was 230 KTS. ATC told us our speed was 30 KTS faster than air carrier Y. (We didn't know the significance of what he was trying to tell us at the time although now with 20/20 hind sight I know he wanted us to follow air carrier Y.) we were just told to maintain visual. (We should have asked then and there what is air carrier Y going to do. The contributing factor here is we did not hear his clearance on the south tower frequency.) we didn't know that air carrier Y was not advised of our parallel departure when he was cleared for takeoff on runway 8R. The paso 6 departure, the one we were cleared on, is an 080 heading to 1 DME. We didn't know what air carrier Y was flying. At approximately 2.6 DME point, air carrier Y, of which I have visually at about 2-3 mi at my 1 O'clock position, makes a sharp left turn (which I later concluded was his on course heading of 330 from looking at the other sids). That is going from my 1 O'clock at 2-3 mi into a 100 degree heading change across my flight path. Our horizontal separation closed rapidly with him unaware of our presence he went at a maximum rate turn. To maintain my present horizontal separation and visual contact I turned with him, thinking he was making a minor course correction. The smaller and lighter aircraft was quickly out turning us. At this time we were forced to take evasive action, i.e., a descent to increase our vertical separation and avoid air carrier Y. No unusual attitudes or G forces were required. The lack of communication of what was going to happen. I know now what the controller was intending but not at the time. I think we should have been given a vertical separation at least in this instance or told he is turning left to a 330 heading you go to the right of him. It was what I call an implied clearance. Supplemental information from acn 198033: the traffic off runway 8R was on a different tower radio frequency so we had not heard his departure instructions nor were we aware of which SID he would be flying. Tower handed us off to departure control without telling us which way (left or right) or when air carrier Y ahead would be turning to on course. Air carrier Y was never advised of our almost simultaneous departure on 8L. Our SID (payso 6) required 080 degree heading until 1 DME (inbound) to srp VOR. At approximately 2.6 DME (inbound) air carrier Y began a hard and tight left turn directly into our flight path. Our closure rate with air carrier Y grew very rapidly. We started a left turn to avoid air carrier Y. We were unable to out turn him to the left and we were forced to make a rapid descent to let him pass overhead. Supplemental information from acn 198152: on takeoff from phoenix runway 8R on drake departure we were turned left in front of departing traffic on 8L. We simply got a heading change instruction -- not 'watch for traffic off of 8L' like they usually do. I did not clear left real good and when I heard phx departure tell an aircraft to 'go behind him', I looked out my left window and there was air carrier X coming right at me in a left turn (like he was trying to avoid me) and going right under my aircraft -- cleared by 200-300 ft below. It scared me it was so close. I told phx departure it was a 'near midair' and continued on with flight to seattle. I'm surprised it didn't show up to the controller on radar what was happening, whether he was distracted or what. I think by telling us both what was planned would have avoided surprise by both aircraft and we wouldn't have come so close.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TWR IMPROPERLY APPLIED VISUAL SEPARATION ACR X HAD NMAC LTSS FROM ACR Y. EVASIVE ACTION TAKEN. SYS ERROR.

Narrative: THE EVENT TOOK PLACE IN PHX ON JAN/XX/92. WE WERE GIVEN A TKOF CLRNC ON RWY 8L. PHX N TWR SAID THAT THERE WAS TFC DEPARTING RWY 8R AND RPT IT IN SIGHT. WE RPTED THE TFC IN SIGHT SHORTLY AFTER TKOF. ATC TOLD US TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION FROM THAT TFC. THE FIRST RESTRICTION IN THE PASO 6 DEP WAS TO CROSS THE 4 DME OF SALT RIVER AT OR BELOW 3000. OUR CLRNC WAS TO MAINTAIN 8000. THE NORMAL PROC IS TO CLB TO 1000 FT AGL AT V2 PLUS 10 KTS THEN CLEAN UP AND CLB OUT AT 0 FLAP MANEUVER TO 3000 FT AGL. ON THIS DAY, WE (ACR X) HAD ALL THE SEATS FULL, THE TKOF WT WAS 292000 AND OUR 0 FLAP MANEUVER WAS 230 KTS. ATC TOLD US OUR SPD WAS 30 KTS FASTER THAN ACR Y. (WE DIDN'T KNOW THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WHAT HE WAS TRYING TO TELL US AT THE TIME ALTHOUGH NOW WITH 20/20 HIND SIGHT I KNOW HE WANTED US TO FOLLOW ACR Y.) WE WERE JUST TOLD TO MAINTAIN VISUAL. (WE SHOULD HAVE ASKED THEN AND THERE WHAT IS ACR Y GOING TO DO. THE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR HERE IS WE DID NOT HEAR HIS CLRNC ON THE S TWR FREQ.) WE DIDN'T KNOW THAT ACR Y WAS NOT ADVISED OF OUR PARALLEL DEP WHEN HE WAS CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 8R. THE PASO 6 DEP, THE ONE WE WERE CLRED ON, IS AN 080 HDG TO 1 DME. WE DIDN'T KNOW WHAT ACR Y WAS FLYING. AT APPROX 2.6 DME POINT, ACR Y, OF WHICH I HAVE VISUALLY AT ABOUT 2-3 MI AT MY 1 O'CLOCK POS, MAKES A SHARP L TURN (WHICH I LATER CONCLUDED WAS HIS ON COURSE HDG OF 330 FROM LOOKING AT THE OTHER SIDS). THAT IS GOING FROM MY 1 O'CLOCK AT 2-3 MI INTO A 100 DEG HDG CHANGE ACROSS MY FLT PATH. OUR HORIZ SEPARATION CLOSED RAPIDLY WITH HIM UNAWARE OF OUR PRESENCE HE WENT AT A MAX RATE TURN. TO MAINTAIN MY PRESENT HORIZ SEPARATION AND VISUAL CONTACT I TURNED WITH HIM, THINKING HE WAS MAKING A MINOR COURSE CORRECTION. THE SMALLER AND LIGHTER ACFT WAS QUICKLY OUT TURNING US. AT THIS TIME WE WERE FORCED TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION, I.E., A DSCNT TO INCREASE OUR VERT SEPARATION AND AVOID ACR Y. NO UNUSUAL ATTITUDES OR G FORCES WERE REQUIRED. THE LACK OF COM OF WHAT WAS GOING TO HAPPEN. I KNOW NOW WHAT THE CTLR WAS INTENDING BUT NOT AT THE TIME. I THINK WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN A VERT SEPARATION AT LEAST IN THIS INSTANCE OR TOLD HE IS TURNING L TO A 330 HDG YOU GO TO THE R OF HIM. IT WAS WHAT I CALL AN IMPLIED CLRNC. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 198033: THE TFC OFF RWY 8R WAS ON A DIFFERENT TWR RADIO FREQ SO WE HAD NOT HEARD HIS DEP INSTRUCTIONS NOR WERE WE AWARE OF WHICH SID HE WOULD BE FLYING. TWR HANDED US OFF TO DEP CTL WITHOUT TELLING US WHICH WAY (L OR R) OR WHEN ACR Y AHEAD WOULD BE TURNING TO ON COURSE. ACR Y WAS NEVER ADVISED OF OUR ALMOST SIMULTANEOUS DEP ON 8L. OUR SID (PAYSO 6) REQUIRED 080 DEG HDG UNTIL 1 DME (INBOUND) TO SRP VOR. AT APPROX 2.6 DME (INBOUND) ACR Y BEGAN A HARD AND TIGHT L TURN DIRECTLY INTO OUR FLT PATH. OUR CLOSURE RATE WITH ACR Y GREW VERY RAPIDLY. WE STARTED A L TURN TO AVOID ACR Y. WE WERE UNABLE TO OUT TURN HIM TO THE L AND WE WERE FORCED TO MAKE A RAPID DSCNT TO LET HIM PASS OVERHEAD. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 198152: ON TKOF FROM PHOENIX RWY 8R ON DRAKE DEP WE WERE TURNED L IN FRONT OF DEPARTING TFC ON 8L. WE SIMPLY GOT A HDG CHANGE INSTRUCTION -- NOT 'WATCH FOR TFC OFF OF 8L' LIKE THEY USUALLY DO. I DID NOT CLR L REAL GOOD AND WHEN I HEARD PHX DEP TELL AN ACFT TO 'GO BEHIND HIM', I LOOKED OUT MY L WINDOW AND THERE WAS ACR X COMING RIGHT AT ME IN A L TURN (LIKE HE WAS TRYING TO AVOID ME) AND GOING RIGHT UNDER MY ACFT -- CLRED BY 200-300 FT BELOW. IT SCARED ME IT WAS SO CLOSE. I TOLD PHX DEP IT WAS A 'NEAR MIDAIR' AND CONTINUED ON WITH FLT TO SEATTLE. I'M SURPRISED IT DIDN'T SHOW UP TO THE CTLR ON RADAR WHAT WAS HAPPENING, WHETHER HE WAS DISTRACTED OR WHAT. I THINK BY TELLING US BOTH WHAT WAS PLANNED WOULD HAVE AVOIDED SURPRISE BY BOTH ACFT AND WE WOULDN'T HAVE COME SO CLOSE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.