Narrative:

While on a right downwind leg, abeam memphis airport at 3000 ft MSL, we were cleared for a visual approach to runway 36R. We were #2 behind a company widebody transport. We turned right base for runway 36R approximately abeam elvis LOM and started our descent. We continued our turn toward the 36R final. In the turn memphis tower advised us of twin small transport traffic at 12 O'clock for 36L. We advised the tower we did not see the traffic. The first officer continued the descent but elected to angle more toward the runway end to join the 36R centerline later in the approach to avoid any possible conflict with the traffic since we still did not have the twin small transport in sight. By 1700 ft MSL our aircraft was in the landing confign with all external lights on. The so was reading the before landing checklist and I was responding. Between 800 and 1000 ft AGL, just as we were nearly established on the 36R centerline, the small transport came into view flying directly towards our flight path, at our altitude and on a direct collision course. The first officer saw the aircraft first since the so and I were doing the checklist. All of us (the 3 crew members and a jump seating captain) had been actively looking for this traffic because none of us ever saw him. The small transport had flown very far through the 36L centerline and was making no apparent corrections away from us; the first officer took immediate evasive action that included a sharp right turn and a slight climb away from the traffic. The tower advised the small transport that he had flown through the 36L centerline. When the small transport was flying back to 36L we turned back to 36R final and landed uneventfully. Observations: none of us saw that the small transport had any landing lights on until he was very close to us. I suspect that we actually first saw him when he turned them on or possibly we could not see them because of our relative positions. No strobe lights were on that we saw (if this aircraft even had them). His navigation lights were on, but given our closure rate and the surrounding backgnd lights we did not see them until he turned his landing lights on. I estimate that we had less then 1500 ft horizontal separation and at the same altitude when we took our evasive action. The small transport was flying at a very high airspeed. After we were both established on final for our respective runways, the small transport appeared to match our ground speed or perhaps even exceed it. We were flying at approximately 135 KIAS. We all noticed this and after we found out this was an small transport X I was extremely surprised. I have a great deal of time flying X model and the normal approach speed is 95 KIAS at maximum allowable gross weight (as per the aircraft flight manual). Post flight: after landing I called the tower. We spoke to a controller who I believe was working the east approach control position at the time of the incident. She said the small transport pilot told the tower controller that he had us in sight. She also told us that she observed him (on radar) fly well through the 36L extended centerline. She declined to speculate as to how close we came but she indicated that she was concerned. She even called and made a comment to the tower controller when she observed the small transport course deviation. From all conversations I heard on the radio during this approach I believe the controllers acted appropriately. I suspect that the small transport either confused his runway assignment, confused the actual runways or misjudged his ground speed and flew through his final due to very excessive approach speeds. Also, by not having all of his available lights on in the airport environment it made it nearly impossible for us to see him.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR HAS CONFLICT WITH SMT ASSIGNED TO PARALLEL RWY.

Narrative: WHILE ON A R DOWNWIND LEG, ABEAM MEMPHIS ARPT AT 3000 FT MSL, WE WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 36R. WE WERE #2 BEHIND A COMPANY WDB. WE TURNED R BASE FOR RWY 36R APPROX ABEAM ELVIS LOM AND STARTED OUR DSCNT. WE CONTINUED OUR TURN TOWARD THE 36R FINAL. IN THE TURN MEMPHIS TWR ADVISED US OF TWIN SMT TFC AT 12 O'CLOCK FOR 36L. WE ADVISED THE TWR WE DID NOT SEE THE TFC. THE FO CONTINUED THE DSCNT BUT ELECTED TO ANGLE MORE TOWARD THE RWY END TO JOIN THE 36R CTRLINE LATER IN THE APCH TO AVOID ANY POSSIBLE CONFLICT WITH THE TFC SINCE WE STILL DID NOT HAVE THE TWIN SMT IN SIGHT. BY 1700 FT MSL OUR ACFT WAS IN THE LNDG CONFIGN WITH ALL EXTERNAL LIGHTS ON. THE SO WAS READING THE BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST AND I WAS RESPONDING. BTWN 800 AND 1000 FT AGL, JUST AS WE WERE NEARLY ESTABLISHED ON THE 36R CTRLINE, THE SMT CAME INTO VIEW FLYING DIRECTLY TOWARDS OUR FLT PATH, AT OUR ALT AND ON A DIRECT COLLISION COURSE. THE FO SAW THE ACFT FIRST SINCE THE SO AND I WERE DOING THE CHKLIST. ALL OF US (THE 3 CREW MEMBERS AND A JUMP SEATING CAPT) HAD BEEN ACTIVELY LOOKING FOR THIS TFC BECAUSE NONE OF US EVER SAW HIM. THE SMT HAD FLOWN VERY FAR THROUGH THE 36L CTRLINE AND WAS MAKING NO APPARENT CORRECTIONS AWAY FROM US; THE FO TOOK IMMEDIATE EVASIVE ACTION THAT INCLUDED A SHARP R TURN AND A SLIGHT CLB AWAY FROM THE TFC. THE TWR ADVISED THE SMT THAT HE HAD FLOWN THROUGH THE 36L CTRLINE. WHEN THE SMT WAS FLYING BACK TO 36L WE TURNED BACK TO 36R FINAL AND LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. OBSERVATIONS: NONE OF US SAW THAT THE SMT HAD ANY LNDG LIGHTS ON UNTIL HE WAS VERY CLOSE TO US. I SUSPECT THAT WE ACTUALLY FIRST SAW HIM WHEN HE TURNED THEM ON OR POSSIBLY WE COULD NOT SEE THEM BECAUSE OF OUR RELATIVE POSITIONS. NO STROBE LIGHTS WERE ON THAT WE SAW (IF THIS ACFT EVEN HAD THEM). HIS NAV LIGHTS WERE ON, BUT GIVEN OUR CLOSURE RATE AND THE SURROUNDING BACKGND LIGHTS WE DID NOT SEE THEM UNTIL HE TURNED HIS LNDG LIGHTS ON. I ESTIMATE THAT WE HAD LESS THEN 1500 FT HORIZ SEPARATION AND AT THE SAME ALT WHEN WE TOOK OUR EVASIVE ACTION. THE SMT WAS FLYING AT A VERY HIGH AIRSPD. AFTER WE WERE BOTH ESTABLISHED ON FINAL FOR OUR RESPECTIVE RWYS, THE SMT APPEARED TO MATCH OUR GND SPD OR PERHAPS EVEN EXCEED IT. WE WERE FLYING AT APPROX 135 KIAS. WE ALL NOTICED THIS AND AFTER WE FOUND OUT THIS WAS AN SMT X I WAS EXTREMELY SURPRISED. I HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF TIME FLYING X MODEL AND THE NORMAL APCH SPD IS 95 KIAS AT MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE GROSS WT (AS PER THE ACFT FLT MANUAL). POST FLT: AFTER LNDG I CALLED THE TWR. WE SPOKE TO A CTLR WHO I BELIEVE WAS WORKING THE E APCH CTL POS AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT. SHE SAID THE SMT PLT TOLD THE TWR CTLR THAT HE HAD US IN SIGHT. SHE ALSO TOLD US THAT SHE OBSERVED HIM (ON RADAR) FLY WELL THROUGH THE 36L EXTENDED CTRLINE. SHE DECLINED TO SPECULATE AS TO HOW CLOSE WE CAME BUT SHE INDICATED THAT SHE WAS CONCERNED. SHE EVEN CALLED AND MADE A COMMENT TO THE TWR CTLR WHEN SHE OBSERVED THE SMT COURSE DEV. FROM ALL CONVERSATIONS I HEARD ON THE RADIO DURING THIS APCH I BELIEVE THE CTLRS ACTED APPROPRIATELY. I SUSPECT THAT THE SMT EITHER CONFUSED HIS RWY ASSIGNMENT, CONFUSED THE ACTUAL RWYS OR MISJUDGED HIS GND SPD AND FLEW THROUGH HIS FINAL DUE TO VERY EXCESSIVE APCH SPDS. ALSO, BY NOT HAVING ALL OF HIS AVAILABLE LIGHTS ON IN THE ARPT ENVIRONMENT IT MADE IT NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO SEE HIM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.