Narrative:

Prior to departing I received a complete briefing for the WX on that day from flight service. As part of that briefing I received no NOTAMS concerning the bader filed. I departed with my 2 passenger and flew VFR to bader with philadelphia approach control assistance. Upon arriving at bader I was provided airport advisories on the CTAF frequency and landed on runway 29. After completing my business in atlantic city, I contacted flight service and provided them with an IFR flight plan since I was aware that the WX was deteriorating over the afternoon. When we arrived at the airport the winds had increased and were gusty from the approaching frontal activity. I called atlantic city clearance for my IFR clearance (bader III to intercept V184 woodstown direct). I also requested the winds at atlantic city international which were 220 degrees at 13 KTS. I advised them I would be ready in about 10-15 min and he provided my clearance and I was told to contact him again when ready for departure. The winds at bader were increasing and I remember the winds to be between 210 to 220 degrees at 15 KTS gusting to 18-20 KTS. The logical choice of departure runway was runway 22 because of the winds. As I began my taxi out I called atlantic city clearance and advised him that I would be planning to use runway 22 for departure and that I could not accept the bader ii departure SID because it was not authorized for runway 22 departures. He advised me of the same, saying that due to obstacle clearance runway 22 was not authorized for that SID procedure. Knowing the capabilities of my aircraft and the effect of the wind I knew that I could easily depart and clear any obstacles so I continued for runway 22. He advised me that he did not have any other departure clearance available at which time I then asked him if I could depart VFR from runway 22 and pick up the clearance airborne. He advised me to contact atlantic city approach on 124.6 when airborne. I continued to taxi out and discovered cones blocking the short taxiway from the right side of runway 29 to runway 22. I was unsure why the cones were there and thought that construction work was taking place on that taxiway. There was no NOTAMS to that effect and no other notice in that area that told me otherwise. So I advised traffic on the CTAF that I was back taxiing runway 22. I completed my checklist items and announced departure from runway 22. My ground roll on the small aircraft was relatively short and I was quickly airborne and was already 200-250 ft AGL crossing the end of runway. At this point in time I heard a transmission prior to switching atlantic city departure that exclaimed that the aircraft departing bader field be advised that runway 22 is closed for takeoffs. I contacted atlantic city departure and received my clearance and returned to west chester, PA. I learned from the airport directory that runway 22 at bader field is closed for takeoffs and runway 4 is closed for lndgs. I recognize my mistake in pre-flight planning even though safety, general accepted flying procedures and common sense was used for my decision to use runway 22. At no time was any individual or property at risk. I provide the following comments associated with this occurrence. Constant vigilance in performing pre-flight planning. Better notification of these types of restrictions such as a) signs (lighted at night) for the departure area of runway 22, B) notices inside the FBO, especially on the wall map that existed at bader field, C) permanent NOTAMS listing for runway 22 and runway 4 for their appropriate restrictions. The approach controller could have provided the notification that runway 22 is not authorized for the bader ii SID because that runway is closed for takeoffs. When making the communication calls on the CTAF at bader the unicom personnel that may be monitoring the radio could have informed pilots prior to attempting their takeoff on runway 22 or landing on runway 4. In reviewing my comm approach charts the restrictions for runway 22 and 4 are not noted on their charts. I would consider this an important item and will contact comm chart maker to ask them to add the restrictions to their charts. Based on the WX conditions present, a takeoff on runway 29 could have been dangerous. With a 90 degree direct crosswind of that magnitude you would reach the crosswind limitations of the aircraft and could subject the aircraft and people to hazardous conditions. I would have discontinued the flight at that time and considered waiting a while. Attempt to correct the problems that precludes takeoffs from runway 22 and lndgs on runway 4.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA TKOF ON CLOSED RWY.

Narrative: PRIOR TO DEPARTING I RECEIVED A COMPLETE BRIEFING FOR THE WX ON THAT DAY FROM FLT SERVICE. AS PART OF THAT BRIEFING I RECEIVED NO NOTAMS CONCERNING THE BADER FILED. I DEPARTED WITH MY 2 PAX AND FLEW VFR TO BADER WITH PHILADELPHIA APCH CTL ASSISTANCE. UPON ARRIVING AT BADER I WAS PROVIDED ARPT ADVISORIES ON THE CTAF FREQ AND LANDED ON RWY 29. AFTER COMPLETING MY BUSINESS IN ATLANTIC CITY, I CONTACTED FLT SERVICE AND PROVIDED THEM WITH AN IFR FLT PLAN SINCE I WAS AWARE THAT THE WX WAS DETERIORATING OVER THE AFTERNOON. WHEN WE ARRIVED AT THE ARPT THE WINDS HAD INCREASED AND WERE GUSTY FROM THE APCHING FRONTAL ACTIVITY. I CALLED ATLANTIC CITY CLRNC FOR MY IFR CLRNC (BADER III TO INTERCEPT V184 WOODSTOWN DIRECT). I ALSO REQUESTED THE WINDS AT ATLANTIC CITY INTL WHICH WERE 220 DEGS AT 13 KTS. I ADVISED THEM I WOULD BE READY IN ABOUT 10-15 MIN AND HE PROVIDED MY CLRNC AND I WAS TOLD TO CONTACT HIM AGAIN WHEN READY FOR DEP. THE WINDS AT BADER WERE INCREASING AND I REMEMBER THE WINDS TO BE BTWN 210 TO 220 DEGS AT 15 KTS GUSTING TO 18-20 KTS. THE LOGICAL CHOICE OF DEP RWY WAS RWY 22 BECAUSE OF THE WINDS. AS I BEGAN MY TAXI OUT I CALLED ATLANTIC CITY CLRNC AND ADVISED HIM THAT I WOULD BE PLANNING TO USE RWY 22 FOR DEP AND THAT I COULD NOT ACCEPT THE BADER II DEP SID BECAUSE IT WAS NOT AUTHORIZED FOR RWY 22 DEPS. HE ADVISED ME OF THE SAME, SAYING THAT DUE TO OBSTACLE CLRNC RWY 22 WAS NOT AUTHORIZED FOR THAT SID PROC. KNOWING THE CAPABILITIES OF MY ACFT AND THE EFFECT OF THE WIND I KNEW THAT I COULD EASILY DEPART AND CLR ANY OBSTACLES SO I CONTINUED FOR RWY 22. HE ADVISED ME THAT HE DID NOT HAVE ANY OTHER DEP CLRNC AVAILABLE AT WHICH TIME I THEN ASKED HIM IF I COULD DEPART VFR FROM RWY 22 AND PICK UP THE CLRNC AIRBORNE. HE ADVISED ME TO CONTACT ATLANTIC CITY APCH ON 124.6 WHEN AIRBORNE. I CONTINUED TO TAXI OUT AND DISCOVERED CONES BLOCKING THE SHORT TAXIWAY FROM THE R SIDE OF RWY 29 TO RWY 22. I WAS UNSURE WHY THE CONES WERE THERE AND THOUGHT THAT CONSTRUCTION WORK WAS TAKING PLACE ON THAT TAXIWAY. THERE WAS NO NOTAMS TO THAT EFFECT AND NO OTHER NOTICE IN THAT AREA THAT TOLD ME OTHERWISE. SO I ADVISED TFC ON THE CTAF THAT I WAS BACK TAXIING RWY 22. I COMPLETED MY CHKLIST ITEMS AND ANNOUNCED DEP FROM RWY 22. MY GND ROLL ON THE SMA WAS RELATIVELY SHORT AND I WAS QUICKLY AIRBORNE AND WAS ALREADY 200-250 FT AGL XING THE END OF RWY. AT THIS POINT IN TIME I HEARD A XMISSION PRIOR TO SWITCHING ATLANTIC CITY DEP THAT EXCLAIMED THAT THE ACFT DEPARTING BADER FIELD BE ADVISED THAT RWY 22 IS CLOSED FOR TKOFS. I CONTACTED ATLANTIC CITY DEP AND RECEIVED MY CLRNC AND RETURNED TO W CHESTER, PA. I LEARNED FROM THE ARPT DIRECTORY THAT RWY 22 AT BADER FIELD IS CLOSED FOR TKOFS AND RWY 4 IS CLOSED FOR LNDGS. I RECOGNIZE MY MISTAKE IN PRE-FLT PLANNING EVEN THOUGH SAFETY, GENERAL ACCEPTED FLYING PROCEDURES AND COMMON SENSE WAS USED FOR MY DECISION TO USE RWY 22. AT NO TIME WAS ANY INDIVIDUAL OR PROPERTY AT RISK. I PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS OCCURRENCE. CONSTANT VIGILANCE IN PERFORMING PRE-FLT PLANNING. BETTER NOTIFICATION OF THESE TYPES OF RESTRICTIONS SUCH AS A) SIGNS (LIGHTED AT NIGHT) FOR THE DEP AREA OF RWY 22, B) NOTICES INSIDE THE FBO, ESPECIALLY ON THE WALL MAP THAT EXISTED AT BADER FIELD, C) PERMANENT NOTAMS LISTING FOR RWY 22 AND RWY 4 FOR THEIR APPROPRIATE RESTRICTIONS. THE APCH CTLR COULD HAVE PROVIDED THE NOTIFICATION THAT RWY 22 IS NOT AUTHORIZED FOR THE BADER II SID BECAUSE THAT RWY IS CLOSED FOR TKOFS. WHEN MAKING THE COM CALLS ON THE CTAF AT BADER THE UNICOM PERSONNEL THAT MAY BE MONITORING THE RADIO COULD HAVE INFORMED PLTS PRIOR TO ATTEMPTING THEIR TKOF ON RWY 22 OR LNDG ON RWY 4. IN REVIEWING MY COMM APCH CHARTS THE RESTRICTIONS FOR RWY 22 AND 4 ARE NOT NOTED ON THEIR CHARTS. I WOULD CONSIDER THIS AN IMPORTANT ITEM AND WILL CONTACT COMM CHART MAKER TO ASK THEM TO ADD THE RESTRICTIONS TO THEIR CHARTS. BASED ON THE WX CONDITIONS PRESENT, A TKOF ON RWY 29 COULD HAVE BEEN DANGEROUS. WITH A 90 DEG DIRECT XWIND OF THAT MAGNITUDE YOU WOULD REACH THE XWIND LIMITATIONS OF THE ACFT AND COULD SUBJECT THE ACFT AND PEOPLE TO HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS. I WOULD HAVE DISCONTINUED THE FLT AT THAT TIME AND CONSIDERED WAITING A WHILE. ATTEMPT TO CORRECT THE PROBLEMS THAT PRECLUDES TKOFS FROM RWY 22 AND LNDGS ON RWY 4.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.