Narrative:

I was the PIC and flying the aircraft. We began our descent, what I believed to be about 35 NM from touchdown, a standard distance for operation of the aircraft when cruising about 7000 ft above airfield elevation. We maintained 700-800 FPM rate of descent. I first realized there was a problem when I was turned to a base leg while still well above the GS intercept altitude. I immediately reduced power to min and began an attempt to slow and configure the aircraft. I was unable to stabilize the approach to my company's required parameters by the time we got to 500 ft above mins and initiated the missed approach. Our second approach was successful in locating the airport, although I feel the approach controller was, at a min, sloppy, and possibly in violation of required vectoring parameters on both our approachs. The first officer, who had been flying to the airfield all week, expressed his belief to me that these 'slam dunk -- intercept the course at the marker' approachs are more the norm from south bend approach controllers than the exception. The frustration I feel and the jet fuel that was wasted could both have been spared if the controller had allowed the aircraft to continue its descent to 3000 ft MSL on the downwind leg. I genuinely feel I could have 'saved' the first approach had I been more attentive to my position, but why should I have to go around 'saving' approachs? Pilots -- myself included -- grow to depend on air traffic controllers for adequate vectoring. Shouldn't we be able to?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR CARGO FLT HAS TO GAR DUE TO HIGH VECTORS FOR ILS APCH.

Narrative: I WAS THE PIC AND FLYING THE ACFT. WE BEGAN OUR DSCNT, WHAT I BELIEVED TO BE ABOUT 35 NM FROM TOUCHDOWN, A STANDARD DISTANCE FOR OP OF THE ACFT WHEN CRUISING ABOUT 7000 FT ABOVE AIRFIELD ELEVATION. WE MAINTAINED 700-800 FPM RATE OF DSCNT. I FIRST REALIZED THERE WAS A PROBLEM WHEN I WAS TURNED TO A BASE LEG WHILE STILL WELL ABOVE THE GS INTERCEPT ALT. I IMMEDIATELY REDUCED PWR TO MIN AND BEGAN AN ATTEMPT TO SLOW AND CONFIGURE THE ACFT. I WAS UNABLE TO STABILIZE THE APCH TO MY COMPANY'S REQUIRED PARAMETERS BY THE TIME WE GOT TO 500 FT ABOVE MINS AND INITIATED THE MISSED APCH. OUR SECOND APCH WAS SUCCESSFUL IN LOCATING THE ARPT, ALTHOUGH I FEEL THE APCH CTLR WAS, AT A MIN, SLOPPY, AND POSSIBLY IN VIOLATION OF REQUIRED VECTORING PARAMETERS ON BOTH OUR APCHS. THE FO, WHO HAD BEEN FLYING TO THE AIRFIELD ALL WK, EXPRESSED HIS BELIEF TO ME THAT THESE 'SLAM DUNK -- INTERCEPT THE COURSE AT THE MARKER' APCHS ARE MORE THE NORM FROM S BEND APCH CTLRS THAN THE EXCEPTION. THE FRUSTRATION I FEEL AND THE JET FUEL THAT WAS WASTED COULD BOTH HAVE BEEN SPARED IF THE CTLR HAD ALLOWED THE ACFT TO CONTINUE ITS DSCNT TO 3000 FT MSL ON THE DOWNWIND LEG. I GENUINELY FEEL I COULD HAVE 'SAVED' THE FIRST APCH HAD I BEEN MORE ATTENTIVE TO MY POS, BUT WHY SHOULD I HAVE TO GAR 'SAVING' APCHS? PLTS -- MYSELF INCLUDED -- GROW TO DEPEND ON AIR TFC CTLRS FOR ADEQUATE VECTORING. SHOULDN'T WE BE ABLE TO?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.