Narrative:

The first officer failed to set the flaps to takeoff position. I failed to catch this. The takeoff flap warning sounded as I advanced power for a rolling takeoff. We aborted the takeoff, reconfigured, and taxied around for a normal takeoff. On this flight we had myself, a senior first officer, and an experienced instructor, in the aircraft type, in the jump seat. Shortly after initiating the taxi checklist we had a taxi conflict. Our taxi instructions were 'taxi to runway 14L.' there were no routing instructions given, due to taxiway repair in progress at iah our taxi options were complicated. After turning on taxiway nb, partially closed, en route to ng, then the north ramp, we noticed an large transport headed what seemed to be head on at us turning onto ng from the north ramp. We stopped and called ground control for instructions. We were told to continue as the large transport was going to terminal B and not onto ng. The first officer continued the taxi checklist from the point he had broken it. He skipped the flaps on the checklist when he restarted and due to communications with ground and the flight attendant signal he was ready for takeoff I failed to notice the omission. We should have started the checklist over since we had no method of marking, without doubt, where we stopped. None of the 3 of us noticed the omission, despite strict sterile cockpit procedures during the approximately 15 min taxi and wait for takeoff. Rigid use of proper checklist protocol would have prevented this situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR FLC ABORTS TKOF DUE FLAP WARNING.

Narrative: THE FO FAILED TO SET THE FLAPS TO TKOF POS. I FAILED TO CATCH THIS. THE TKOF FLAP WARNING SOUNDED AS I ADVANCED PWR FOR A ROLLING TKOF. WE ABORTED THE TKOF, RECONFIGURED, AND TAXIED AROUND FOR A NORMAL TKOF. ON THIS FLT WE HAD MYSELF, A SENIOR FO, AND AN EXPERIENCED INSTRUCTOR, IN THE ACFT TYPE, IN THE JUMP SEAT. SHORTLY AFTER INITIATING THE TAXI CHKLIST WE HAD A TAXI CONFLICT. OUR TAXI INSTRUCTIONS WERE 'TAXI TO RWY 14L.' THERE WERE NO RTING INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN, DUE TO TAXIWAY REPAIR IN PROGRESS AT IAH OUR TAXI OPTIONS WERE COMPLICATED. AFTER TURNING ON TAXIWAY NB, PARTIALLY CLOSED, ENRTE TO NG, THEN THE N RAMP, WE NOTICED AN LGT HEADED WHAT SEEMED TO BE HEAD ON AT US TURNING ONTO NG FROM THE N RAMP. WE STOPPED AND CALLED GND CTL FOR INSTRUCTIONS. WE WERE TOLD TO CONTINUE AS THE LGT WAS GOING TO TERMINAL B AND NOT ONTO NG. THE FO CONTINUED THE TAXI CHKLIST FROM THE POINT HE HAD BROKEN IT. HE SKIPPED THE FLAPS ON THE CHKLIST WHEN HE RESTARTED AND DUE TO COMS WITH GND AND THE FLT ATTENDANT SIGNAL HE WAS READY FOR TKOF I FAILED TO NOTICE THE OMISSION. WE SHOULD HAVE STARTED THE CHKLIST OVER SINCE WE HAD NO METHOD OF MARKING, WITHOUT DOUBT, WHERE WE STOPPED. NONE OF THE 3 OF US NOTICED THE OMISSION, DESPITE STRICT STERILE COCKPIT PROCS DURING THE APPROX 15 MIN TAXI AND WAIT FOR TKOF. RIGID USE OF PROPER CHKLIST PROTOCOL WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS SITUATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.